This study investigates the influence of smart supply chain management on the Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) performance of Chinese manufacturing firms spanning from 2009 to 2022. Our findings reveal a positive association between smart supply chain management and enhanced ESG performance, a relationship consistently upheld across various analytical methodologies. Additionally, we uncover that smart supply chain practices stimulate corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosure, contributing to heightened transparency and subsequently bolstering ESG metrics within firms. Furthermore, our analysis demonstrates that the positive effect of smart supply chain management on ESG outcomes is particularly pronounced among firms that are operating in less competitive and more environmentally impactful industries, receiving heightened media scrutiny, and influenced by Confucian principles. This research provides actionable insights for firms seeking to advance their ESG initiatives.

We examine whether and how mandatory corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosures affect corporate tax avoidance. Using a CSR disclosure mandate in China that requires a subset of firms to disclose their CSR activities as an exogenous shock to CSR disclosures, our difference-in-differences analyses show that firms affected by the disclosure mandate engage in less tax avoidance relative to control firms. Additional analyses indicate that increased public scrutiny following the disclosure mandate is the likely channel through which mandatory CSR disclosures constrain tax avoidance. Cross-sectional analyses suggest that the effect of the disclosure mandate varies with institutional environments. Overall, our results indicate that the CSR disclosure mandate constrains corporate tax avoidance, which is consistent with mandatory CSR disclosures nudging firms toward more socially desirable behavior.

It remains unclear whether state shareholding (SS) truly enhances firms’ fulfillment of their corporate social responsibility (CSR) or merely motivates them to strategically release “enhanced” CSR reports. Utilizing the reform that permits state–owned equity to participate in privately–owned enterprises (POEs) in China, we find that the participation of SS enhances POEs’ access to resources and alleviates their needs for legitimacy, leading to disparities in CSR disclosure and substantive CSR activities for POEs, consistent with the notion of greenwashing. The greenwashing behavior is particularly pronounced in the presence of large state-owned shareholder and when CSR disclosure is compulsory.

Using staggered exogenous shocks to mandatory CSR disclosure, we examine the effect of mandatory CSR disclosure on employment growth. We find that CSR reporting firms have a higher employment growth following the mandate than non-CSR reporting firms. With respect to potential channels, we document that mandatory CSR disclosure promotes employment growth by improving firms’ CSR performance on employee welfare. In cross-sectional tests, we find that the employment effect is more pronounced for state-owned enterprises, firms in hazardous industries and firms in high-tech industries. We also find that cities most impacted by the mandate exhibit higher aggregate employment growth. While mandatory CSR disclosure promotes employment growth of mandated firms, it has a crowding out effect on employment growth of non-mandated local peer firms. Our paper offers novel evidence on the impact of mandatory CSR disclosure on labor resource allocation.

Firms in China increase green innovation following a mandate that requires them to regularly disclose their corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities. Further analyses show that the CSR disclosure mandate leads to higher media coverage of disclosing firms' environmental issues, and the increase mainly comes from negative environmental news. By contrast, voluntary CSR disclosure does not affect corporate green innovation, and it increases positive but not negative environmental media coverage. These findings suggest that (1) it is the mandatory feature of the mandate, not the act of disclosure, that matters most for the positive effect on corporate green innovation; and (2) the negative media coverage induced by mandatory CSR disclosure plays a disciplinary role and promotes green innovation, while the positive media coverage induced by voluntary CSR disclosure does not.

We examine whether family firms differ from nonfamily firms in their corporate social responsibility (CSR) reporting practice. Using a sample of Chinese firms, we find that, compared to nonfamily firms, family firms are more likely to have a system in place that guides the establishment and development of their CSR activities. Family firms are also more likely to adopt the GRI guidelines, and they disclose significantly more information about their CSR practice. The findings are consistent with the notion that family firms are more long-term oriented, and as a result, they are more concerned about firm reputation and use CSR disclosure as a means to establish and maintain a good reputation and to legitimize their behavior. We further find that the positive relation between family firms and CSR disclosure exists mainly in those firms with relative high state ownership, which helps mitigate government expropriation risk. Our research contributes to the limited literature on the relation between family firms and CSR practice. We also contribute to the literature on the impact of government expropriation risk and its interaction with firm ownership structure on firm behavior.

This study examines the effect of mandatory corporate social responsibility (CSR) on firm excess perks by exploiting China’s 2008 mandate requiring firms to disclose CSR activities with a difference-in-differences design. We find that firms mandated to report CSR experience a decrease in excess perks subsequent to the mandate. Our empirical results also reveal that the decrease in abnormal perks is more pronounced for firms with worse information environments and lower CSR disclosure quality, suggesting that mandatory CSR disclosure significantly reduces executive abnormal perks and restricts managers’ unethical behavior by improving the quality of the information environment for investors. Our main finding does not change using the subsample before 2012, indicating that the reduction of abnormal perks is driven by the enaction of mandatory CSR rather than the anti-corruption campaign started in 2012. The last but not the least, the reductions of excess perk consumption are primarily driven by non-SOE firms and competitive industries, and mandatory CSR firms are subject to a significant and stronger pay-to-performance, which again confirm the well-governed view of corporate social responsibility.