Common ownership

  • 详情 Common Ownership and Knowledge Spillovers in Developing Countries: Evidence from Chinese Listed Firms
    Common institutional ownership can enhance knowledge spillovers by increasing portfolio firms’ awareness about each other’s innovation. By investigating listed electronic hardware firms in China for 2000-2016, we find that when common ownership by mutual funds is higher between a firm pair, it is more likely that these two firms cite each other’s patents. To confirm causality, we show that even the exogenous increase in firms’ common ownership following their inclusion into the stock index still positively influences the citing likelihood. We also find that such citations are taken place in a timely manner. Additionally, this positive effect is robust when the effects of overlapping board members and common ownership by other types of institutional investors are controlled for. This effect is more pronounced among nonneighboring firms, when non-neighboring firms are close to their common owners, when common owners hold shares longer, and when firms’ executives have lower incentive to communicate (i.e., SOEs). Last, we find that common ownership by mutual funds also enhances knowledge spillovers through third-party patents. This paper deepens the understanding of knowledge spillovers among firms in developing countries.
  • 详情 Common Ownership and Knowledge Spillovers in Developing Countries: Evidence from Chinese Listed Firms
    Common institutional ownership can enhance knowledge spillovers by increasing portfolio firms’ awareness about each other’s innovation. By investigating listed electronic hardware firms in China for 2000-2016, we find that when common ownership by mutual funds is higher between a firm pair, it is more likely that these two firms cite each other’s patents. To confirm causality, we show that even the exogenous increase in firms’ common ownership following their inclusion into the stock index still positively influences the citing likelihood. We also find that such citations are taken place in a timely manner. Additionally, this positive effect is robust when the effects of overlapping board members and common ownership by other types of institutional investors are controlled for. This effect is more pronounced among nonneighboring firms, when non-neighboring firms are close to their common owners, when common owners hold shares longer, and when firms’ executives have lower incentive to communicate (i.e., SOEs). Last, we find that common ownership by mutual funds also enhances knowledge spillovers through third-party patents. This paper deepens the understanding of knowledge spillovers among firms in developing countries.
  • 详情 Institution Al Common Ownership and Stock Price Crash Risk
    The existing literature studies the relationship between institutional investors and the risk of stock price crash from multiple dimensions. Based on the phenomenon that institutional investors hold the shares of several listed companies in the same industry, this paper takes the A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2008 to 2018 as the research samples to explore the relationship between institutional common ownership and stock price crash risk. The results show that: institutional common ownership significantly increases the risk of stock price crash. After a series of robustness tests, the conclusion remains unchanged. The impact mechanism test shows that institutional common ownership improves the stock price synchronization, investor sentiment and stock liquidity, and then aggravates the risk of stock price crash. Further tests show that the higher the product market competition, the more media coverage, and the weaker the protection of regional investors, the positive impact of institutional common ownership on the risk of stock price crash is more significant.