This study evaluates whether electric vehicles (EVs) in China have delivered on their “green” promise by improving air quality and reducing private ownership costs. Combining city–month data on EV adoption and air pollution with detailed vehicle-level transaction records, we find little evidence that rising EV adoption reduces concentrations of major pollutants or greenhouse gases. Both the traditional instrumental variable (IV) and the Bartik IV estimations show that the null effects persist after addressing potential endogeneity. The limited environmental gains are largely attributable to the continued dominance of coal in electricity generation and to a sizable rebound effect whereby lower operating costs increase vehicle usage. On the private side, although EVs reduce energy expenditures by roughly CNY 16,747, their faster depreciation leads to an average net loss of about CNY 18,175 over the ownership period relative to fuel vehicles (FVs). Counterfactual simulations show that EVs match the emissions of fuel vehicles when the coal share falls to about 55%, deliver measurable benefits below 49%, and require a reduction to around 31% once higher utilization is considered. The results show that the environmental benefits from EV adoption depend on a transition toward cleaner electricity generation.

The Full Guaranteed Purchase System began to replace the subsidy system as the core policy for promoting renewable energy integration, designating grid companies as the sole entity responsible for the physical integration of renewable energy. Meanwhile, the Tradable Green Certificates system provides environmental benefits for renewable power generators through market mechanisms. Therefore, exploring the strategic choices of various entities under the dual policy interventions, and uncovering the mechanisms for realizing electricity energy value and green value under different integration models, is of great significance for advancing China’s renewable energy integration. Based on China’s actual conditions, this study integrates the features of both policies and constructs a three-party evolutionary game model involving government, power generators, and grid enterprises to simulate their interactions and identify key factors influencing strategic choices. The results show that active government regulation effectively encourages positive strategies from both generators and grid companies, and that active power integration by grid companies further promotes green power generation. A “stepwise complementary” relationship exists among reputation gains, reputation losses, and regulatory costs: higher reputation gains can offset decision-making resistance arising from increased regulatory costs. Green power generation costs and innovation costs have significant negative effects on strategic choices, while the guaranteed purchase price has a significant positive effect on generators’ active strategies. The penalty parameter plays a key positive role in grid companies’ active strategies, and the guaranteed purchase price significantly influences their active integration behavior. This paper provides recommendations for motivating all entities actively participate in the consumption process.