We construct the China Crude Oil Volatility Index (CNOVX)—the first model-free, optionimplied measure of forward-looking oil price risk for China—using INE crude oil options from 2021 to 2024 and an adapted CBOE methodology that accounts for sparse strike availability via smooth interpolation and extrapolation. Our results show that CNOVX increases with trading activity in the futures market, declines with option volume, and is strongly predicted by the 30-day realized variance of the SC crude oil futures contract. External shocks, including the Russia–Ukraine conflict and the Geopolitical Risk Index, significantly elevate CNOVX levels. During the COVID-19 pandemic, mortality risk intensifies the volatility-amplifying role of futures trading and strengthens the volatility-dampening effect of options, while confirmed case counts have weaker influence. We further document a pronounced asymmetric leverage effect: negative futures returns raise CNOVX more than positive returns of equal size. However, volatility feedback effects are negligible, as changes in implied volatility respond primarily to contemporaneous market conditions. Overall, CNOVX serves as a timely and informative benchmark for monitoring risk in China’s evolving crude oil derivatives market, with valuable implications for investors, hedgers, and policymakers.

We find that the level of short interest in a firm's stock significantly predicts future seasoned equity offers (SEOs). The probability of an SEO announcement increases by 34% (decreases by 49%) for firms in the top (bottom) quintile of short interest. We identify a causal impact of short interest on SEO issuance using a novel instrument for short interest based on future litigation filings in close geographical proximity to hedge fund centers. Our findings suggest that corporate decisions can be triggered by the aggregate trading activity of sophisticated outside investors.

We study the effect of managerial career concerns on informational feedback from stockmarkets. We set up a model in which managers with career concerns can learn information from their own information production or from stock price feedback. A key insight from the model is that if managerial career concerns are high, a less frictional market induces more information production by both managers and speculators. As a result, although price informativeness improves, managers learn less from the stock market, contrasting with the classical view in the literature on stock price feedback. Exploiting a quasi-natural experiment, we document evidence consistent with model predictions.