Suppliers’ bargaining power mainly comes from their market position or top supplier status. However, it is also affected by the horizontal competition from top supplier size homogeneity based on the purchasing proportion of a buyer. Using a sample of listed companies in China, we find an inverted U-shaped relationship between the supplier size homogeneity with shared customers and trade credit provisions. As size homogeneity increases, suppliers may increase (decrease) trade credit provision to expand sales (for cash income). That is, based on the degree of supplier size homogeneity, the homogeneity may strengthen or weaken the supplier competition effect. We also find that if upstream and downstream firms have associated relationships, or if the business environment is poor, the competition effect from supplier size homogeneity is not obvious, whereas the weak financing ability of buyer promotes the supplier competition. In addition, the competition effect from supplier size homogeneity is not observed in state-owned firms.

Bank bailouts are systemic in China, having been extended to nearly all distressed banks, including those with no systemic importance. This paper investigates the consequences of regulators seizing control of Baoshang Bank, the country’s first bank failure in two decades. Despite the numerous liquidity and credit provision measures immediately implemented by bank regulators, we find that the collapse of this city-level commercial bank significantly exacerbated funding conditions in the market for negotiable certificates of deposit (NCD), resulting in liquidity distress for other banks. Our empirical analysis demonstrates that the spillover of Baoshang’s collapse is disproportionately concentrated in systemically unimportant (SU) banks, owing to diminished market confidence in government bailouts of SU banks, or implicit nonguarantee. We employ a difference-in-differences approach to show that the Baoshang event had a persistent and significant effect on SU banks’ NCD issuance, increasing credit spreads by 21.9 bps and the likelihood of issuance failure by 6.3%. Our empirical framework further enables us to examine the impact of China’s long-standing guarantee of SU banks, which we find impairs price efficiency, undermines market discipline, encourages excessive risk taking, and raises equity prices.

This paper evaluates the impact of mobile cashless payment on credit provision to the underprivileged. Using a representative sample of Alipay users that contained detailed information about their activities in consumption, credit, investment, and digital footprints, I exploit a natural experiment to identify the real effects of cashless payment adoption. In this natural experiment, the staggered placement of Alipay-bundled shared bikes across different Chinese cities brings exogenous variations to the payment flow, allowing me to address the endogeneity issues and establish a causal relationship. I find that the use of in-person payment in a month increases the likelihood of getting access to credit in the same month by 56.3%. Conditional on having credit access, a 1% increase in the in-person payment flow leads to a 0.41% increase in the credit line. Those having higher in-person payment flow also use their credit lines more. Importantly, the positive effect of in-person payment flow on credit provision mainly exists for the less educated and the older, suggesting that cashless payment particularly benefits those who are traditionally underserved.