Suzhou and Shenzhen are among the top cities in China by GDP, and both have performed exceedingly well in terms of cultivating technological industries and attracting foreign investment. This is in spite of the fact that neither city is a provincial capital nor a centrally administered city like Shanghai and Beijing. Yet, the two cities embody very different administrative models with respect to their relationship with the provincial and central governments. Shenzhen, in particular, has a closer relationship with the central government than almost any non-centrally administered city in China, whereas Suzhou is a city that remains closely in coordination with the provincial government even as its economy has grown by leaps and bounds. This begs the question of which city's model will prevail moving forward: the Shenzhen model, typified by "re-centralization" of power, or the Suzhou model, which represents more of the conventional regional decentralization model that has been prevalent in China since the 1980s. The article attempts to argue that even though Shenzhen is of pivotal importance to the central government's policies, it will remain an outlier for the time being so as to avoid disturbing the delicate balance between the central and provincial governments, barring an unforeseen economic or political crisis.

Establishing a comprehensive risk management system and establishing a sound and effective internal control mechanism are important conditions for the survival and healthy development of enterprises. Enterprises should continue to innovate their internal control mechanisms, continuously improve and strengthen their internal control and risk management functions, continuously improve their internal control effectiveness, and assist in high-quality development of enterprises. The article elaborates that the digital transformation of auditing helps to achieve internal audit goals and improve the effectiveness of internal control; Blockchain technology, due to its excellent characteristics of distributed decentralization, authenticity, transparency, and tamper resistance, will help transform the methods of financial and accounting business and audit supervision; The application of blockchain technology in the field of auditing will inevitably lead to the reshaping of audit work models; Blockchain technology will become a trigger point for the audit revolution, comprehensively empowering audit and risk management work. The article introduces JD's blockchain ABS standardization solution, while Tencent and TCL Group's industrial blockchain solve the reliable transmission of trust and value at low cost, confirming that the close combination of blockchain technology with enterprise finance and auditing can assist internal control and play an important risk prevention and control role in enterprise operations. The "blockchain+audit" can achieve online real-time audit, risk assessment and warning, and data analysis becomes the core of audit content; Blockchain+auditing will become an important tool for internal control and risk management in enterprises.

In this paper, on the premise that the expropriation of corporate assets by controlling shareholders would generate a residual loss, we studied how the laws of investor protection influenced on the decentralization of corporate ownership, the penalty and the cost of litigation. There are several interested conclusions we reached. At first, the effective protection of minority shareholders will lead to the decentralization of ownership, which is irrelevant to whether there is litigation cost or who should pay the cost. Second, if litigation costs remain unchanged, effective minority shareholder protection laws will evolve along a self-reinforcing path. On the other hand, if the penalty remains unchanged, effective minority shareholder protection laws will cause litigation costs to increase over time. These conclusions are irrelevant to who pays the litigation cost. Last, pay the cost by minority shareholders or controlling shareholders will cause litigation costs to increase or decrease with the penalty.

A political-macroeconomic model is developed to explain why small differences in fiscal decentralization may ultimately lead to dramatically di¤erent economic policies toward FDI hence starkly different amount of FDI flows into two otherwise identical developing countries. Too much fiscal decentralization hurts incentives of the central government while too little fiscal decentralization renders the local governments captured by the protectionist special interest group. Moreover, the local government's preference for FDI can be endogenously polarized and sensitive to fiscal decentralization. Calibration and counterfactual experiments results support fiscal decentralization as the major reason for China and India's nine-fold difference in FDI per capita.