The discussion on the innovative effects of intellectual property pledge financing is a mainstream trend. In this context, this study has improved the existing research from several aspects, such as broadening the dimensions of innovation, adding dynamic analysis, refining multidimensional mediation mechanisms, and employing unique samples. Ultimately, we come to the following conclusions: (1) Intellectual property pledge financing suppresses enterprise innovation, especially innovation quality, but this pattern will be broken by raising the threshold of innovation conditions. The reason is that strict innovation conditions can lead to a poor innovation foundation for enterprises, which are rarely affected by the fluctuation of funds obtained from intellectual property pledge financing. (2) Intellectual property pledge financing has a non-linear effect on firm innovation, characterized by an increase followed by a decrease, suggesting that intellectual property pledge financing in current China can only provide a temporary stimulus for firm innovation. (3) The relationship between intellectual property pledge financing and enterprise innovation is strongly moderated by the ownership, type, and size of the enterprise, with the inhibitory effect of intellectual property pledge financing on enterprise innovation occurring mainly in state-owned enterprises, high-tech enterprises, and small enterprises, while its positive effects are more pronounced in private enterprises, non-high-tech enterprises, and medium-sized enterprises. (4) Financing constraints, internal incentives, external supervision, and signaling mechanisms are indeed key pathways through which intellectual property pledge financing affects firm innovation, especially when we analyse these mechanisms using dynamic models.

We investigate the effect of third-party certification for green bonds by analyzing its impact on issuer's future green innovation performances. We find that third-party certification for green bonds can significantly promote issuer's future green innovation performances. Furthermore, the promotion effect is more prominent in non-state-owned issuers, large issuers and heavy polluting issuers, and can be more significantly exerted by professional and reputable third-party certification agencies. Besides, third-party certification for green bonds can play the effect by reducing the issuer's tax expenditure, increasing the issuer's loan financing, and receiving a positive response in stock returns. But unexpectedly, it cannot play the effect by further reducing the credit spread of green bonds. Our findings indicate that independent external supervision can play a positive role in green bond issuance, but there is still a long way to go.

We examine the impact of state-owned shareholders on fraud within private firms. Utilizing a sample of A-share private listed firms in China observed from 2008 to 2021. We discover a significant negative association between state-owned shareholders and the likelihood of fraud in private firms. State-owned shareholders primarily act as inhibitors of fraud, and their effect on the probability of fraud being detected is not statistically significant. This finding remains robust even after conducting a series of sensitivity tests to mitigate potential selectivity bias and reverse causality endogeneity issues. In the analysis of heterogeneity, we found that state-owned shareholders play a more active role under conditions of imperfect external institutional development, and they also exert a more significant inhibitory effect on enterprises with lower governance levels and higher business risks. Our mechanism test demonstrates that the inhibitory effect of state-owned shareholders on corporate fraud is achieved by improving corporate governance and alleviating financial distress. This study also examines the impact of state-owned shareholders' local characteristics, external supervision mechanisms, and internal governance mechanisms in unique Chinese enterprises on fraudulent behaviour by private enterprises. Overall, our study provides empirical evidence that state-owned shareholder ownership is associated with reducing fraudulent behaviour within private firms.

Using the establishment of the Chinese Integrated Circuit Industry Investment Fund in 2014 as a quasi-natural experiment, we investigate whether and how the national industrial investment fund affects corporate R&D investment. We find that the policy has a significant and positive effect on corporate R&D investment, and this effect is more pronounced in firms with more severe financial constraints, poorer internal governance, and laxer external supervision. Furthermore, the mechanism tests show that this policy helps alleviate firms’ financial constraints and agency conflict, thereby increasing corporate R&D investment.

In this paper, we use a distinct quasi-natural experiments to examine the effect of liberalization of the stock market on corporate environmental, social, and governance(ESG) disclosure quality. We find that the liberation of the opening of Shanghai(Shenzhen)-Hong Kong Stock Connect (SHSC) significantly and consistently improves ESG disclosure quality of listed companies, and this effect is most evident in environmental information disclosure. We then find that the SHSC can improve the quality of ESG disclosure of listed companies through “voting with feet” and “external supervision” effect. Furthermore, the effect is stronger in firms that are Non-SOEs and with low equity concentrations. Overall, our results suggest that the liberalization of stock market can improve the quality of companies’ ESG disclosure quality.

Using the establishment of the Chinese Integrated Circuit Industry Investment Fund in 2014 as a quasi-natural experiment, we investigate whether and how the national industrial investment fund affects corporate R&D investment. We find that the policy has a significant and positive effect on corporate R&D investment, and this effect is more pronounced in firms with more severe financial constraints, poorer internal governance, and laxer external supervision. Furthermore, the mechanism tests show that this policy helps alleviate firms’ financial constraints and agency conflict, thereby increasing corporate R&D investment.

In this paper, we use a distinct quasi-natural experiments to examine the effect of liberalization of the stock market on corporate environmental, social, and governance(ESG) disclosure quality. We find that the liberation of the opening of Shanghai(Shenzhen)-Hong Kong Stock Connect (SHSC) significantly and consistently improves ESG disclosure quality of listed companies, and this effect is most evident in environmental information disclosure. We then find that the SHSC can improve the quality of ESG disclosure of listed companies through “voting with feet” and “external supervision” effect. Furthermore, the effect is stronger in firms that are Non-SOEs and with low equity concentrations. Overall, our results suggest that the liberalization of stock market can improve the quality of companies’ ESG disclosure quality.