The Full Guaranteed Purchase System began to replace the subsidy system as the core policy for promoting renewable energy integration, designating grid companies as the sole entity responsible for the physical integration of renewable energy. Meanwhile, the Tradable Green Certificates system provides environmental benefits for renewable power generators through market mechanisms. Therefore, exploring the strategic choices of various entities under the dual policy interventions, and uncovering the mechanisms for realizing electricity energy value and green value under different integration models, is of great significance for advancing China’s renewable energy integration. Based on China’s actual conditions, this study integrates the features of both policies and constructs a three-party evolutionary game model involving government, power generators, and grid enterprises to simulate their interactions and identify key factors influencing strategic choices. The results show that active government regulation effectively encourages positive strategies from both generators and grid companies, and that active power integration by grid companies further promotes green power generation. A “stepwise complementary” relationship exists among reputation gains, reputation losses, and regulatory costs: higher reputation gains can offset decision-making resistance arising from increased regulatory costs. Green power generation costs and innovation costs have significant negative effects on strategic choices, while the guaranteed purchase price has a significant positive effect on generators’ active strategies. The penalty parameter plays a key positive role in grid companies’ active strategies, and the guaranteed purchase price significantly influences their active integration behavior. This paper provides recommendations for motivating all entities actively participate in the consumption process.

Exploring the relationship between government subsidies, market competition, and the digital transformation of cultural and tourism enterprises (CTEs) will provide inspiration for upgrading and promoting the digitization development of China’s cultural and tourism industry. This paper theoretically and empirically evaluates the effect of government subsidies on digital transformation of CTEs by developing an evolutionary game combined with Hotelling model, and meanwhile using the econometric model. The theoretical model demonstrates that different subsidy scale will affect the evolutionary efficiency of the system under different market competition intensities. And the empirical model shows that the relationship between government subsidies and the digital transformation of CTEs is a U-shaped curve and the market competition exerts the flattening moderation on the U-shaped relationship. The findings provide guidance to both policymakers and managers.

The e-CNY, with its information transparency and financial inclusion, activates an innovative solution to cure the financing obstacles among the small and medium enterprises in China. The research establishes a game model between enterprises and commercial banks embedded in information asymmetry, and incorporates the e-CNY payment choice within the framework to analyse the cure effect of e-CNY on enterprise financing obstacles. With equilibrium results calculated, it simulates the outcomes of changing parameters on the behaviours of enterprises and banks. The findings involve that, based on the incremental utility of e-CNY and subsidies attached, e-CNY is preferred in transaction, reducing the bad debt risk caused by misalignment when both achieving excess returns. The People’s Bank of China must strengthen a more transparent publicity of e-CNY and structure an inclusive system of financial regulation to well use digital currency and realise high-quality socio-economic development.

This work explored the changes in production decision-making trends of Chinese steel enterprises under the influence of the carbon border adjustment mechanism. First, using evolutionary game theory, the interactive mechanism of complex production strategies among steel enterprises considering the carbon border adjustment mechanism was studied, including the impact of government subsidy coefficients, additional profits and carbon tax prices on enterprise decisionmaking.Second, the influence of key parameters on the dynamic evolutionary process was analysed. On this basis, the empirical simulation method was used to verify the game model and the main conclusions. Finally, the sensitivity analysis of the selected parameters was determined using Matlab software. The results showed that additional profits from green investment, government subsidy coefficients, input-output values and carbon tax prices had a higher impact on the evolution of enterprise production strategies. The results of this study provide a decision-making basis for the selection of future production methods for steel enterprises.