Using data from Chinese A-share listed companies for the period 2007–2022,we investigates the impact of financialization on the long-term use of short-term debt (LUSD). Our findings reveal that increased financialization leads to a stronger issue of LUSD. Financialization squeezes long-term investments and equity financing levels of firms, thereby leading to LUSD. Moreover, the rise in financing costs and the degree of financing constraints intensify the effects of financialization on LUSD. The smaller the scale of the enterprise, the shorter its operating period, the higher its operational risk, the greater the promoting effect of financialization on LUSD.

As China’s shadow banking sector expands, the impact of listed companies’ involvement in financial stability and the real economy accumulates increasing attention. Despite being a crucial channel for non-financial firms to participate in shadow banking, the literature has given limited consideration to the acquisition of wealth management products (WMPs). Using data from Chinese listed firms between 2007 and 2020, we analyze how excessive equity financing affects companies’ WMP acquisitions. Our findings indicate that over-financing significantly boosts WMP purchases among these firms, particularly in cases of private ownership, raised environmental uncertainty, and strict financing constraints.

We examine the rise of cloud computing in China and its impact on industry dynamics. We find that industries which depend more on cloud infrastructure experience a higher increase in firm entry and exit after cloud computing expands in China. The positive relation with firm exit is driven by the increased exit through business failure and adjustments as well as the increase in the exit of less productive incumbents. Despite the large numbers of firms that exit, the number of firms increases as entryaccelerates and the competition increases in industries with more exposure to cloud infrastructure. The average age of firms also becomes younger in industries with more exposure to cloud infrastructure. Finally, we show that equity financing increases for industries impacted by cloud computing and the positive impact is more pronounced for younger firms. These findings point to increased competition and increased industry churn through the technological effects of cloud computing.

We investigate how marginal corporate tax rate affects corporate policy changes in response to a regulatory credit crunch. With a surge in debt due to a fiscal stimulus after 2008, the Chinese government rolled out the “deleveraging” program in 2015 which, through tightening monetary policies, restricting credit flows, and regulating shadow banks, significantly increased firms’ cost of debt and the incentive to deleverage. With a difference-in-differences design, we find that high-tax-rate firms reduce leverage to a less extent than low-tax-rate firms after the initiation of the deleveraging program. This effect is stronger in non-state-owned firms and firms with less non-debt tax shields. More importantly, through retaining more debt, high-tax-rate firms reduce dividend and switch to equity financing to a less extent, and also cut less investments in fixed assets, R&D and human capital. We conclude that tax constitutes an important factor in shaping the micro-economic consequences of a credit crunch.

This paper examines the ‘certification’ of government venture capital (GVC) programs, disputes whether the Chinese government venture capital (CGVC) can promote target firms’financing through the ‘certification’ on target firms, and how the ‘certification’ work. Using a dataset of 87865 Chinese listed firms over 2008–2018, we confirmed that CGVC’s investment promotes target firms’ equity financing but inhibits corporate debt financing through the certification effect and CGVC’s reputation. Moreover, the high reputation of GVC and high market awareness could strength the ‘certification effect.’Simultaneously, the ‘certification effect’is only effective for early and late-stage firms and private-owned firms, and invalid for mature stage and state-owned firms.

This paper generalizes the Myers and Majluf (1984) model by introducing an agency cost structure based on private benefits of control. This new model predicts that many corporate finance variables each have opposing effects on under- and overinvestment. Private benefits exacerbate overinvestment but, interestingly, a small amount of private benefits can enhance firm value by alleviating underinvestment. Likewise, an increase in insider ownership alleviates overinvestment but aggravates underinvestment. When private benefits are small, the adverse effect of insider ownership on underinvestment tends to dominate. When there are considerable private benefits, the incentive-alignment effect of insider ownership is pronounced. Additionally, this model reconciles existing equity financing theories on announcement effects. It helps resolve the puzzle that small-growth firms do not seem to have an asymmetric information disadvantage when they issue new equity.