This paper examines how AI investment and data assets affect corporatecredit risk. Using Chinese listed firms, we construct four complementary measures ofAI investment, asset-based, labor-based, LLM-based, and text-based, and link them tofirms’ distance-to-default. We find that benchmark-level AI investment reduces defaultrisk, while excessive ffrm-speciffc investment increases it by eroding profitability andreffecting risk-taking and competitive pressure. The dominance of this adverse effectyields a negative overall relation between AI investment and credit risk. Cash flow riskis the transmission channel: benchmark-level AI improves cash ffow quality, whereasexcessive investment worsens it. High-quality data assets complement benchmark-levelAI by stabilizing cash ffow, but this benefit fades once investment becomes excessive.Overall, the impact of AI on credit risk depends on both investment intensity and dataquality, operating primarily through cash flow dynamics.

This study examines the role of negative peer events, specifically initial bond defaults, in driving leverage manipulation of non-defaulting firms within the same region. Controlling for firm-specific time-varying characteristics, we find that initial bond defaults within a province are associated with an increase in leverage manipulation among non-defaulting firms. Two potential mechanisms underlying this relationship include increased financial constraints for these firms and elevated investor risk perception of the local bond market. The positive impact of bond defaults on leverage manipulation is more pronounced for financially constrained firms, firms with severe information asymmetry, and those affected by high-rated bond and principal defaults. We further show that companies that manipulate their debt ratios experience higher default risk. Our findings have important implications for transparent disclosure and highlight the negative effect of regional bond defaults on corporate financial reporting practices.

This study examines the economic consequences of China’s Three-Red-Lines policy, introduced in 2021 to cap real estate developers' leverage by imposing strict thresholds on debt ratios and liquidity. Developers breaching these thresholds experienced sharp declines in financing, land acquisitions, and financial performance. Privately owned developers(POE) are hit harder than state-owned firms (SOE), with larger drops in sales and higher default risk. Using granular project-level data, we show that the policy reduces developer sales primarily by curtailing new-project supply: breached developers launch fewer projects. On the demand side, homebuyers reallocate purchases from privately owned developers to SOEs, further widening the POE-SOE gap. The policy also reduced local governments’ land-transfer revenues and increased reliance on local government financing vehicles (LGFVs) for land purchases. These LGFV-acquired parcels exhibit very low subsequent development rates, which may increase local governments’off-balance-sheet debt risks.

Using a sample of 501 Chinese non-financial firms listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange from 2008 to 2020, we find that both foreign exchange (FX) derivatives and foreign currency (FC) debt significantly reduce firms’ probability of default. We further observe that larger, non-state-owned enterprises (SOEs), Hong Kong-headquartered firms, firms operating after China’s 2015 exchange rate reform and firms under high trade policy uncertainty (TPU) are more likely to use both FX derivatives and FC debt concurrently, thereby diversifying their strategies for managing default risk. Our analysis indicates that these tools reduce firms’ default risk primarily by improving firms’ profitability, raising their likelihood of obtaining credit ratings, and increasing their use of interest rate derivatives. Importantly, we reveal that FX derivatives and FC debt act as substitutes in mitigating firms’ default risk. Notably, this substitution effect is more pronounced for larger, non-SOEs, Hong Kong-headquartered firms, firms operating after exchange rate reform and firms facing high TPU. Finally, we find that using FX derivatives significantly dampens firms’ investment, which may explain why Chinese firms tend to prefer FC debt to manage their default risk.

This study aims to examine the causal effect of carbon regulatory risk on corporate bond yield spreads in emerging markets through empirical analysis. Exploiting China's commitment to peak CO2 emissions before 2030 and achieve carbon neutrality before 2060 as an exogenous shock to an unexpected increase in carbon regulatory risk, we perform a difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD) strategy. We find that exposure to carbon regulatory risk leads to an increase in bond yield spreads for carbon-intensive firms located in regions with stricter regulatory enforcement. This positive relationship is more pronounced for firms with financing constraints, belonging to more competitive industries, and located in regions with a high marketization process. We further identify that higher earnings uncertainty and increased investor attention serve as two mechanisms by which carbon regulatory risk influences the yield spreads of corporate bonds. Moreover, the spread decomposition reveals that the rise in bond yield spreads after an increase in carbon regulatory risk is primarily driven by the rise in default risk rather than the rise in liquidity risk. Overall, our findings highlight the importance of considering carbon regulatory risk exposure in financial markets, especially in developing economies like China.

