This opinion paper analyzes China’s new mandatory climate disclosure standards, which were formally launched between December 2024 and December 2025. We argue that China has not simply adopted the investor-focused model of the International Sustainability Standards Board (ISSB) or the European Union’s comprehensive double materiality approach. Instead, it has crafted a distinct “third way”—a new model of sustainability governance marked by a deliberate blending of global convergence and national priorities. Through a close, provision-level comparison, we identify eight specific provisions where China’s standard goes beyond both IFRS S2 (Climate-related Disclosures, issued by the International Sustainability Standards Board) and ESRS E1 (Climate Change, issued under the European Sustainability Reporting Standards), revealing a consistent rationale that treats corporate disclosure as an instrument of national governance, reaching institutional completeness by simultaneously issuing assurance standards, and maintaining developmental sensitivity through mechanisms like the proportionality principle. While considerable implementation challenges persist, this paper concludes that China’s approach presents a useful and reproducible model for other developing nations, positioning China as an active contributor to the evolving global standards architecture.

Despite strong GDP growth and a favourable demographic profile, India faces an impending jobs crisis. A large share of the workforce remains employed in lowproductivity agriculture, while many new labour market entrants are absorbed into the persistently large informal sector. By contrast, China's rapid ascent was driven by manufacturing-led, export-oriented industrialisation, underpinned by large inflows of foreign direct investment and sustained technology transfer. India's manufacturing base remains modest in contrast. The bulk of well-paid, formal employment continues to be concentrated in the high-skill services sector. This paper contrasts the development trajectories of these two economies and identifies several underutilised jobs-growth levers in India: manufacturing, goods exports, manufacturing-oriented foreign direct investment and innovation. All of these remain underdeveloped, yet together they offer a pathway to more labour-absorbing, durable growth. Leveraging them effectively would be central to achieving India's 'Viksit Bharat 2047' ambition of attaining high-income status. The scale of India's challenge to employ eight to ten million labour-market entrants per year implies that job creation must become an explicit policy priority. This calls for greater trade openness, particularly with Asia and Europe, to integrate India into Asia-centric global supply chains as an alternative to China. Labour market reform is equally critical, making the effective implementation of the new labour codes essential. Strengthening innovation ecosystems and realigning education and skills policies to support industrialisation are also key. Without these structural shifts, India's current pattern of jobless growth risks transforming its demographic dividend into a long-term liability.

The global financial system is currently navigating a profound transformation driven by digitalization and the rise of decentralized financial innovations. In response, central banks are increasingly exploring or implementing Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs) as a sovereign digital evolution of fiat money. This study investigates the dual nature of CBDCs, evaluating whether they represent a strategic opportunity to modernize the economy or a systemic threat to existing financial stability. Employing a qualitative methodology, the research analyzes official policy frameworks from the IMF and BIS alongside diverse real-world case studies, including China’s e-CNY, the Bahamas’ Sand Dollar, Nigeria’s eNaira, and the European Central Bank’s Digital Euro. The findings suggest that while CBDCs offer significant benefits—such as enhanced payment efficiency, reduced transaction costs, and improved financial inclusion—they also introduce critical risks. These include the potential disintermediation of commercial banks, heightened cybersecurity vulnerabilities, and concerns regarding individual data privacy and government surveillance. The study concludes that the successful integration of CBDCs is not merely a technical challenge but a social and strategic one. Adoption is heavily dependent on infrastructure, digital literacy, and public trust. Ultimately, the research highlights that there is no "one-size-fits-all" model; the future of money will be shaped by how effectively individual nations balance technological innovation with the preservation of financial architecture.

