This article examines the impact of the Green Financial Regulatory Policy on corporate strategic ESG behavior against the backdrop of the 2017 policy integration of “green finance” into the Macro-Prudential Assessment by the central bank. The research identifies that GFRP may shift corporate focus towards the disclosure of ESG performance while neglecting the actual practices of ESG engagement, potentially inducing firms to engage in ESG greenwashing. It is further posited that corporate green perception and executives’ environmental backgrounds serve as primary mechanisms in this dynamic. Additionally, the policy efficacy of GFRP on strategic ESG behavior exhibits heterogeneity

The e-CNY, with its information transparency and financial inclusion, activates an innovative solution to cure the financing obstacles among the small and medium enterprises in China. The research establishes a game model between enterprises and commercial banks embedded in information asymmetry, and incorporates the e-CNY payment choice within the framework to analyse the cure effect of e-CNY on enterprise financing obstacles. With equilibrium results calculated, it simulates the outcomes of changing parameters on the behaviours of enterprises and banks. The findings involve that, based on the incremental utility of e-CNY and subsidies attached, e-CNY is preferred in transaction, reducing the bad debt risk caused by misalignment when both achieving excess returns. The People’s Bank of China must strengthen a more transparent publicity of e-CNY and structure an inclusive system of financial regulation to well use digital currency and realise high-quality socio-economic development.

Local financial development is crucial for advancing regional financial supply side structural reform, enabling local governments to leverage financial instruments to effectively mobilize land resources and foster competitive growth. The introduction of numerous financial products linked to land-related rights and interests has resulted in a pronounced transmission and interconnection of fiscal and financial risks across regions. This study examines the impact of local financial development on land financialization in China using panel data from prefecture-level cities and detailed information on land mortgages. The findings indicate that the establishment of city commercial banks (CCBs) contributes to the progress of land financialization by incentivizing local government financing vehicles to participate in land mortgage financing, increasing the transfer of debt risks to the financial sector. Notably, the impact of CCBs on land financialization is more pronounced in regions with urban agglomeration, high GDP manipulation, inadequate local financial regulation, and robust implicit government guarantees. Further analysis reveals that CCB establishment has negative spillover effects on land financialization in neighboring areas, while expansion strategies such as establishing intercity branches, engaging in cross-regional mergers, and relaxing regulations have mitigated the rise of land financialization at the regional level. This study provides policy recommendations that focus on reducing local governments’ reliance on land financing and enhancing the prevention and management of financial risks.

A lack of sufficient information about potential borrowers is a major obstacle to access to financing from the traditional financial sector. In response to the need for better information to prevent fraud, to increase access to finance and to support balanced sustainable development, countries around the world have moved over the past several decades to develop credit information reporting requirements and systems to improve the coverage and quality of credit information. Until recently, such requirements mainly covered only banks. However, with the process of digital transformation in China and around the world, a range of new credit providers have emerged, in the context of financial technology (FinTech, TechFin and BigTech). Application of advanced data and analytics technologies provides major opportunities for both market participants – both traditional and otherwise – as well as for credit information agencies: by utilizing advanced technologies, participants and credit reporting agencies can collect massive amounts of information from various online and other activities (‘Big Data’), which contributes to the analysis of borrowing behavior and improves the accuracy of creditworthiness assessments, thereby enhancing availability of finance and supporting growth and development while also moderating prudential, behavioral and conduct related concerns at the heart of financial regulation. Reflecting international experience, China has over the past three decades developed a regulatory regime for credit information reporting and business. However, even in the context of traditional banking and credit, it has not come without problems. With the rapid growth and development of FinTech, TechFin and BigTech lenders, however, have come both real opportunities to leverage credit information and data but also real challenges around its regulation. For example, due to fragmented sources of borrower information and the involvement of many players of different types, there are difficulties in clarifying the business scope of credit reporting and also serious problems in relation to customer protection. Moreover, inadequate incentives for credit information and data sharing pose a challenge for regulators to promote competition and innovation in the credit market. Drawing upon the experiences of other jurisdictions, including the United States, United Kingdom, European Union, Singapore and Hong Kong, this paper argues that China should establish a sophisticated licensing regime and setout differentiated requirements for credit reporting agencies in line with the scope and nature of their business, thus addressing potential for regulatory arbitrage. Further, there is a need to formulate specific rules governing the provision of customer information to credit reporting agencies and the resolution of disputes arising from the accuracy and completeness of credit data. An effective information and data sharing scheme should be in place to help lenders make appropriate credit decisions and facilitate access to finance where necessary. The lessons from China’s experience in turn hold key lessons for other jurisdictions as they move from credit information to credit data regulation in their own financial systems.

This paper researches into development of China’s shadow banking during 2020-2022, a special period marked by COVID-19 and strengthened global regulation on Non-Bank Financial Intermediation (NBFI). Research focus includes balance sheet evolvement, growth dynamics, and relation with macro-finance. Its business model surprisingly resembles western peers. They both fund underserved sectors and have similar exposure to balance sheet mismatch. Massive holding of bond investment (36.6% of total asset) is funded by uninsured interbank fund and wealth management product, which makes it more closely related with banks’ balance sheet and risk contagion from NBFI to traditional commercial banks more easily. This paper then re-summarizes growth dynamics of China’s shadow banking in a “Pull-Push” framework, and proposes concept of reintermediation in respective to disintermediation. Consecutive regulation on NBFI and real estate sector kept dragging on growth of shadow banking, and rendered it in liquidity surplus, which is invested into interbank market. This paper also provides empirical evidence on relation of China’s shadow banking with macro-finance, and notes several empirical breakdowns of pre- COVID relations among economic and financial indicators. Most important breakdown is the non-functionality of monetary policy transmission channel. Besides, it continued to twist de facto financial regulatory indicators, however with fading impact.

We study non-performing loan (NPL) transactions in China using proprietary data from a leading market participant. We find these transactions – driven by tighter financial regulation – are consistent with banks concealing non-performing assets from regulators as (i) transaction prices do not compensate for credit risks; (ii) banks fund the NPL transactions and remain responsible for debt collection; and (iii) 70% of NPL packages are re-sold at inflated prices to bank clients. These results imply NPL transactions do not truly resolve NPLs. Recognizing the hidden NPLs implies the total NPLs in China is two to four times the reported amount.