In the late 1980s, Mexico opened itself to international trade and foreign investment, followed in the early 1990s by China. China and Mexico are still the two countries characterized as middle-income by the World Bank with the highest levels of merchandise exports. Although their measures of openness have been comparable, these two countries have had sharply different economic performances: China has achieved spectacular growth, whereas Mexico’s growth has been disappointingly modest. In this article, we extend the analysis of Kehoe and Ruhl (2010) to account for the differences in these experiences. We show that China opened its economy while it was still achieving rapid growth from shifting employment out of agriculture and into manufacturing while Mexico opened long after its comparable phase of structural transformation. China is only now catching up with Mexico in terms of GDP per working-age person, and it still lags behind in terms of the fraction of its population engaged in agriculture. Furthermore, we argue that China has been able to move up a ladder of quality and technological sophistication in the composition of its exports and production, while Mexico seems to be stuck exporting a fixed set of products to its North American neighbors.

The benchmark discrepancy phenomenon arises when fund managers deviate from their stated benchmarks. We investigate benchmark discrepancy in China's mutual fund market by analyzing holdings data from all actively managed funds and document its widespread prevalence. However, in China – unlike in the U.S. – benchmark discrepancy reduces relative performance and capital inflows. We also examine the characteristics of fund managers exhibiting benchmark discrepancies and find they are more likely to be male, highly educated, and professionally experienced.

We investigate the relationship between the intensity of intraday return reversals and future stock returns in the Chinese stock market. We find that a high frequency of positive overnight returns followed by negative daytime returns predicts one-month ahead returns positively. The analysis shows that daytime retail investors tend to overly sell their own rising stocks at market open, accepting lower stock prices in exchange for liquidity. As the price pressure attenuates, these stocks experience subsequent price increases, implying a positive relationship between return reversals and future returns.

This study investigates the impact of early leadership experiences on innovation performance in small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in China. Using Enterprise Survey for Innovation and Entrepreneurship in China (ESIEC) cross-sectional datasets, it examines the mediating role of psychological traits and the moderating effect of age in this relationship. The analysis employs fixed effects models to control for regional and industry-specific unobserved characteristics. Results indicate a significant positive relationship between early leadership experiences and innovation, with psychological traits mediating this relationship strongly in younger entrepreneurs. For older entrepreneurs, early leadership has a more direct and stronger impact on innovation. These findings underscore the importance of early leadership development in education phase and suggest that the influence and pathways evolve with age, offering particular insights into the formation and application of social and human capital in the entrepreneurial journey

Banks have a significant funding-cost advantage if their liabilities are protected by bailout guarantees. We construct a corporate finance-style model showing that banks can exploit this funding-cost advantage by just intermediating funds between investors and ultimate borrowers, thereby earning the spread between their reduced funding rate and the competitive market rate. This mechanism leads to a crowding-out of direct market finance and real effects for bank borrowers at the intensive margin: banks protected by bailout guarantees induce their borrowers to leverage excessively, to overinvest, and to conduct inferior high-risk projects. We confirm our model predictions using U.S. panel data, exploiting exogenous changes in banks' political connections, which cause variation in bailout expectations. At the bank level, we find that higher bailout probabilities are associated with more wholesale debt funding and lending. Controlling for loan demand, we confirm this effect on bank lending at the bank-firm level and find evidence on loan pricing consistent with a shift towards riskier borrower real investments. Finally, at the firm level, we find that firms linked to banks that experience an expansion in their bailout guarantees show an increase in their leverage, higher investment levels with indications of overinvestment, and lower productivity.

We examine how mutual funds form stock market expectations and the implications of these beliefs for asset returns, using a novel text-based measure extracted from Chinese fund reports. Funds extrapolate from recent stock market and fund returns when forming expectations, with more recent returns receiving greater weight. This recency tendency is weaker among more experienced managers. At the aggregate level, consensus expectations positively predict short-term future market returns, both in and out of sample. At the fund level, expectations are positively related to subsequent fund performance in the time series. In the cross-section, however, superior performance arises only when funds accurately forecast market direction and adjust their portfolios accordingly. This effect is stronger for optimistic forecasts and among funds with greater exposure to liquid stocks. Our findings highlight the conditional nature of belief-driven performance, shaped jointly by forecasting skill and the ability to implement views in the presence of execution frictions such as short-selling and liquidity constraints.

With fintech growth and smartphone adoption, e-wallets, which enable instant transactions while offering cash management products with financial returns, have become increasingly prevalent. Using a unique dataset from Alipay, the world’s largest e-wallet provider, we find that holdings in Yu’EBao—an investment product usable for payments—are less affected by interest rate changes than similar assets without payment functions. This effect is stronger for users who depend on Yu’EBao for daily spending, during peak payment periods, or among less experienced investors. Our findings show that Yu’EBao reduces retail fund flow to riskier assets by 7.7% for every one-percentage-point interest rate cut, dampening monetary policy transmission through the portfolio rebalancing channel.

This study examines the economic consequences of China’s Three-Red-Lines policy—introduced in 2021 to cap real estate developers’ leverage by imposing strict thresholds on debt ratios and liquidity. Developers breaching these thresholds experienced sharp declines in financing, land acquisitions, and financial performance, with privately-owned developers disproportionately affected relative to state-owned firms. Using granular project-level data, we document significant drops in sales and a demand shift from private to state-owned developers. The policy also reduced local governments’ land sale revenues, prompting greater reliance on hidden local government financing vehicles for land purchases. The policy induced broad structural changes in China’s housing and land markets.

We investigate the economic impact of artificial intelligence (AI) adoption in the mutual fund industry by introducing a novel measure of AI adoption based on the presence of AI skilled personnel at fund management firms. We provide robust evidence that AI adoption enhances fund performance, primarily by improving risk management, increasing attentive capacity, and enabling faster information processing. Furthermore, we find that mutual funds with higher levels of AI adoption experience greater investor net flows and exhibit lower flow-performance sensitivity. While AI adoption benefits individual funds, we find no evidence of aggregate performance improvements at the industry level.

Utilizing a dataset from 2013 to 2022 on China’s listed companies, we explored whether a hedge fund network could help explain the occurrence of Chinese stock crash. First, this study constructs a hedge fund network based on common holdings. Then, from the perspective of network centrality, we examine the effect of hedge fund network on stock crash risk and its mechanism. Our findings show that companies with greater network centrality experience lower stock crash risk. Such results remain valid after alternating measures, using the propensity score matching method, and excluding other network effects. We further document that the centrality of hedge fund network reduces crash risk through three channels: information asymmetry, stock price information content and information delay. In addition, the negative effect of hedge fund network centrality on crash risk is more prominent for non-SOEs firms. In summary, our research shed light on the important role of hedge fund information network in curbing stock crash.