Despite strong GDP growth and a favourable demographic profile, India faces an impending jobs crisis. A large share of the workforce remains employed in low-productivity agriculture, while many new labour market entrants are absorbed into the persistently large informal sector. By contrast, China’s rapid ascent was driven by manufacturing-led, export-oriented industrialisation, underpinned by large inflows of foreign direct investment and sustained technology transfer. India’s manufacturing base remains modest in contrast. The bulk of well-paid, formal employment continues to be concentrated in the high-skill services sector. This paper contrasts the development trajectories of these two economies and identifies several underutilised jobs-growth levers in India: manufacturing, goods exports, manufacturing-oriented foreign direct investment and innovation. All of these remain underdeveloped, yet together they offer a pathway to more labour-absorbing, durable growth. Leveraging them effectively would be central to achieving India’s ‘Viksit Bharat 2047’ ambition of attaining high-income status. The scale of India’s challenge to employ eight to ten million labour-market entrants per year implies that job creation must become an explicit policy priority. This calls for greater trade openness, particularly with Asia and Europe, to integrate India into Asia-centric global supply chains as an alternative to China. Labour market reform is equally critical, making the effective implementation of the new labour codes essential. Strengthening innovation ecosystems and realigning education and skills policies to support industrialisation are also key. Without these structural shifts, India’s current pattern of jobless growth risks transforming its demographic dividend into a long-term liability.

The endurance of empire in China over much of the past two millennia contrasts starkly with the political fragmentation in Europe since the fall of Rome. To explain the persistence of China’s empire, we analyze the role of keju, the imperial civil service examination system. We argue that the systematic implementation of keju from the Song dynasty onward tied local elites to the imperial state, sustaining political integration and reducing secessionist conflicts. Exploiting panel data covering 4,243 grid cells and 22 centuries, we find robust evidence that areas producing more jinshi – the top exam passers – experienced significantly fewer secessionist wars. Our study shows how the examination system created the political incentives for imperial durability.

This study examines the evolution and spillover effects of informational efficiency across carbon markets following the launch of China ’s national carbon emissions trading system (NCET). Using a time-varying parameter VAR model, we analyze efficiency transmission among the National Carbon Emission Allowance (CEA), six China’s pilot markets, and the European Union Allowances (EUA). The results reveal substantial heterogeneity in efficiency dynamics. Since early 2023, the CEA and Shenzhen have shown improved efficiency and stability, while the EUA and other pilot markets have experienced declines in efficiency and increased volatility. Despite progress in domestic markets’ efficiency, the EUA remains the primary source of efficiency spillover effects, followed by the CEA, Shenzhen, and Beijing, whereas other pilot markets—particularly Shanghai—act mainly as net recipients. Spillover intensity increases significantly during major regulatory periods, especially around China’s annual “Two Sessions,” highlighting the influence of policy signals on market linkages. These findings offer empirical insights into the time-varying transmission of efficiency under institutional reform and inform the coordinated design of carbon trading policies.

We use nearly a decade’s worth of panel data from European Union Chamber of Commerce in China business confidence surveys to analyse the deteriorating outlooks of EU firms in China from 2017 to 2025. All firms in China currently face challenges including slow profit growth and deflation. These circumstances have contributed to a rare drop of foreign direct investment into China over the last two years. However, certain challenges are particularly acute for foreign firms, including those from the EU. According to survey results, business sentiment among EU firms operating in China has never been bleaker. Respondents view their profitability, growth opportunities and competitiveness negatively, while fewer respondents than ever plan to expand their Chinese operations. Moreover, significant shares of respondents report recent increases in political pressure from the Chinese state and media, while nearly a third of respondents say they are siloing their Chinese operations, meaning separating them from other global activities. Disaggregated by size, sector, and years of operation in China, insightful differences emerge between the business strategies of EU firms. We broadly classify these into four categories: doubling-down, hedging, hibernating and ready to exit. EU policymakers should consider how to address the challenges EU firms in China face, such as asset-heavy sectors being ‘stuck’ in China and smaller firms lacking the capacity to operate at a loss in China’s market. The EU might need to facilitate transitions for these companies, helping them to reduce exposure to China and diversify into other emerging markets.

