To address the challenges posed by renewable energy integration in power systems, China is advancing the development of Pumped Hydro Storage (PHS). However, the rapid growth of PHS installations, coupled with strict regulations and a high reliance on capacity compensation, has led to increasing financial burdens on other utilities. One solution is to reallocate the capacity compensation through market-based approaches to implement the “beneficiary-pays” principle. To achieve this goal, an operational policy named ’partial-regulated dispatch’ is proposed in this study. The analysis of this policy encompasses two crucial dimensions: the dispatch mechanism and business models. The dispatch mechanism evaluates PHS’s capacity contribution to grid stability, while the business models focus on enhancing PHS profitability to reduce dependency on capacity compensation while ensuring long-term economic sustainability. Furthermore, the flexibility of PHS is introduced as a criterion for assessing system security contributions, considering both individual unit vibration characteristics and multi-unit commitment strategies. The case study shows that through partial-regulated dispatch, PHS can reduce its reliance on capacity compensation by nearly 50% while ensuring its regulation service via flexibility compensation. This policy effectively balances economic viability with system support capabilities. Moreover, flexibility compensation provides PHS operators with a risk mitigation strategy in the complex power market environment. Under an appropriate operational strategy and policy incentives, the flexibility can be enhanced by nearly 30% in a fully marketized scenario, contributing to both system stability and operational efficiency.

Fintech has significantly influenced the traditional financial industry by introducing advanced technologies and innovative business models with profound impacts. We aim to study the effect of Fintech development on labor allocation efficiency, and to explore its underlying mechanisms. Using a set of companies on Chinese A-share market over the years of 2011- 2020, we find that Fintech development plays a positive role in labor allocation efficiency, mainly through suppressing labor overinvestment. This positive effect is further reinforced by market competition. In addition, our investigation reveals that the primary pathways through which Fintech enhances labor allocation efficiency are lowering information asymmetry, mitigating agency issues and substituting low-skilled labor. Moreover, we show that the dimensions of depth and digitalization are particularly important in improving labor allocation efficiency among the three dimensions of Fintech development. Lastly, we find that Fintech development enhances total factor productivity by improving labor allocation efficiency.

The “Internet celebrity economy” is a business model aimed at capitalizing on online traffic based on the purchasing power of users on social media in which “influencers”—highly influential individuals—exercise their marketing power to create a fandom. China has witnessed an abrupt outbreak in its “Wanghong” (internet celebrity) economy since 2016, eventually leading to consecutive high closes for related stocks from around 2020. The empirical findings are as follows: First, investors’ attention to Wanghong stocks and cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are significantly positively associated. However, operational results and CARs are weakly linked, implying that the economic impact of intense influencer marketing is short-lived, and abnormal returns constitute an anomaly. Second, the positive abnormal returns of Wanghong stocks last approximately six months, which overlaps with the boom period of the Wanghong index based on influencer news articles.

