Public emergencies reduce social welfare but may paradoxically stimulate corporate innovation through crisis-driven technological adoption. This study establishes a theoretical framework demonstrating that exogenous shocks create asymmetric innovation incentives, with digitally disadvantaged firms exhibiting stronger technological upgrading responses. Empirically, we construct a firm-level digital transformation index through textual analysis using a multi-source media database in China to show that digital transformation can endow firm resilience by boosting capital market performance during public emergencies, especially for those medium-sized enterprises due to the costs and need for digital transformation. This research adds to the evidence that public emergencies can leverage advanced technology adoption.

Existing literature has demonstrated the aggregation and allocation effects of the corporate holding financial institutions on financial resources, but there is little literature to discuss whether it will further affect corporate employment. Therefore, this paper uses data from China's A-share listed companies from 2010 to 2021 to examine whether holding financial institutions can affect corporate employment, thus serving the real economy. Empirical results show that holding financial institutions significantly expands corporate employment, which is pronounced in periods of tight monetary policy, in financially underdeveloped areas, and for enterprises with high financing constraints, weak external supervision, and high labor intensity. The conclusion still holds after conducting a series of robustness tests. Mechanism tests show that holding financial institutions can expand corporate employment by alleviating liquidity constraints and inhibiting the dissipation of internal funds caused by agency problems. Further discussion also shows that holding financial institutions has significantly improved corporate operating performance and increased the salary levels of executives and ordinary employees, which means that there is no “executive plunder” after profit increases; Meanwhile, holding financial institutions generates spillover effects along the supply chain, expanding corporate employment among major suppliers and customers. This paper has important implications for taking measures related to “finance serves for the real economy” to achieve high-quality economic development.

This paper investigates how institutional investors’ site visits affect firm productivity by using a dataset of China’s A-share listed firms. The findings reveal that site visits have a constructive effect on firm productivity. Moreover, mechanism analysis indicates that reducing information asymmetry and improving stock price informativeness are two channels through which site visits influence firm productivity. Heterogeneity analysis demonstrates that the nexus between site visits and firm productivity is more pronounced for non-state-owned firms and firms with intenser product market competition. Overall, this study brings new insights into the benefits of site visits and highlights the importance of investor activism.

This paper aims to clarify the relationship between key audit matters (KAMs) disclosure and corporate financialization. The findings reveal that key audit matters (KAMs) disclosure can provide incremental information value, thereby impeding corporate financialization in China. Moreover, this effect is more pronounced in the samples with low media attention, low shareholding of institutional investors, and non-state-owned enterprises. Further research indicates that reducing managerial myopia and easing financing constraints serve as key channels through which key audit matters (KAMs) disclosure affects corporate financialization. This study provides empirical evidence on efficiently preventing excessive financialization of enterprises, as well as some insights for mitigating systemic financial risks from the key audit matters (KAMs) disclosure perspective.

This paper examines how macroeconomic surprises affect corporate risk-taking in China. Using well-identified business cycle shocks to proxy the unexpected fluctuations of the Chinese aggregate economy, we find that the risk-taking level of publicly listed firms positively correlates with business cycle shocks in general. The underlying mechanism is the evolvement of firms’ financial constraints. However, this finding of full sample analysis is driven mainly by positive business cycle shocks, as the subsample analysis shows that firms also tend to increase risk-taking due to agency problems as adverse business cycle shocks get larger. Moreover, firm-level characteristics, such as managerial shareholdings, growth opportunities, and cash holdings, significantly affect the magnitude of corporate risk-taking’s response to business cycle shocks.

Enterprise digital transformation has become an inevitable trend in the digital economy era that can significantly impact enterprises. This paper takes the data of A-share listed companies from 2006 to 2022 as a sample to explore the effect of enterprise digital transformation on listed companies' corporate social responsibility and the mechanism of its role. It was found that corporate digital transformation can significantly enhance Csr(Corporate social responsibility), and enterprise digital transformation has a noticeable enabling effect on Csr, which can dramatically improve Csr. The relationship between the two still holds after the robustness test. It has been found that digital transformation can affect Csr by enhancing the green innovation capability of enterprises, the fairness of internal compensation distribution, and the sustainable development capability of enterprises. Heterogeneity analysis reveals that corporate digital transformation's impact on Csr fulfillment performance is more significant for non-state-owned firms and firms in the central and eastern regions. In addition, corporate financing constraints and government innovation subsidies influence Csr.

