Using “the Measures for the Administration of Bank Wealth Management (henceforth BWM) Funds Sales” as an exogenous shock in fund distribution channels in Chinese BWM industry, we investigate the impact of non-affiliated distribution on fund performance. We find that the adoption of non-affiliated distribution brokers has a positive effect on BWM fund performance. We further find that the effect is more pronounced when the non-affiliated distribution broker has more market power and when the fund issuer has better governance. We interpret our findings to indicate that non-affiliated distribution brokers alleviate the agency problems of fund managers by introducing both ex-ante and ex-post monitoring, highlighting the role of non-affiliated distribution brokers as an external governance mechanism in wealth management industry.

This paper investigates how transparency in lawsuit information affects capital allocation and aggregate industrial production. Greater transparency enhances the availability of information about firms' fundamentals, which can influence resource distribution. We exploit regional variations in courts' compliance with mandated judicial document disclosures in China, implemented since 2014, as a natural experiment. For firms with initially high marginal revenue products of capital (MRPK), a 10-percentage-point increase in legal transparency results in a 4.4% increase in physical capital and a 7.9% reduction in MRPK, relative to firms with lower MRPK. Additionally, regions with higher transparency experience a rise in aggregate output. Further analysis differentiating firms by ownership type, public listing status, and industry-level contract intensity enhances the robustness of our findings.

Individual institutions marginal contributions to the systemic risk contain predictive power for its potential future exposure and provide early warning signals to regulators and the public. We use higher-order co-skewness and co-kurtosis to construct systemic risk contribution measures, which allow us to identify and characterize the co-movement driving the asymmetry and tail behavior of the joint distribution of asset returns. We illustrate the usefulness of higher-order moment augmented approach by using 4868 stocks living in the Chinese market from June 2002 to March 2022. The empirical results show that these higher-order moment measures convey useful information for systemic risk contribution measurement and portfolio selection, complementary to the information extracted from a standard principal components analysis.

Our investigation reveals that the top 10 shareholders are the only credible contenders for dominant control rights in China's listed corporations. To measure the ultimate control of these entities, we adopt the Shapley-Shubik power index and calculate the principal shareholder's control at the top of the control pyramid. Our results demonstrate that approximately 70% of firms exhibit an ultimate control value of 1. Additionally, our analysis reveals a non-linear relationship between the ultimate control, the tunneling behavior of the ultimate controller, and the executives’excess perk consumption .Specifically, our findings suggest that this relationship is characterized by a phase transition.

Identifying and addressing the factors influencing the within-firm pay gaps has become a pressing issue amidst the widening global income inequality. This study investigates the impact of corporate ESG ratings on employee income and pay gaps using data from Chinese-listed companies between 2017 and 2021. The results suggest that ESG ratings significantly increase employee income. Further research indicates that ESG ratings exacerbate the within-firm pay gaps and income inequality due to the varying bargaining power among employees. This effect is particularly pronounced in non-state-owned and large-scale companies. This is also true for all kinds of companies in traditional and highly competitive industries. However, reducing agency costs and improving information transparency can help vulnerable employees with weaker bargaining power in income distribution to narrow their pay gaps. The research findings offer important insights to promote fair income distribution within companies and address global income inequality.

This paper explores the factors that influence redistributive preferences in the context of significant economic transformation, focusing on the transition premium and growth. Using an online survey experiment with a nationally representative sample from China, we find that priming getting rich via relatively less meritocratic, yet representative ways under market transition in post-reform China reduces redistributive support, specifically for policies that aim to take from the rich and the belief in the government’s duty to redistribute, indicating the presence of a set of fairness views in China that deviate from the conventional meritocratic paradigm. Heterogeneous treatment effects analyses reveal that such non-meritocratic fairness views are a general phenomenon, and self-interest in the form of subjective economic pressure only serves as a secondary concern. While people feel that the rich are more deserving and demand less redistribution regardless of subjective economic pressure, only those under less economic pressure exhibit decreased support for policies that aim to help the poor. These representative ways of getting rich under market transition are similarly fair compared to winning a lottery, far less fair than a self-made entrepreneur, but much more legitimate than acquiring wealth through corruption. Priming China’s growth story does not result in statistically significant changes in redistributive support. Additionally, we rule out the influence of three relevant confounders: low tax salience, preference falsification under authoritarianism, and misperceptions about relative income positions and intergenerational occupational mobility. We argue that such non-meritocratic fairness views are particularly salient in societies that break away from a centrally-planned economic system in the past and transition towards a high-growth market economy, where economic opportunities are becoming more inclusive.

