This study investigates the impact of investor attention on stock market reactions to ChatGPT using dialogues on the Chinese interactive investor platforms (IIPs). We measure investor attention by the number of investors’ questions toward ChatGPT on the IIPs and categorize the firms’ answers as Investing, Speculative, and Absent. The research reveals positive and statistically significant market reactions surrounding the initial questions that occur before firm responses. Positive abnormal returns are also observed around the initial answer dates, with Investing firms evoking the highest market response, followed by Speculative firms, and Absent firms exhibiting the lowest reactions. Furthermore, positive market reactions persist even as firms modify their ChatGPT involvement statements or face stock exchanges inquiries, suggesting that the stock price upswing may primarily be fueled by ChatGPT-related mania. Our findings imply the potential of ChatGPT fervor: collusion caused by investor attention to ChatGPT and firm’s responses catering to investors.

This paper examines the relationship between kin-based institutions and the state in the modern economy, exploring how clan captures the local government. Using data from China’s primary land market and a nationwide genealogy dataset, we employ spatial matching to estimate clan’s causal impacts on land parcel prices, which are a crucial source of fiscal revenue for local government. We find that firms linked to local clans obtained 1.3%-3.0% lower prices than those without clanship connections. We show that clan firms get lower prices through collusion with bidders, a process facilitated by local officials. This patron-client relationship leads to a decline in economic growth at the county level, while China’s anti-corruption campaign transforms the economic impact from negative to positive.

The credit collusion is the main form of internal fraud and will lead to the wrong decision on loan-issue and further worsen the operation risk as well as the default risk. At present, the loan initiated by commercial banks in China is surging and challenges the loan management. Based on the literature and the situation of risk management in Chinese banking industry, this paper adopts the P-S-A model to study the collusion between loan officers and lending firms. Finally, it derives the collusion-free conditions and proposes some measures to reduce the collusions, which includes: (1) to impose harsher penalty on bribes to deter any collusion for increasing individual welfare; (2) to launch more sophisticated remuneration for loan officers to develop long relationship with commercial banks; (3) to spend more efforts on monitoring the larger sized loans.

Existing literatures indicate that, in Nontradable Shares Reform, institutional investors collude with nontradable shareholders (controlling shareholders) to help them settle a lower compensation ratio. Classifying institutional investors into mutual funds and non-mutual funds, this paper presents a further research upon whether fund governance helps mitigate collusion. Due to the rigorous entry qualifications, and the worldwide reputation as hostage, a foreign background fund is expected to have better governance quality than a domestic fund. Our empirical evidence shows that, relative to those dominated by domestic funds, mutual funds dominated by foreign background funds are less inclined to collude with nontradable shareholders. Introducing foreign institutional investors into domestic markets is Chinese government’s consistent policy. Our evidence indicates that this policy may be beneficial to the sound development of Chinese stock markets. Meanwhile, we find no sufficient evidence that mutual funds dominated by open-end funds are less inclined to collude with nontradable shareholders, although an open-end fund is expected to have better governance quality than a closed-end fund due to the redemption mechanism. As for the effect of ownership structure, it is found that mutual funds with a lower institutional ownership are less inclined to collude with nontradable shareholders. Fund governance seems to deteriorate as institutional ownership increases. Providing an implication for policy making, our evidence suggests that restricting the proportion of fund shares held by institutions may help improve fund governance in China.

本文通过两个模型分析了在不存在保荐人和存在保荐人的情况下，证监会的事后惩罚力度与上市公司作假行为之间的关系。我们的分析发现，公司的作假行为与证监会事后的处罚力度、事后被市场发现的概率呈反向关系，而与公司发行的流通股的比例、公司上市的预期收益呈正向关系。保荐人与企业的合谋行为与证监会事前的监督力度、事后的处罚力度和事后被市场发现的概率呈反向关系，而与公司发行的流通股的比例、公司上市的预期收益呈正向关系。 Abstract: This article builds two models to show the relationship between ex post regulatory punishment and the forgery of listed companies. We show that the more severe the ex post regulatory punishment, the less forgery of listed companies, and the larger the probability of the forgery to be found by market, the less forgery, the larger the share of out equity, the more forgery, and that the more expected returns by forging, the more forgery, too. The probability that the advisor to collude with the forgery company is also affected by the severeness of the regulatory punishment, the probability of the forgery to be found by market, the share of out equity and the expected returns by forging. Ex ante supervision to advisor by regulatory agency is good to reduce the probability of the collusion between advisor and the forgery companies.