While previous research has delved into the relationship between political uncertainty and the aggregate cross-border flows of capital, there remains a notable gap in our understanding of how political uncertainty affects firm ownership structure within foreign direct investment (FDI) projects, specifically concerning the intensive margin. In this study, we commence by introducing a stylized model, wherein a risk-averse foreign investor teaming up with a local producer is concerned about the political risk associated with the provision of public goods by the local government. Our analysis demonstrates that the foreign investor, acting as a residual claimant, allocates a greater proportion of revenues to the local partner when local policy conditions are more uncertain. This strategic decision indirectly locks in local government commitment to the international joint venture, thereby mitigating the negative influence of political uncertainty. Subsequently, we test our theoretical framework by employing a unique dataset that encompasses city-level political turnovers and firm-level incentive structures in the context of China. The results unveil robust evidence substantiating that uncertainty arising from local political turnover significantly affects the revenue-sharing agreements between foreign investors and their local partners within the international joint production.

As a bridge between Chinese mainland and international financial markets, the Stock Connect program allows investors on both sides to gain mutual access. By analyzing how cross-border flows respond to macro-related shocks, we show that compared with possibly homemade foreign investors, genuine foreign investors are more likely affected by the U.S. monetary shocks, the exchange rate risk, the U.S. market performance as well as the cross-market valuation disparity. The paper highlights the importance of profiling different groups of cross-border participants over market integration.

Using cross-border holding data from all custodians in China’s Stock Connect, we provide evidence that Chinese mainland insiders tend to evade the see-through surveillance by round-tripping via the Stock Connect program. After the regulatory reform of Northbound Investor Identification in 2018, the correlation between insider trading and northbound flows decays, and so does the return predictability of northbound flows. The reduction of return predictability is especially pronounced among less prestigious foreign custodians and cross-operating mainland custodians, behind which mainland insiders are more likely to hide. Our analysis sheds light on the role of regulatory cooperation over capital market integration.