We examine ESG pricing in the Chinese stock market. The results show that holding stocks with high ESG scores does not provide investors with higher future excess returns. On the contrary, stocks with low ESG scores perform better. However, this negative ESG premium feature is robust only in small-cap stocks. As size increases, the negative ESG premium fades away and is characterized by a positive premium in larger stock subgroups. We further examine the source of the negative ESG premium in small-cap stocks. The results show that this negative premium can not be explained by firm characteristics, short-term reversal effects, and lottery characteristics of stocks, but is associated with ESG investors. Specifically, the higher the ESG score with more ESG investors in small-cap stocks, the lower the expected excess return of the stock. This result implies that firms may benefit from ESG performance and disclosure, while investors may suffer from ESG strategies. Based on the results, we remind investors that they should be cautious in using ESG indicators to guide their investment decisions.

This study documents how the political hierarchy plays a significant role in determining corporate environmental governance. By conducting difference-in-differences analysis to investigate listed firms in China, this study demonstrates that local and central SOEs headquartered in jurisdictions far removed from central government supervision have worse environmental governance than POEs. Verticalization reforms implemented in 2016 enable provincial environmental protection bureaus to direct lower-level bureaus. Local governments cannot control environmental protection bureau leaders for economic development. This study finds that the corporate environmental governance of local SOEs has significantly improved following the reform, as local environmental protection bureaus no longer have conflicts of interest with local governments. However, the reform has not resulted in improvements to corporate environmental governance in central SOEs, whose executives occupy higher status than provincial Environmental Protection Bureau leaders, nor in POEs, which were already managed before the reform. Further evidence indicates that local SOEs experience an increase in abatement investments and relationship building expenses following the reform. Lastly, our study reveals that verticalization reform costs are negligible. Local SOEs have not experienced a decline in financial performance or corporate valuation. This study suggests that policymakers should consider the political ranking of government agencies and enterprises to improve environmental governance.

This paper examines analysts’ catering behavior to current investor demand proxied by the unbalanced stock market reactions towards optimistic forecasts and nonoptimistic forecasts (optimism premium). Using data on earnings forecasts issued by Chinese sell-side analysts during the period 2014-2018, we find that optimism premium significantly increases analysts’ tendency to issue optimistic forecasts, in other words, analysts do cater to investor demand. Implications for theory and practices are discussed.

This paper investigates the value effect of large investors through their impact on corporate investment policy using a sample of listed firms in the Chinese stock market where large shareholdings and concentrated ownership are a norm. We find that the impact of capital expenditures on firm value is closely related to the level of large shareholdings (non-tradable or state shareholdings). Capital expenditures are negatively associated with firm value if firms are controlled by entrenched large shareholders. Although there is a general tendency of over-investment, the negative impact of over-investment is cancelled out if firms are controlled by incentive-aligned large shareholders. We also find that, the incentive-alignment effect of large investors is stronger in scenarios where agency conflicts are more intensified. Our findings suggest that capital investment is an important channel through which the value effect of large investors is achieved.

结构性产品以其设计的灵活性、降低融资成本和风险管理成本以及丰富投资品种等优势，一经产生便获得迅猛发展，很快成长为全球固定收益市场中重要的组成部分。然而2007年次贷危机爆发，结构性产品成为某些分析者眼中的替罪羊，为结构性产品进行信用评级的评级机构也随之声名狼藉，成为众矢之的。首先简要介绍结构性产品的评级过程和三大评级机构（穆迪、标准普尔和惠誉）的评级方法，然后分析评级中可能存在的模型风险、评级套利(rating model arbitrage, 又称为rating shopping)、内在利益冲突(inherent conflicts of interest)以及其他衍生的问题，最后探讨我国改进结构性产品信用评级质量的方向。

Abstract Universal corporate banks are defined as financial institutions that may offer the entire range of financial services, and own equity in financial and non-financial firms. The emergence of universal corporate banks is one of the responses of banks to the environmental changes in global financial markets. An idealized model of corporate bank is developed to describe the nature of corporate bank. The corporate banking policies include internationalization of financial services and information net-work, expansion and integration of corporate banking functions, creating close corporate clients relationship, acquiring knowledge and information advantage in corporate and financial markets, performance of corporate control and corporate governance to influence corporate management. Transaction cost and other theories are used to explain the universal corporate bank, especially the rationale for expansion and r-organization, for developing close corporate relationship, for acquiring information and knowledge of corporate clients, and the influence concerning corporate governance. In this study, the evolution of regulation, present situation of banking system, future development of corporate banking in some countries are investigated. It is found that free selection of organizational structure and financial activities of financial institutions is a general tendency in these countries. The problems such as conflicts of interest, culture conflict encountered when implementing corporate banking policies are discussed in this study. Different organization designs, management models, external regulations, and corporate culture are introduced as solutions. The development of corporate bank has great implications for financial reform in China. The pre-requisitions and barriers of developing universal corporate in China are discussed. A case study of China Construction Bank is utilized to illustrate the current situation and further development of banks in China. It is argued that a gradually financial liberalization with correct order should be accomplished. Some recommendations are produced for further reform of financial market in China including diversification of bank’s ownership, permission of foreign banks enter Chinese financial market, liberalizing interest rate, and establishing a fully floated foreign exchange market.

The seminal works of Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Myers (1977) highlight the conflicts of interest between the owners, managers, and debt holders of the firm and discuss the risk-shifting behavior of the managers assumed for our purpose to be the“firm” in detriment of their debt holders. Although a considerable amount of research has been undertaken on this topic, much less studies are devoted to endogenizing risk choices in the presence of financial guarantees and in the context of corporate project financing. A firm risk’s appetite increases when it has a guarantee contract on its debt, which creates a conflict between the firm and the guarantee provider. Addressing formally this moral hazard issue, we propose an equilibrium model in which the borrowing firm and the guarantee provider pre-commit themselves to conscripted risk levels at the signature of the loan guarantee contract. We show if the borrowing firm and the guarantor precommit, the equilibrium risk level is lower than the one the firm will choose unilaterally. For short (long) maturity debts, both parties gain by agreeing on a high (low) risk project when the firm shareholders have a big equity stake in the new project. We also study the trade-off between the borrowing firm’s capital structure and its risk level. The optimal risk level of the firm is entirely determined by its ex-post capital structure.