This study investigates how the interaction of political accountability and local officials’ career incentives shapes the market for Municipal Corporate Bonds (MCBs) in China, taking the 2017 local government debt personal responsibility rule as a quasinatural experiment. We develop a stylized incomplete-information bargaining model to analyze how the rule reshapes the bargaining equilibrium by rendering officials’ observable characteristics credible signals of bailout incentives. Using a dataset of prefecture-level MCBs from 2008 to 2020, we empirically test the model’s predictions and focus on separating officials’ incentive effects from their inherent ability. Our core findings show that post-announcement of the rule, each additional year of a local party secretary’s remaining time to retirement, a proxy for bailout incentives, reduces MCB spreads by approximately 2.5 basis points and increases issuance volume by about 2.0%. These effects are significantly amplified in fiscally stressed cities. Notably, under the 2017 rule, cities led by party secretaries with stronger bailout incentives can expand MCB issuance, which is contrary to the rule’s original intent to rein in local borrowing.

The China Securities Regulatory Commission is allowing firms to use externally financed funds for share repurchases, a recent measure to enable listed companies address valuation pressures and protect investors; however, its implications for corporate marketing decisions remain unclear. Using an event sample of Chinese listed firms that conducted open-market repurchases between 2009 and 2024, this study empirically examines how this market activity financed by different sources influence marketing decisions and explores the underlying mechanisms. The findings show that compared with firms using internal cash for repurchases, those relying on debt financing are inclined to resist myopic marketing decisions, and this negative relationship is pronounced under high analyst coverage and when privately owned listed firms are controlled by family entrepreneurs. These results remain robust after replacing the dependent variables and applying propensity score matching. Overall, this study shows that debt financing to support share repurchases has a long-term beneficial governance impact as it improves earnings quality and protects investor interests, and offers a new perspective on the relationship between financing-based repurchases and marketing myopia, and provides useful policy insights for evaluating the effectiveness of China’s refinancing regulations related to share repurchases, while guiding further refinement.

This paper identifies the marginal investors in China’s stock market and examines their impact on stock pricing. To clearly distinguish between the equity constraint channel and the debt constraint channel, we construct the capital ratio factor and the debt constraint factor for banks and securities companies, the two most critical financial intermediaries in China’s stock market. Our results demonstrate that banks indeed serve as marginal investors and influence stock market efficiency primarily through the equity capital constraint channel. Furthermore, we find that the bank capital ratio factor significantly explains stock mispricing in China, with the single-factor model based on bank equity capital producing substantially smaller pricing errors compared to traditional multi-factor models.

Bankruptcy abuse prevention has been criticized for increasing foreclosure rates, imposing negative impacts on housing markets, and aggravating the financial crisis. By contrast, this paper documents that bankruptcy abuse prevention reduces household debt overhang, a phenomenon harmful to home values and housing markets. Using a difference-in-differences analysis, we find that households in recourse states increased their home improvement and maintenance expenditures after the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act, a period during which the households paid considerable attention to the downside risk of the housing market, and that the effects vary by home equity level. The results remain unchanged with alternative specifications and cannot be explained by credit changes, judicial and nonjudicial foreclosures, homestead exemption, house sales, or heterogeneous expectations. Last but not least, we use entropy balancing to eliminate the differences between the treatment and control groups and get similar results. 预防破产滥用的政策被认为推高止赎率、对住房市场造成负面影响以及加剧金融危机而饱受批评。与之相反，本文证明破产滥用预防能够缓解家庭债务积压（debt overhang）—— 而债务积压恰恰是一种损害房屋价值与住房市场的现象。采用双重差分（DID）分析，我们发现：在《破产滥用预防与消费者保护法案》（BAPCPA）实施后，**追索权州（recourse states）**的家庭增加了住房改善与维护支出；该时期家庭对住房市场的下行风险高度关注，且上述效应因房屋净值水平的不同而存在异质性。在多种替代设定下结果依然稳健，且不能被信贷变化、司法与非司法止赎、宅基地豁免、房屋销售或异质性预期所解释。最后，我们使用熵平衡（entropy balancing）方法消除处理组与控制组之间的差异，同样得到了一致的结果。

Financial crises rarely erupt without warning; they are preceded by long periods of hidden fragility. Yet traditional market indicators such as the VIX capture only realized volatility, offering little foresight. This paper introduces the Stability Gap Model (SGM), developed iteratively from a simple intuition: fragility arises when risk-taking diverges from fundamentals and systemic buffers are insufficient. We trace the evolution of the model from its original formulation, through corrections and extensions, to its present form. The Classic SGM captures instantaneous imbalance, while the Beta SGM incorporates memory of past shocks. Empirical analysis demonstrates that the SGM provided clear early warnings ahead of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, the 2011 Eurozone debt episode, the 2015 China/oil slowdown, and the 2018 tightening cycle, while also trending upward in 2019 before the COVID-19 crash. Furthermore, the paper demonstrates the model's utility in assessing fragility in hedge funds and proposes its application as a universal framework for stability analysis across diverse systems, from corporate finance to supply chains.

