A central premise of mandatory disclosure regulation is that greater transparency reduces information asymmetry and lowers borrowing costs. We challenge this premise by examining industry-level operational disclosure - a regulatory form that reveals horizontally comparable information across peer firms rather than refining individual firm fundamentals. Exploiting the staggered introduction of mandatory industry-specific disclosure guidelines by Chinese stock exchanges between 2013 and 2019, we find that enhanced industry disclosure significantly widens bond credit spreads by approximately 54 basis points - the opposite of what standard disclosure theory predicts. This counterintuitive effect is more pronounced in non-homogeneous industries, among smaller firms, and for bonds restricted to institutional investors. Mechanism tests confirm two opposing channels: disclosure reduces information asymmetry while simultaneously intensifying product market competition by exposing strategically sensitive operational metrics. Our evidence challenges the one-size-fits-all approach to disclosure regulation and highlights that the competitive implications of disclosed information - not merely its quantity - shape credit risk pricing.

Strengthening disclosure regulation and improving disclosure quality are central to China's transition to a full registration system and crucial for preventing capital market risks. Using prospectuses disclosed by IPOs on the STAR Market, ChiNext, and the Beijing Stock Exchange from 2019 to 2023, this study constructs four textual indicators from prospectuses—length, sentence complexity, technical term density, and uncertainty—and examines how they affect resource allocation efficiency under the registration system. We find that text length and sentence complexity improve resource allocation efficiency, consistent with an information effectiveness effect. In contrast, technical term density and uncertainty reduce efficiency, reflecting information redundancy. Further analysis shows that the registration system reform enhances the comprehensiveness and complexity of disclosures, but its net effect on efficiency depends on the balance between information effectiveness and redundancy. This study contributes to the international literature on “institutional environment—disclosure—resource allocation” with evidence from an emerging market, while also extending theories of information asymmetry and impression management. Our findings support Chinese regulators in optimizing prospectus standards and strengthening review oversight, and provide policy insights for other emerging markets seeking to improve capital allocation through more effective disclosure design.

We examine whether and how mandatory corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosures affect corporate tax avoidance. Using a CSR disclosure mandate in China that requires a subset of firms to disclose their CSR activities as an exogenous shock to CSR disclosures, our difference-in-differences analyses show that firms affected by the disclosure mandate engage in less tax avoidance relative to control firms. Additional analyses indicate that increased public scrutiny following the disclosure mandate is the likely channel through which mandatory CSR disclosures constrain tax avoidance. Cross-sectional analyses suggest that the effect of the disclosure mandate varies with institutional environments. Overall, our results indicate that the CSR disclosure mandate constrains corporate tax avoidance, which is consistent with mandatory CSR disclosures nudging firms toward more socially desirable behavior.