Quantum theory provides a comprehensive framework for quantifying uncertainty, often applied in quantum finance to explore the stochastic nature of asset returns. This perspective likens returns to microscopic particle motion, governed by quantum probabilities akin to physical laws. However, such approaches presuppose specific microscopic quantum effects in return changes, a premise criticized for lack of guarantee. This paper diverges by asserting that quantum probability is a mathematical extension of classical probability to complex numbers. It isn’t exclusively tied to microscopic quantum phenomena, bypassing the need for quantum effects in returns.By directly linking quantum probability’s mathematical structure to traders’ decisions and market behaviors, it avoids assuming quantum effects for returns and invoking the wave function. The complex phase of quantum probability, capturing transitions between long and short decisions while considering information interaction among traders, offers an inherent advantage over classical probability in characterizing the multimodal distribution of asset returns.Utilizing Fourier decomposition, we derive a Schr¨odinger-like trading equation, where each term explicitly corresponds to implications of market trading. The equation indicates discrete energy levels in financial trading, with returns following a normal distribution at the lowest level. As the market transitions to higher trading levels, a phase shift occurs in the return distribution, leading to multimodality and fat tails. Empirical research on the Chinese stock market supports the existence of energy levels and multimodal distributions derived from this quantum probability asset returns model.

This study examines the enduring effects of China’s planned economy on contemporary social attitudes. By leveraging spatial disparities in the historical distribution of state-owned enterprises and external shocks such as the First Five-Year Plan and the Third Front Construction movement, we find that a one percentage point increase in the historical SOE proportion of industrial output corresponds with a 0.57% to 0.89% increase in the contemporary preference for state-owned sectors. The results are robust after controlling the contemporary SOE employment share, and this effect does not apply to the younger generation born after the marketization reform. Furthermore, we provide evidence that city-level state ownership preferences significantly impact the likelihood of SOEs receiving subsidies, with this effect notably amplified in cities governed by locally-born leaders, but the share of locally-born leaders has been trending down.

Based on the expected utility under uncertain probability distribution, we explore whether the ambiguity of individual stocks is priced in China’s A-share market and the mechanism behind the ambiguity premium phenomenon. Theoretically, when the asset price is in a specific price range, investors with ambiguity aversion do not participate in the transaction of the asset. As the ambiguity of assets increases, investors with high ambiguity aversion withdraw from the market, and investors with low ambiguity aversion remain in the market (the limited market participation phenomenon); investors who remain in the market due to lower ambiguity aversion are also willing to accept a low ambiguity premium. Empirically, we use "the volatility of the distributions of daily stock returns within a month" to measure monthly ambiguity; and find that (1) the equal-weighted average returns of the most ambiguous portfolios (top 20%) are significantly lower 1.38% than those of the least ambiguous portfolios (bottom 20%); (2) ambiguity still significantly negatively affects the cross-sectional stock return after controlling for common firm characteristics; (3) the higher the ambiguity, the lower the future trading activity, the empirical results are consistent to the theoretical predictions. Those findings reveal the mechanism of the negative ambiguity premium in the A-share market, provide new ideas for further building a factor pricing model suitable for the A-share market, and provide a fresh perspective for preventing systemic financial risk.

This study examines the effects of the robotic subsidy policy in China’s manufacturing sector. The demand-side subsidy policy aims at encouraging manufacturing firms to invest in robotics by lowering the cost of purchase. Our difference-in-difference analysis reveals distributional impacts of municipality-level robot subsidies on manufacturing firms of different scales. Although the subsidy brings a 14.2% increase in the application of robot patents, the facilitated access to robotics has not transformed into new firm entries. Strikingly, new firm entry decreases by 23.5% after the policy implementation. On the other hand, robot subsidies have increased the revenue, total asset, and employment of larger manufacturing firms by 9.8%, 6.9%, and 6.7%, respectively. To interpret the mechanism, we develop a simplified framework incorporating financial frictions into a task-based model. The model reveals that idiosyncratic borrowing costs lead to an inefficient equilibrium by generally depressing automation adoption and creating automation dispersion across firms. Such ex-ante distortion results in a uniform subsidy disproportionately benefiting firms with better capital access, thus creating a trade-off in terms of efficiency: while the subsidy can enhance overall automation, it simultaneously exacerbates automation dispersion. To quantify the efficiency implications, we embed this simplified model into a dynamic heterogeneous-agent framework, calibrated to the 2010 productivity distribution, financial frictions, and robot density in the industrial sector in China. Our dynamic model reveals that a 20% robot subsidy narrows the gap between mean and optimal automation level by 22% percentage points, while raises automation dispersion by 49%. This results in a 1.23% increase in aggregate output at the cost of a 2.40% decline in TFP. This dynamic model proposes a novel mechanism that automation exacerbates capital misallocation by enlarging asset accumulation dispersion between workers and entrepreneurs. Controlling for this dynamic feedback could enhance the subsidy-induced output gain by an additional 26%