The development of the wealth management market is based on the needs of investors. The logic of market regulation should also be based on the interests of investors. On the basis of summarizing the regulatory experience of the global wealth management market, suggestions are put forward to improve the system of China's wealth management market . The fundamental driving force for the establishment of a regulatory legal system for the wealth management market comes from the needs of the development of the wealth management market. Moreover, the structure and process of this institutional construction are also closely related to the structure and development of market demand. China's current wealth management market has become a huge financial sector, and the deepening of the market and the diversification of participants all put forward requirements for the construction of a fair and scientific regulatory system. Wealth management business is different from traditional financial business in many aspects such as function, business standard and business model, and its basic legal relationship is also far from traditional business. The commonality of business in China's current wealth management market is in line with the basic elements of the legal relationship of trust. From the perspective of the realistic basis and the nature of the industry, it is appropriate to define the basic legal nature of wealth management business as a trust relationship. Due to factors such as information asymmetry and economic scale, financial investors are in a serious imbalance and imbalance when they trade with financial institutions. Therefore, the financial supervision system should grasp this core contradiction, give investors the status of consumer protection, and establish the concept of protecting wealth consumers. The regulation of wealth management operators should grasp the requirements of the basic trust relationship, take the basic principle of supervising the performance of trustee duties by financial management institutions, and implement a series of rules for trustees to be loyal and prudent in financial management. These rules should focus on risk prevention, and include establishment of access standards for wealth management business, supervision of independent development of wealth management business, supervision of full performance of prudent management duties by wealth management institutions, and guidance for healthy development of wealth management institutions. The experience in the supervision of developed wealth management markets such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, and Singapore shows that the establishment of a legal system for the protection of wealth management consumers is an inevitable result of the development of the financial market, and it is necessary to set up special institutions and mechanisms to implement the concept of wealth management investor protection, and emphasize wealth management products. Providers' fiduciary obligations to investors, and functional supervision based on a unified system in the regulatory system can be used as a reference for China . China's wealth management market regulatory system include inconsistent rules, weak protection, biased guidance, and lack of independence. Due to the separate regulatory system, different game rules apply to homogeneous wealth management business operated by different types of financial institutions, resulting in rule conflicts and market injustice. However, the substantive rights of wealth management investors still exist in a vacuum that cannot be confirmed. At the same time, the status of consumers is far from being officially confirmed, and the consumer protection mechanism cannot truly achieve justice. As regulatory guidance still favors the concept and tools of supervising traditional businesses, wealth management institutions mainly expand extensively by selling products, and wealth management products also present serious "bond-like" characteristics. The "non-neutral " positioning of financial regulatory agencies has externalized into phenomena such as rule conflicts, "policy following suit" and "excessive maintenance of stability". Constructing and continuously improving China's wealth management market supervision system is: the purpose of supervision is to restore the effective operation of the market mechanism. The basic legal relationship in China's wealth management market should be recognized as a trust relationship. This is not only an essential requirement of the wealth management market, but also a practical need to integrate regulatory chaos. It is the trend of financial and economic development that the regulatory system positions the position of wealth management consumers. It should start with legislative policies, make key breakthroughs around consumers' substantive rights and protection mechanisms, and gradually improve investor protection mechanisms. The regulatory system should focus on supervising financial institutions to fulfill their fiduciary obligations, and establish sound access rules, business independence rules, prudent management rules, and strict market exit mechanisms. China's wealth management market supervision system should be based on unified legislation and gradually implement functional supervision in order to achieve effective management and harmonious development of the wealth management market.

This paper researches into development of China’s shadow banking during 2020-2022, a special period marked by COVID-19 and strengthened global regulation on Non-Bank Financial Intermediation (NBFI). Research focus includes balance sheet evolvement, growth dynamics, and relation with macro-finance. Its business model surprisingly resembles western peers. They both fund underserved sectors and have similar exposure to balance sheet mismatch. Massive holding of bond investment (36.6% of total asset) is funded by uninsured interbank fund and wealth management product, which makes it more closely related with banks’ balance sheet and risk contagion from NBFI to traditional commercial banks more easily. This paper then re-summarizes growth dynamics of China’s shadow banking in a “Pull-Push” framework, and proposes concept of reintermediation in respective to disintermediation. Consecutive regulation on NBFI and real estate sector kept dragging on growth of shadow banking, and rendered it in liquidity surplus, which is invested into interbank market. This paper also provides empirical evidence on relation of China’s shadow banking with macro-finance, and notes several empirical breakdowns of pre- COVID relations among economic and financial indicators. Most important breakdown is the non-functionality of monetary policy transmission channel. Besides, it continued to twist de facto financial regulatory indicators, however with fading impact.

This chapter introduces alternative financial institutions (AFIs) in China that do not fall within traditional financial institution (FI) models. We describe their business models and development dynamics in the context of economic and financial reforms and technological advancement. We find that various AFIs are formed based on social, business, and virtual networks to overcome capital allocation barriers, reduce costs, or improve efficiency, providing financial services for the underserved. However, without proper regulations, these AFIs could pose alarming levels of risk on financial stability. They repeat a boom-and-bust pattern, in parallel with the government's initial laissez faire approach but later harsh interferences: being taken over by formal FIs or shut down as illegal practices until the exceptional Ant-Financial case. Improving investors' financial knowledge and regulators’ competency is critical for China to advance its financial system and develop mature FIs and AFIs. We recommend key features required in such a regulatory framework.

