To avoid illiquidity spillovers and basis risk in swaps, interbank lenders are especially cautious about whether interbank borrowers can meet their claims. We examine whether the incentive of interbank lenders to penalize risky borrowers can reduce borrowers' liquidity risk taking. We find that interbank borrowers, especially small and medium banks, manage their liquidity risks more prudently than their counterparts. This phenomenon is especially significant for borrowers with high information asymmetry, low liquidity buffers, and high funding gaps. Our results suggest that interbank exposure reduces the asset, funding, and off‐balance‐sheet liquidity risks of small and medium borrowing banks, and can therefore supplement regulatory liquidity requirements, which target only the largest banks.

The asymmetric dissemination of information among financial firms in the financial market reflects their asymmetric response to the dissemination of both positive and negative information. However, it is worth studying whether this asymmetry will intensify or alleviate under different financial market conditions. Based on high-frequency minute stock price data of Chinese A-share listed financial firms from July 2020 to July 2023, we decompose the good and bad information, as well as the positive and negative volatility information in the return series. We utilize the quantile cross-spectral correlation method to construct an information overflow network at monthly intervals. We use the MVMQ-CAViaR model to estimate the value at risk (VaR) for various quantiles and build a risk spillover network that incorporates both positive and negative tail risk information, using the quantile dynamic SIM-COVAR-TENET model. We calculated the network dissemination efficiency of both good and bad information, including average speed, speed deviation, densest speed, and depth, to explore the changes in the asymmetry of good and bad information dissemination under different financial market conditions. We get that when the financial market is booming, financial firms’ asymmetric response to good and bad information will increase, and the firms will pay more attention to bad information. When the financial market declines, the asymmetric response of financial firms to good and bad information is diminished, and their sensitivity to both positive and negative information is heightened. In addition, the dissemination of bad information by firms in the five sub-financial industries across various markets exacerbates the asymmetric response of other financial firms to good and bad information. More importantly, the release of positive return information, negative volatility information, and highly negative tail risk information by the real estate financial firms all impact the asymmetric response of financial firms to good and bad information in a prosperous financial market. In recessionary financial markets, financial regulators can strategically release positive information to mitigate the decline in the financial market. Conversely, in a booming financial market, financial regulators should be cautious of the negative impact that bad information can have on financial firms, particularly in relation to the excessive growth of the real estate sector and the potential chain reaction of significant adverse events.

We provide firm-level evidence on the real effects of shadow banking in terms of technological innovation. Firm-to-firm entrusted loans, the largest part of the shadow banking sector in China, enhance the borrowers’ innovation output. The effects are more prominent when the borrowers are subject to severer financial constraints, information asymmetry, and takeover exposures. A plausible underlying channel is capital reallocations from less productive but easy-financed lender firms to more innovative but financially less-privileged borrower firms. Our paper suggests that shadow banking helps correct bank credit misallocations and thus serves as a second-best market design in financing the real economy.

Using sample of Chinese listed firms from Q1 2017 to Q4 2022, this article examines the impact of economic policy uncertainty on share repurchases. We find that economic policy uncertainty significantly increases the probability and scale of open market share repurchases. Private enterprises, government-supported enterprises, innovative enterprises, and investment hotspot enterprises repurchased more shares during periods of high economic policy uncertainty. Additionally, the market value of repurchase programs issued during periods of high economic policy uncertainty is larger. We also discover that economic policy uncertainty substantially influences the characteristics, timing, and outcomes of the repurchase programs. Lastly, this article confirms that share repurchase behavior has a similar effect to voluntary disclosures and can alleviate the information asymmetry triggered by economic policy uncertainty. In summary, Chinese listed firms have resorted to more share repurchases during periods of high economic policy uncertainty to convey their actual value and boost investor confidence, aligning with the signaling motive. Open market share repurchases surface as an efficacious instrument to cope with the risk from economic policy uncertainty.

