This paper explores the widespread perception of insurers as bad payers, often accused of unjustly rejecting legitimate claims. We explore the mechanisms leading to this negative image by examining the strategic “nitpicking” behaviour of insurers. Such behaviour involves an insurer’s effort to find evidence that can help it cut the indemnities of honest claims. Our findings reveal that this nitpicking behaviour only arises in markets with asymmetric information, where policyholders are unable to observe insurers’ nitpicking strategies. Conversely, in markets with symmetric information, insurers lose the incentive to engage in nitpicking. Moreover, our study highlights that nitpicky behaviour leads to a reduction in welfare and Pareto-inefficiency. This is because nitpicking is essentially an overpriced gam- ble that charges lower premiums from policyholders at a no-loss state, but cuts actual indemnities received by policyholders at a loss state.

Corporate site visits provide investors with opportunities to obtain non-standard, tailored "soft" information about the firm. In this study, we investigate the impact of information disclosed from corporate site visits on stock market stability from the perspective of stock return volatility. Our findings suggest that it is the information disclosed rather than the visits themselves that significantly reduce stock return volatility, primarily by mitigating information asymmetry. Moreover, we observe that the volatility-mitigating effect of site visits is more pronounced when the visit information better aligns with investors' concerns and when it is more effectively disseminated. Our study contributes to the literature by demonstrating that the timely disclosure of site visit details serves as a stabilizing mechanism for stock prices through effective information mining and dissemination.

We develop a signaling game model of investment to explore the effects of ambiguity aversion on corporate equilibrium strategies, investment dynamics, and financing decisions in incomplete markets with asymmetric information. Our analysis shows that volatility ambiguity aversion has a similar but more pronounced effect than asymmetric information, leading to higher financing costs, lower investment probabilities, and a greater likelihood of non-participation in investment. Importantly, volatility ambiguity aversion exhibits an amplifier effect, magnifying financing costs, adverse selection costs, and distortion in investment choices under asymmetric information. This increased ambiguity aversion raises the chances of inefficient separating and pooling equilibria, resulting in notable welfare losses. These findings highlight the significant impact of ambiguity aversion on strategic decision-making and equilibrium outcomes in investment, particularly in settings marked by information asymmetry and incomplete markets.

When examining corporate governance in China, it is crucial to recognize the unique socioeconomicstructures and legal systems at play. The mechanisms of corporate governance theorized in the West might not necessarily have the same impact in China. In particular, given China’s distinct feature of the domestic economy and its socio-political structure, the results of introducing a hostile takeover system might not align with common anticipations that scholars and policymakers in China and elsewhere broadly share. In greater detail, this paper highlights the significant market imperfections in the Chinese economy, stemming from information asymmetry, imperfect product markets, and capital-market inefficiency. These market imperfections suggest that an active hostile takeover regime might not function effectively in China, as its disciplinary mechanism operates successfully in other advanced countries. Additionally, this paper underscores that due to China’s distinctive features—including its state-owned corporate landscape, the dominance of controlling shareholders in private corporations’ ownership structures, and its unique brand of socialism—the introduction of an active takeover regime could produce unintended consequences in the Chinese economy. Overall, challenging the prevailing perspective, I posit that within the Chinese hostile takeover framework, corporate governance is not as influential as one might assume.

We study how bank liberalization affects analyst forecast accuracy using two interest rate deregulations in China—the removal of the cap on bank lending rates in 2004 and the removal of the floor in 2013—as quasi-natural experiments. Our results show that the analyst forecast accuracy for high-risk firms decreases significantly after the removal of the lending rate cap, whereas analyst forecast accuracy for low-risk firms increases significantly after the removal of the lending rate floor. Moreover, interest rate liberalization affects forecast accuracy through operational risk and information asymmetry channels. Furthermore, the impact was concentrated on firms whose actual performance fell short of performance expectations and those that received more bank loans. Our findings imply that interest rate liberalization policies may have unintended consequences for analyst forecasts.

This paper examines the impact of the rating of equity crowdfunding platforms in China on funding campaign success. We gather information from 2014 to 2021 on 583 fund raising campaigns. Our results suggest that campaign success is positively correlated with the reputation of the platforms but especially for the most reputable one. We also show that the level of technological intensity of the industries and services is positively correlated with the amount raised. Overall, our paper suggests that platform ratings provide a valuable signal to investors, especially when projects are risky and when information asymmetry is high.

In this paper, we present an entropy-based approach to measure the asymmetry of stock returns. By applying this approach, we use the Bootstrap method that our asymmetry measure exhibits a significantly enhanced ability to detect asymmetry compared to skewness. Moreover, our empirical findings reveal that stocks characterized by higher upside asymmetries, as determined by our innovative entropy measure, exhibit lower average returns across a crosssection of stocks. This supports the conclusions drawn by Han et al. (2018). In contrast, when employing the three-moment skewness measure, the relationship between asymmetry and stock returns remains inconclusive within the Chinese market.

This study finds that reducing political influence over local courts weakens local government debt capacity. We establish this result by exploiting the staggered roll-out of a judicial centralization reform aimed at alleviating local court capture in China and find reduced judicial favoritism towards local governments post-reform. The majority of local government lawsuits are with contractors over government payment delays. The reform not only increases government lawsuit losses but also exposes their credit risk, as payment delays without court support signal government liquidity constraint. Investors respond by tightening lending and increasing interest rates, which curbs government spending.

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The impact of corporate environment, society, and governance (ESG) disclosure on the online market remains uncertain. To address this ambiguity, this study utilizes text analysis to thematically classify research samples to examine the positive influence of corporate ESG disclosure on stock liquidity from a reputational perspective. Interestingly, the reputational effect of ESG disclosure shows asymmetry within the online market, particularly in its highly information-sensitive environment. Notably, negative media reputation insignificantly diminishes the positive impact of ESG disclosure on stock liquidity. A series of robustness tests confirm the reliability of the sample screening method and findings.