The improvement of production efficiency and the change of business model brought about by the deep integration of the digital economy and the real economy have become an important driving force for industrial transformation and upgrading. This paper explains the necessity of digital transformation of manufacturing, the trends, paths and six technologies of financial digital transformation. In the digital era, relying on data, scenarios, and algorithms to explore the essential logic of business, make predictions and decisions based on business insights, and put forward higher requirements for financial empowerment business. As an important way for enterprise management transformation and upgrading, the core goal of financial digital transformation is to take "data-driven" as the main line, promote transformation based on the two principles of industry-finance integration and in-depth scenarios, and build "value-creating" finance, that is, based on the integrated application of digital technology, so that finance can expand the functions of supporting strategy, assisting decision-making, empowering business, preventing and controlling risks, lean management, operational excellence, quality and efficiency, compliance supervision and other functions on the basis of basic transaction accounting functions, and promote and even lead the value creation functions of enterprises. The article points out that the manufacturing industry should take enhancing competitiveness as the direction, financial management as the center, and improving quality and efficiency as the goal to accelerate digital transformation. Introduced Midea Group's financial digital transformation practices and results. It is proposed that enterprises should vigorously promote the deep integration of big data, Internet, cloud computing, Internet of Things, artificial intelligence, blockchain and the real economy, accelerate the digital transformation of finance, and inject new impetus into the high-quality development of enterprises.

The improvement of production efficiency and changes in business models brought about by the deep integration of the digital economy and the real economy have become an important driving force for industrial transformation and upgrading. This paper expounds the necessity of digital transformation of manufacturing industry and its path selection. The important role of industrial Internet and Internet platforms is pointed out, and the characteristics of industrial Internet platforms such as Midea Group and Siemens MindSphere and their effects on industrial transformation are analyzed. Enterprises should vigorously promote the deep integration of big data, the Internet, cloud computing, the Internet of Things, artificial intelligence, blockchain and the real economy, accelerate the digital transformation of the manufacturing industry, and inject new impetus into the high-quality development of the manufacturing industry.

The past decade has witnessed a phenomenal rise of digital wallets, and the COVID-19 pandemic further accelerated their adoption globally. Such e-wallets provide not only a conduit to external bank accounts but also internal payment options, including the ever-popular Buy-Now-Pay-Later (BNPL). We examine, for the first time, e-wallet transactions matched with merchant and consumer information from a world-leading provider based in China, with around one billion users globally and a business model that other e-wallet providers quickly converge to. We document that internal payment options, especially BNPL, dominate both online and on-site transactions. BNPL has greatly expanded credit access at the extensive margin through its adoption in two-sided payment markets. While BNPL crowds out other e-wallet payment options, it expands FinTech credit to underserved consumers. Exploiting a randomized experiment, we also find that e-wallet credit through BNPL substantially boosts consumer spending. Nevertheless, users, especially those relying on e-wallets as their sole credit source, carefully moderate borrowing when incurring interest charges. The insights likely prove informative for economies transitioning from cash-heavy to cashless societies where digital payments and FinTech credit see the largest growth and market potential.

Abstract: In this paper, we assume the R&D research for new products and new business models of an entrepreneur will get some cash-flow in the future. And because of the patent protection, the entrepreneur will become a monopolist in that defined market. The successful R&D research represents the growth value for the entrepreneur. We assume that the value of growth is the value of the entrepreneur. The total market value of entrepreneur can be understood as a real growth option plus a discounted real exchange option. The first time in the theory, this paper gets the formula of the real compound option under three stochastic parameters. 关键词：创业企业，增长价值，定价，复合实物期权 Keywords: entrepreneur, growth value, pricing, compound real option