In highly competitive product markets, firms can internalize other firms’ resources through interfirm collaboration. Using a longitudinal dataset on strategic alliances among private and public firms in Europe, this study examines how industry competition induced by international trade inflows affects the interfirm competitive and cooperative dynamics. We document that industry-level competition shocks, caused by Chinese import penetration, are a key driver in shaping corporate alliances. Notably, firms with constrained cash flow but ample cash reserves are more likely to form alliances in industries experiencing competition shocks. After these alliances, we observe improvements in cash flow growth and investment, with this positive impact of interfirm collaboration being more pronounced among private firms. These findings suggest that strategic alliances are crucial tools for restructuring following international trade inflows, particularly among small, private enterprises.

Background: How to cope with the rapid growth of LTC (long-term care) needs for the old people without activities of daily living (ADL), which is also a serious hazard caused by public health emergencies such as COVID-2019 and SARS (2003), has become an urgent task in China, Germany, Japan, and other aging countries. As a response, the LTCI (longterm care insurance) system has been executed among European countries and piloted in 15 cities of China in 2016. Subsequently, the influence and dilemma of LTCI system have become a hot academic topic in the past 20 years.Methods: The review was carried out to reveal the effects of the LTCI system on different economic entities by reviewing relevantliterature published from January 2008 to September 2019. The quality of 25 quantitative and 24 qualitative articles was evaluated using the JBI and CASP critical evaluation checklist, respectively. Results: The review systematically examines the effects of the LTCI system on different microeconomic entities such as caretakers or their families and macroeconomic entities such as government spending. The results show that the LTCI system has a great impact on social welfare. For example, LTCI has a positive effect on the health and life quality of the disabled elderly. However, the role of LTCI in alleviating the financial burden on families with the disabled elderly may be limited. Conclusion: Implementation of LTCI system not only in reducing the physical and mental health problems of health care recipients and providers, and the economic burden of their families, but also promote the development of health care service industry and further improvement of the health care system. However, the dilemma and sustainable development of the LTCI system is the government needs to focus on in the future due to the sustainability of its funding sources.

A lack of sufficient information about potential borrowers is a major obstacle to access to financing from the traditional financial sector. In response to the need for better information to prevent fraud, to increase access to finance and to support balanced sustainable development, countries around the world have moved over the past several decades to develop credit information reporting requirements and systems to improve the coverage and quality of credit information. Until recently, such requirements mainly covered only banks. However, with the process of digital transformation in China and around the world, a range of new credit providers have emerged, in the context of financial technology (FinTech, TechFin and BigTech). Application of advanced data and analytics technologies provides major opportunities for both market participants – both traditional and otherwise – as well as for credit information agencies: by utilizing advanced technologies, participants and credit reporting agencies can collect massive amounts of information from various online and other activities (‘Big Data’), which contributes to the analysis of borrowing behavior and improves the accuracy of creditworthiness assessments, thereby enhancing availability of finance and supporting growth and development while also moderating prudential, behavioral and conduct related concerns at the heart of financial regulation. Reflecting international experience, China has over the past three decades developed a regulatory regime for credit information reporting and business. However, even in the context of traditional banking and credit, it has not come without problems. With the rapid growth and development of FinTech, TechFin and BigTech lenders, however, have come both real opportunities to leverage credit information and data but also real challenges around its regulation. For example, due to fragmented sources of borrower information and the involvement of many players of different types, there are difficulties in clarifying the business scope of credit reporting and also serious problems in relation to customer protection. Moreover, inadequate incentives for credit information and data sharing pose a challenge for regulators to promote competition and innovation in the credit market. Drawing upon the experiences of other jurisdictions, including the United States, United Kingdom, European Union, Singapore and Hong Kong, this paper argues that China should establish a sophisticated licensing regime and setout differentiated requirements for credit reporting agencies in line with the scope and nature of their business, thus addressing potential for regulatory arbitrage. Further, there is a need to formulate specific rules governing the provision of customer information to credit reporting agencies and the resolution of disputes arising from the accuracy and completeness of credit data. An effective information and data sharing scheme should be in place to help lenders make appropriate credit decisions and facilitate access to finance where necessary. The lessons from China’s experience in turn hold key lessons for other jurisdictions as they move from credit information to credit data regulation in their own financial systems.