Understanding the impact of local government debt on economic development has emerged as a focal issue for both academic research and policymakers. This study adopts a financing structure perspective and utilizes panel data from 214 cities and 3,228 A-share listed companies in China (2017–2023) to empirically investigate the impact of local government debt on corporate “shift from virtual to real economy” and its underlying mechanisms. The expansion of local government debt significantly promotes enterprises “shift from virtual to real economy”. The positive impact of local government debt on enterprises” transition from financialization to the real economy is more pronounced among firms in first tier and new first-tier cities, non-state-owned enterprises, and labor-intensive industries. Further analysis indicates that local government debt drives capital reallocation from financial investments to real investments by alleviating corporate financing constraints. This study proposes policy recommendations including optimizing debt fund allocation, further optimizing the financing environment, implementing differentiated regulatory measures. These suggestions provide both a theoretical foundation and practical references for synergistically advancing debt governance and real economy revitalization.

新质生产力实体资产技术迭代速度快、有效运营周期偏短，传统永续现金流折现估值易产生系统性偏差，导致该类资产难以被商业银行认定为合格抵质押物，融资约束问题突出。结合股份制银行实地调研与公开行业数据测算，国内新质生产力实体资产抵押融资存在显著规模缺口，形成“资产具备稳定收益、却难以实现抵押融资”的结构性矛盾。本文构建达叔（DASU,Debt Asset Settlement Unit,偿债资产清算单元）估值框架，以历史经营性现金流为核心锚点，设定五年估值截断规则与五维度审慎折价体系，依托三方均衡模型完成理论推演，并选取 49 只公募 REITs 开展实证检验。结果显示，框架估值与市场成交均价平均偏差仅 1.50%，估值波动较传统永续模型下降 42.3%；五维模型整体解释力达 89.2%，市场投机因子边际影响不足 0.5%，对新质生产力资产、粤港澳大湾区标的适配性更强。研究提炼现金流锚定、期限匹配两大理论命题，形成可审计的银行抵质押物估值标准，为商业银行估值逻辑转向有限期审慎评估提供实证支撑。

This paper investigates whether firms’ overtime intensity affects the cost of debt financing. Using satellite-based night-time light data for Chinese listed firms between 2013 and 2022, we construct an objective measure of weekday overtime that captures firms’ operational effort and capacity utilization. We find that higher overtime intensity is associated with significantly lower bond offering yield spreads. The effect is stronger among smaller, less-followed, less-profitable, and non-AAA-rated issuers, consistent with an information-asymmetry channel where investors rely more on observable operational behavior when hard information is weaker. The findings suggest that overtime functions as a priced form of soft information in debt markets, offering new evidence that real-time operational signals influence credit risk assessment.

This study examines the role of negative peer events, specifically initial bond defaults, in driving leverage manipulation of non-defaulting firms within the same region. Controlling for firm-specific time-varying characteristics, we find that initial bond defaults within a province are associated with an increase in leverage manipulation among non-defaulting firms. Two potential mechanisms underlying this relationship include increased financial constraints for these firms and elevated investor risk perception of the local bond market. The positive impact of bond defaults on leverage manipulation is more pronounced for financially constrained firms, firms with severe information asymmetry, and those affected by high-rated bond and principal defaults. We further show that companies that manipulate their debt ratios experience higher default risk. Our findings have important implications for transparent disclosure and highlight the negative effect of regional bond defaults on corporate financial reporting practices.

Serving on the official unsecured creditors' committee (UCC) of a bankrupt firm provides hedge funds with access to material nonpublic information (MNPI), which can facilitate their informed trading across firms and asset markets. We find that hedge funds increase equity turnover and execute more large trades in the quarters following UCC membership. In contrast, hedge funds do not exhibit such trading behavior after accessing public information about bankrupt firms or holding the bankrupt firm's debt without committee involvement. Importantly, these large trades often target firms with close economic ties to the bankrupt entity. Returns from these MNPI-driven trades are substantial.