Reputation is widely regarded as a stabilizing factor in financial institutions, reducing capital constraints and enhancing firm resilience. However, in the insurance industry, where capital requirements are shaped by solvency regulations and policyholder behavior, the effects of reputation on capital management remain unclear. This paper examines the unintended consequences of reputation in insurance asset-liability management, focusing on its impact on capital allocation. Using a novel reputation risk measure based on large language models (LLMs) and actuarial models, we show that reputation shifts influence surrender rates, altering capital requirements. While higher reputation reduces surrender risk, it increases capital demand for investment-oriented insurance products, whereas protection products remain largely unaffected. These findings challenge the conventional wisdom that reputation always eases capital constraints, highlighting the need for insurers to integrate reputation management with capital planning to avoid unintended capital strain.

This paper investigates how transparency in lawsuit information affects capital allocation and aggregate industrial production. Greater transparency enhances the availability of information about firms' fundamentals, which can influence resource distribution. We exploit regional variations in courts' compliance with mandated judicial document disclosures in China, implemented since 2014, as a natural experiment. For firms with initially high marginal revenue products of capital (MRPK), a 10-percentage-point increase in legal transparency results in a 4.4% increase in physical capital and a 7.9% reduction in MRPK, relative to firms with lower MRPK. Additionally, regions with higher transparency experience a rise in aggregate output. Further analysis differentiating firms by ownership type, public listing status, and industry-level contract intensity enhances the robustness of our findings.

Efficient enterprise development plays a crucial role in the achievement of economic efficiency, which is reflected in the improvement of total factor productivity (TFP). This study examines the effect of corporate maturity mismatch on TFP and explores whether financialisation influences this relationship. This study uses data from Chinese A-share listed non-financial enterprises from 2007 to 2019. We find that maturity mismatch negatively impacts TFP through performance inhibition, agency costs, and capital allocation efficiency reduction. Additionally, we find that financialisation positively moderates the negative effect of corporate maturity mismatch on TFP, and the effect is more pronounced when a firm has higher risk-bearing capacity and greater governance efficiency. We use two-stage least squares to demonstrate the robustness of our results.

This study explores how Chinese mutual fund managers’ degrees of disagreement (DOD) on stock market returns affect investor capital allocation decisions using a novel textbased measure of expectations in fund disclosures. In the time series, the DOD negatively predicts market returns. Cross-sectional results show that investors correctly perceive the DOD as an overpricing signal and discount fund performance accordingly. Flow-performance sensitivity (FPS) is diminished during high dispersion periods. The effect is stronger for outperforming funds and funds with substantial investments in bubble and high-beta stocks, but weaker for skilled funds. We also discuss ffnancial sophistication of investors and provide evidence that our results are not contingent upon such sophistication.

This paper investigates how domestic policy uncertainty stemming from discretionary fiscal policy disrupts the efficient capital allocation across firms. While fiscal policy represents the government’s reaction to economic conditions, its volatility presents firms with considerable uncertainty about conditions affecting their future profitability and consequently disrupts firms’ decisions on investment in the presence of capital adjustment costs. Using firm-level data from Chinese manufacturing industries spanning from 1998 to 2007, we find that reducing fiscal policy volatility leads to a decrease in the dispersion of marginal revenue product of capital, accounting for 8.9 percent of the observed improvement in capital allocation during the sample period. In addition to various fiscal reforms to curb fiscal policy volatility directly, policies contributing to lower capital adjustment costs and lower reliance of firms on government expenditure can alleviate the adverse effects caused by fiscal policy volatility.

This paper argues that ffnancial lease, a dominant representation of shadow banking in China, plays a special role in improving the capital allocation efficiency. In a two-sector general equilibrium model with heterogeneous firm, information asymmetry and financial frictions, this paper shows that existence of finance lease market increases aggregate TFP by allowing low productivity SOE firms to lend out and allowing high productivity POE firms to leverage up. Due to the repossession advantage, financial leasing is a “good“ form of shadow banking that does not necessarily cause financial systemic risks.

This chapter introduces alternative financial institutions (AFIs) in China that do not fall within traditional financial institution (FI) models. We describe their business models and development dynamics in the context of economic and financial reforms and technological advancement. We find that various AFIs are formed based on social, business, and virtual networks to overcome capital allocation barriers, reduce costs, or improve efficiency, providing financial services for the underserved. However, without proper regulations, these AFIs could pose alarming levels of risk on financial stability. They repeat a boom-and-bust pattern, in parallel with the government's initial laissez faire approach but later harsh interferences: being taken over by formal FIs or shut down as illegal practices until the exceptional Ant-Financial case. Improving investors' financial knowledge and regulators’ competency is critical for China to advance its financial system and develop mature FIs and AFIs. We recommend key features required in such a regulatory framework.

We examine how hometown ties among local politicians affect capital allocation in China. We use a difference-in-differences design that relies on the exogenous replacements of city officials. Our results indicate that hometown ties between city party secretaries increase city-dyad investment by 10% and firm registrations by 1%. These effects are larger between distant cities and for the investment of small and private firms. Comparing the effects before and after the Chinese anti-corruption campaign, we provide nuanced evidence showing that, although hometown ties may entice the rent-seeking activities of officials, such activities may promote economic growth.

We build a unified framework to quantitatively examine population aging and credit market frictions in contributing to Chinese economic growth between 1977 and 2014. We find that demographic changes together with endogenous human capital accumulation account for a large part of the rise in per capita output growth, especially after 2007, as well as some of the rise in savings. Credit policy changes initially alleviate the capital misallocation between private and public firms and lead to significant increases in both savings and output growth. Later, they distort capital allocation. While contributing to further increase in savings, the distortion slows down economic growth. Among factors that we consider, increased life expectancy and financial development in the form of reduced intermediation cost are the most important in driving the dynamics of savings and growth.

Fluctuations in investor demand dramatically affect firms' valuation and access to capital. To quantify its real impact, we develop a dynamic investment model that endogenizes both the demand- and supply-side of capital. Strong investor demand elevates equity prices and dampens price impacts of issuance, facilitating investment and financing, while weak investor demand instead incentivizes firms to optimally repurchase shares at favorable prices, which can crowd out investment, especially among firms with liquidity constraints. We estimate the model using indirect inference by matching the endogenous relationship between investors' portfolio holdings and firm characteristics. Our estimation suggests that investor demand substantially distorts firms' real investment decisions and impedes the efficient capital allocation across firms. Eliminating excess demand reduces dispersion in the marginal product of capital by 10.74% and TFP losses by 16.20%. Investor demand also influence firm size distributions and generates a heavy right tail---large excess demand provides firms with market power and opportunities to profit from their financial market activities, contributing to the emergence of superstar firms.