How does executive authority affect household behavior? I develop a model in which the executive branch of the government is partially constrained. These constraints credibly limit intervention under normal conditions but can be overridden when a sufficiently large fraction of the population is in distress. Households anticipate this and strategically coordinate their financial risks through public markets, creating collective distress that compels government bailouts. Weaker constraints lower the threshold for intervention, making implicit guarantees more likely. The model explains why implicit guarantees are prevalent in China and predicts that such guarantees may discontinuously emerge elsewhere as executive constraints gradually weaken.

This paper examines the consequences of Chinese regulators deviating from a long-standing full bailout policy in addressing the distress of a city-level commercial bank. This policy shift led to a persistent widening of credit spreads and a significant decline in funding ratios for negotiable certificates of deposit issued by small banks relative to large ones. Our empirical analysis reveals a novel contagion mechanism driven by reduced confidence in future bailouts (implicit non-guarantee), contributing to the subsequent collapse of other small banks. However, in the longer term, this policy shift improved price efficiency, credit allocation, and discouraged risk-taking among small banks.

In China, inadequate levels of cross-regional investment represent a challenge. Our study uses the bailout reform initiated in China in 2014 to test whether market-oriented reforms of this type can help stimulate national economic integration. We observed that following a bond default event, nonlocal listed firms tend to establish a higher proportion of subsidiaries in the province where the default occurred. This phenomenon can be attributed to China’s bailout reform signaling a reduction in local protectionism in financial and product markets. Meanwhile, we found that the effects of bond defaults on cross-regional investment are more pronounced under the following conditions: when the impact of the bond default is greater; when the economic and fiscal conditions of the province where default occurs are better; when local protectionism in the home province is higher; and when the degree of asset specificity of the listed firms is lower. Finally, we found that China’s bailout reform has led to positive economic consequences, including reduced operational risks and improved total factor productivity (TFP) of firms. Overall, our paper supplements the literature on bond defaults and cross-regional investment.

This paper investigates the consequences of Chinese regulators deviating from a long-standing full bailout policy in addressing a city-level commercial bank’s distress. This event led to a persistent widening of credit spreads and a significant decline in funding ratios for negotiable certificates of deposit issued by small banks relative to large ones. Our empirical analysis pinpoints a novel contagion mechanism marked by diminished confidence in bank bailouts, which accounts for the subsequent collapse of several other small banks. However, the erosion of confidence in government guarantees enhances price efficiency and credit allocation while discouraging risk taking among small banks.

Bank bailouts are systemic in China, having been extended to nearly all distressed banks, including those with no systemic importance. This paper investigates the consequences of regulators seizing control of Baoshang Bank, the country’s first bank failure in two decades. Despite the numerous liquidity and credit provision measures immediately implemented by bank regulators, we find that the collapse of this city-level commercial bank significantly exacerbated funding conditions in the market for negotiable certificates of deposit (NCD), resulting in liquidity distress for other banks. Our empirical analysis demonstrates that the spillover of Baoshang’s collapse is disproportionately concentrated in systemically unimportant (SU) banks, owing to diminished market confidence in government bailouts of SU banks, or implicit nonguarantee. We employ a difference-in-differences approach to show that the Baoshang event had a persistent and significant effect on SU banks’ NCD issuance, increasing credit spreads by 21.9 bps and the likelihood of issuance failure by 6.3%. Our empirical framework further enables us to examine the impact of China’s long-standing guarantee of SU banks, which we find impairs price efficiency, undermines market discipline, encourages excessive risk taking, and raises equity prices.

In this paper, we examine the cost of equity capital for politically connected firms. After controlling for several firm- and country-level determinants, our results show that politically connected firms have a lower cost of equity capital than their nonconnected peers. Our results are robust to alternative measures and proxies for the cost of equity capital. We thus provide strong evidence that investors require a lower cost of capital for politically connected firms, suggesting that these firms are generally considered to be less risky than non-connected firms. Our findings imply that the benefits of political connections outweigh their costs. We conjecture that this perception is fueled by the soft budget constraints generally enjoyed by politically connected firms, and by their lower default probability, given the assurance of corporate bailout in the event of financial downturns.

It is commonly argued that poorly designed banking system safety nets are largely to blame for the frequency and severity of modern banking crises. For example, “underpriced” deposit insurance and/or low reserve requirement are often viewed as factors that encourages risk-taking by banks. In this paper, we study the effects of three policy variables: deposit insurance premia, reserve requirement and the way in which the costs of bank bailouts are financed. We show that when deposit insurance premia are low, the monetization of bank bailout costs may not be more inflationary than financing these costs out of general revenue. This is because, while monetizing the costs increases the inflation tax rate, higher levels of general taxation reduce savings, deposits, bank reserves, and the inflation tax base. Increasing the inflation tax rate obviously raises inflation, but so does an erosion of the inflation tax base. We also find that low deposit insurance premia or low reserve requirements may not be associated with a high rate of bank failure.