This paper extracts investor risk concern from the text of investormanagement communications and examines their impact on insider opportunistic sales. Utilizing data from listed companies holding online earnings communication conferences (OECCs) in China from 2007 to 2022, we find that heightened investor risk concern significantly curbs insider opportunistic sales, as manifested by reduced frequency and magnitude of such transactions. This governance effect of investor risk concern persists irrespective of motivation strength behind opportunistic sales. Further analysis reveals that the governance effect intensifies when investors exhibit superior information processing capabilities and when management’s risk statements better align with investor expectations. Notably, while mitigating opportunistic sales, elevated investor risk concern also significantly decreases the firm’s cost of equity capital. Our findings underscore the importance of fostering transparent and engaging investor-management communication in promoting effective corporate governance and mitigating insider misconduct.

China's SMIC and Taiwan's TSMC are caught on opposite sides of the "Global Chip War." TSMC, despite having extensive commercial ties and fabs in the Mainland, is a beneficiary of U.S. efforts to stifle competition from Mainland competitors like SMIC. Geopolitical considerations, therefore, are increasingly influencing TSMC’s business decisions, as shown by TSMC’s construction of fabs in Japan and the United States despite founder Morris Chang’s longstanding opposition to overseas fabs due to their high costs. SMIC, meanwhile, is the Mainland’s best hope for creating a “red chip supply chain” and achieving 70% semiconductor self-sufficiency via domestic suppliers, which has taken on even more importance due to U.S. sanctions on advanced chips for AI model development. This article analyzes SMIC founder Richard Chang’s dream of building a red chip giant on the Mainland that can rival or even replace TSMC, which will directly conflict with Chang's former co-worker and fellow Taiwanese Morris Chang’s dream of solidifying TSMC and Taiwan’s position as the irreplaceable center of the semiconductor industry well into the 21st century.

Trade credit is a vital external source of financing, playing a crucial role in redistributing credit from financially stronger firms to weaker ones, especially during difficult times. However, it is puzzling that the redistribution perspective alone fails to explain the changes in trade credit when firms get involved in major litigation, which can be seen as an external shock for firms. Based on a firm-level dataset of litigations from China, we find that firms involved in major litigation not only exhibit an increased demand for trade credit but also extend more credit to their customers. Our further analysis reveals that whether as plaintiffs or defendants, litigation firms experience an increase in the demand and supply of trade credit. Moreover, compared to plaintiff firms, defendant firms experience a more pronounced increase in the demand for trade credit. Using firms’ market power and liquidity as moderators, we find that the increase in the demand for trade credit is more likely due to firms’ deferred payments rather than voluntary provision by suppliers, and the increase in the supply of trade credit appears to be an expedient measure to maintain market share. Generally, our results provide evidence of credit contagion effect within the supply chain, where the increased demand for trade credit is transferred from firms’ customers to themselves when they get involved in major litigations, while the default risk is simultaneously transferred from litigation firms to upstream firms.

China's tech companies are making waves with their recent achievements, including a "trifold" phone from Huawei and the revolutionary AI reasoning model from DeepSeek. Much discussion has centered on the founders of these companies and their ability to gain an edge on American rivals. But what is less appreciated or understood among foreign analysts of China’s tech giants is the role that innovation and transformation in corporate governance and organizational structure has played in these companies’ successes. Moreover, there are unique aspects of these companies from a corporate governance perspective that are not commonly seen in tech companies in other parts of the world or even within China itself. For instance, Huawei is 99% employee owned, while Alibaba is primarily governed by an "Alibaba Partnership." These unique corporate structures have arisen due to several factors, including the rapid changes to China’s regulatory landscape over the past three decades, distinct characteristics of Chinese business culture, geopolitical tensions and preoccupations with national security, and the “socialism with Chinese characteristics” model. In this article I overview some of the more distinctive corporate governance mechanisms of four Chinese tech companies: Huawei, Alibaba, Bytedance, and DeepSeek, and explain why these structures were adopted.