We investigate the relationship between ESG rating divergence and stock returns from an investor’s perspective, to explore the impact of inconsistency among ESG rating agencies on the capital market. We construct ESG rating divergence data using ratings from three prominent ESG rating agencies in China. Our study is based on 54,679 company-quarter observations from 2018 to 2022, which covers 4,377 Chinese listed companies. Our findings demonstrate a significant negative impact of ESG rating divergence on stock returns, which we validate through a series of robustness tests and endogenous analyses. Notably, we find that investors’ expectations mediate the relationship between ESG rating divergence and stock returns. Further analyses show that only the divergence in social ratings have a significant inhibitory effect on stock returns. In addition, ESG rating divergence significantly impedes subsequent average ESG ratings. The adverse relationship between ESG rating divergence and stock returns is particularly pronounced in non-heavy pollution companies, non-state-owned companies, and companies with lower external attention.

We study the role of Chinese government guidance funds (GGFs) in value creation for investee firms. Using a sample of 2,855 firms that went public during the period of 2010-2021, we show that GGF-backed IPO firms had higher initial returns than non-VC-backed IPO firms and nonGGF VC-backed IPO firms. After decomposing the initial return into IPO underpricing and market overvaluation, we find that GGF-backed firms enjoyed higher overvaluation and lower underpricing than other firms. Consistent with investor sentiment and information asymmetry hypothesis, our results indicate that public investors value the benefits of political resources more than the costs of government interference associated with GGF sponsoring. However, GGF-backed firms did not outperform other-VC-backed firms when post-IPO long-term stock, operating and innovation performance is assessed. The divergence in the effects of GGFs observed in the financial and product markets reveals the complexity in evaluating the role of GGFs in value creation.

This study examines the impact of Shenzhen Stock Exchange’s (SZSE) information disclosure ratings on investment efficiency in China. Based on a sample of Chinese A-share listed companies on the SZSE from 2001 to 2018, we discover that superior information disclosure ratings improve investment efficiency after controlling for various firm- and industry-level variables. Our findings remain valid after various robustness tests and using instrumental variables to address the endogeneity problem. Specifically, we find that improving information disclosure ratings help firms attract more investor attention, which leads to higher investment efficiency. In addition, this information disclosure effect is more pronounced for underinvestment firms and firms on the main board than for smaller firms on SEM (small- and medium-sized enterprise) and GEM (growth enterprise market) boards. Our evidence supports the idea that regulatory activities for information disclosure ratings of companies listed on China’s stock exchanges improve investment efficiency.

This paper argues that ffnancial lease, a dominant representation of shadow banking in China, plays a special role in improving the capital allocation efficiency. In a two-sector general equilibrium model with heterogeneous firm, information asymmetry and financial frictions, this paper shows that existence of finance lease market increases aggregate TFP by allowing low productivity SOE firms to lend out and allowing high productivity POE firms to leverage up. Due to the repossession advantage, financial leasing is a “good“ form of shadow banking that does not necessarily cause financial systemic risks.

We develop a banking model to explain the remarkable growth of China’s shadow banking since the global financial crisis. In the presence of local government interventions for low-quality projects due to short-termism, a policy combination of tightening formal banking and loosening shadow banking can reduce inefficiency given the information asymmetry between banks and regulators. This is because the higher funding liquidity risk of shadow banking incentivizes banks to be more disciplined about the quality of projects. We find consistent empirical evidence that when on-balance-sheet financing was constrained by regulators, banks shifted high-quality projects into shadow banking and rejected low-quality ones.

In the new wave of sustainable finance, firms are under increasing pressure from stakeholders to engage in ESG activities, among which the role of financial analysts is a key driving factors of corporate sustainability. This paper investigates the effect of analyst coverage on corporate environmental, social, and governance (ESG) performance. Using the dataset of listed firms in China from 2009 to 2020, we find that analyst coverage significantly improves the target firm’s ESG scores. We validate three non-mutually exclusive channels through which analyst coverage encourages ESG engagement: (1) encourage firms’ awareness on ESG issues via ESG-oriented information production; (2) alleviate ESG undervaluation and strengthen the financial relevance of ESG performance; (3) mitigate financial constraints to support corporate ESG activities. We establish causality with an instrumental variable estimation and a difference-in-differences approach. Our findings highlight the information intermediary role of financial analysts in driving corporate sustainability.