This paper examines whether reserve prices impact the discount on private equity placements (PEPs). Using a sample of auction-based PEPs in China, we find that reserve price discounts are positively associated with bid (offer) price discounts. This inference holds after executing several robustness checks. As extra analyses reveal, the documented impact is ascribed to bidders anchoring on reserve prices. The positive association also depends on bidder identity and anchor-target compatibility. Our evidence ultimately shows that investor wealth benefits from such anchoring biases. Altogether, these findings demonstrate that reserve prices induce bidder undervaluation, thereby resulting in lower offer prices.

We study how institutional investors utilize potentially biased information by analyzing the e ect of IPO underwriters' earnings forecasts on investors' bidding behaviors in Chinese IPO auctions. Despite the presence of upward biases in underwriters' earnings forecasts, we  nd that investors' bid prices are higher in IPOs with higher earnings forecasts. The investors' positive reaction to biased information can be explained in a rational expectation model where the underwriter has valuable information about the IPO but has a biased incentive in presenting the information to investors. Consistent with the model's predictions, we  nd that an investor's bid price is more sensitive to the underwriter's earnings forecast when the forecast bias is expected to be smaller, when the relative precision of the underwriter's information over the investor's information is higher, and when the investor has a higher valuation of the IPO.