Trade credit is a vital external source of financing, playing a crucial role in redistributing credit from financially stronger firms to weaker ones, especially during difficult times. However, it is puzzling that the redistribution perspective alone fails to explain the changes in trade credit when firms get involved in major litigation, which can be seen as an external shock for firms. Based on a firm-level dataset of litigations from China, we find that firms involved in major litigation not only exhibit an increased demand for trade credit but also extend more credit to their customers. Our further analysis reveals that whether as plaintiffs or defendants, litigation firms experience an increase in the demand and supply of trade credit. Moreover, compared to plaintiff firms, defendant firms experience a more pronounced increase in the demand for trade credit. Using firms’ market power and liquidity as moderators, we find that the increase in the demand for trade credit is more likely due to firms’ deferred payments rather than voluntary provision by suppliers, and the increase in the supply of trade credit appears to be an expedient measure to maintain market share. Generally, our results provide evidence of credit contagion effect within the supply chain, where the increased demand for trade credit is transferred from firms’ customers to themselves when they get involved in major litigations, while the default risk is simultaneously transferred from litigation firms to upstream firms.

This paper revisits the default-crash risk relation in the context of China. We find that firms with higher default risk have lower stock price crash risk both in monthly and yearly frequencies. To identify the causal effect, we use the first-ever default event in China’s onshore bond market in 2014 as an exogenous shock to the strength of implicit guarantees. The negative relation arises from the active involvement of the government before 2014 and creditors after 2014 in corporate governance. Consistent with the external scrutiny mechanism, the impact of default risk on stock price crashes is stronger in situations in which creditors are more likely to engage in active monitoring (i.e., firms with higher liquidation costs, lower liquidation value, and higher levels of information asymmetry), with these effects primarily observed in the post-2014 period. Overall, our study highlights the role of the “invisible hand” in the absence of the “visible hand.”

We conceptually identify and empirically verify the features distinguishing FinTech platforms from non-financial platforms using marketplace lending data. Specifically, we highlight three key features: (i) Long-term contracts introducing default risk at both the individual and platform levels; (ii) Lenders’ investment diversification to mitigate individual default risk; (iii) Platform-level default risk leading to greater asymmetric user stickiness and rendering platform-level cross-side network effects (p-CNEs), a novel metric we introduce, crucial for adoption and market dynamics. We incorporate these features into a model of two-sided FinTech platform with potential failures and endogenous participation and fee structures. Our model predicts lenders’ single-homing, occasional lower fees for borrowers, asymmetric p-CNEs, and the predictive power of lenders’ p-CNEs in forecasting platform failures. Empirical evidence from China’s marketplace lending industry, characterized by frequent market entries, exits, and strong network externalities, corroborates our theoretical predictions. We find that lenders’ p-CNEs are systematically lower on declining or well-established platforms compared to those on emerging or rapidly growing platforms. Furthermore, lenders’ p-CNEs serve as an early indicator of platform survival likelihood, even at the initial stages of market development. Our findings provide novel economic insights into the functioning of multi-sided FinTech platforms, offering valuable implications for both industry practitioners and financial regulators.

Recently, the Chinese Government has strengthened the enforcement of bankruptcy laws to protect creditors’ rights. This study shed light on the effect of creditor protection on asset-debt maturity mismatch by employing a quasi-natural experiment in China. The results show that creditor protection mitigates maturity mismatch, and the effect is more pronounced among financially constrained firms. Results remain robust after the dynamic effects test, placebo test, propensity score matching approach, entropy balancing method, and controlling for COVID-19 shocks. Mechanism tests show that creditor protection decreases the cost of debt and reduces over-investment. The effect of creditor protection is pronounced in private companies, financially independent companies, and companies with secured loans. Creditor rights can alleviate maturity mismatch in firms with medium ownership concentration and managerial ownership levels. Economic consequences studies suggest that creditor protection reduces corporate default risk. This study reveals the mechanism and effect of creditor protection on asset-debt maturity mismatch in emerging markets, providing recommendations to policymakers for assessing and improving bankruptcy law regimes.

“How does a firm’s bankruptcy affect its regional environment?” is an open empirical question that has received little attention in the literature. We hypothesize that because enterprises provide funds to protect their regional environment, their default risk negatively impacts that environment. We analyze the impact of corporate default risk on environmental deterioration in the international setting to answer this question. Using a firm-level corporate default risk quarterly data from 2013q1 to 2020q4, we find that corporate default risk is positively associated with CO2 emissions and decomposed components. These findings are reliable in low-income and highly uncertain countries but weak in countries having more market competition. We also find that the negative impact of corporate default risk on the environment is more robust in countries with more population density and fewer forest area thresholds. Finally, using the instrumental variable approach, we provide preliminary evidence that firm-level political risk (for US and Canadian firms only) increases corporate default risk, leading to a degrading environment. Our findings are robust to alternative measurements of a firm’s default risk and environmental deterioration. Our research will help environmental authorities to consider corporate default risk as a determinant when formulating environmental-related strategies.