Financial leverage

  • 详情 Labor Protection and Financing Decisions of Firms: The Case of China
    Serfling (2016) examines how the increase in firing costs impacts the capital structure decisions of firms and hypothesizes that higher firing costs of labor lead to a decline in a firm’s financial leverage use by directly increasing its distress costs and indirectly lifting its operating leverage. Stricter labor protection laws passed in China in 2007 provide an opportunity to revisit the issue within a controlled environment. Employees of SOEs already enjoy the benefits that the new labor law imparts. So, SOEs are exposed to lower firing costs than their non-SOE counterparts. Additionally, the exposure to bankruptcy is more limited for SOEs than non-SOEs. We hypothesize and show that non-SOE firms’ financial leverage decreases more than SOEs, confirming the leverage-lowering effect of labor protection laws. Further, the decline in financial leverage is more pronounced for a labor-intensive firm or one that encounters steep competition.
  • 详情 Digital Finance and Corporate Financial Fraud
    This paper examines the impact and mechanism of digital finance on financial fraud by constructing a theoretical framework of digital finance affecting corporate financial fraud. We use panel data of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2011 to 2018. The results that digital finance can significantly inhibit corporate financial fraud and improve the ability of financial institutions to identify financial statements. Thus, the incentive and opportunity for corporations to engage in financial fraud is directly reduced. The internal mechanism shows that digital finance can restrain corporate financial fraud by alleviating the financing constraints faced by enterprises, as well as reducing corporate financial fraud by reducing corporate leverage. These effects will reduce debt pressure, thus easing the motivation of corporate financial fraud. The results of heterogeneity analysis that digital finance has a significant inhibitory effect on financial fraud of enterprises with different scales and different property rights.
  • 详情 Country of Origin Effects in Capital Structure Decisions: Evidence from Foreign Direct Investments in China
    We investigate the role of managers’ country of origin in leverage decisions using data on foreign joint ventures in China. By focusing on foreign joint ventures in a single country, we are able to hold constant the financing environment, eliminate the effects of formal institutions in the foreign managers’ home country, and consequently reveal the effects of informal institutions such as national culture on corporate finance decisions. Using cultural values of embeddedness, mastery, and uncertainty avoidance to explain country of origin effects, we find that national culture has significant explanatory power in the financial leverage decisions of foreign joint ventures in China. Country-level variation is evident in capital structure and appears to work through choices of firm characteristics, industry affiliation, ownership structure, and region of investment.
  • 详情 Country of Origin Effects in Capital Structure Decisions: Evidence from Foreign Direct Investments in China
    We investigate the role of managers' country of origin in leverage decisions using data on foreign joint ventures in China. By focusing on foreign joint ventures in a single country, we are able to hold constant the financing environment, eliminate the effects of formal institutions in the foreign managers' home country, and consequently reveal the effects of informal institutions such as national culture on corporate finance decisions. Using cultural values of embeddedness, mastery, and uncertainty avoidance to explain country of origin effects, we find that national culture has significant explanatory power in the financial leverage decisions of foreign joint ventures in China. Country-level variation is evident in capital structure and appears to work through choices of firm characteristics, industry affiliation, ownership structure, and region of investment.
  • 详情 Agency Costs of Government Ownership: A Study of Voluntary Audit Committee Formation in China
    In this paper, we investigate the agency costs of government ownership and their impact on corporate governance and firm value. China is used as a laboratory because of the prevalent state shareholdings in exchange-listed firms. In this context, we specifically consider the trade-offs involved in the voluntary formation of an audit committee when the controlling shareholder is the state. The decision to improve corporate governance (in this case, introduce an audit committee) is shown to be value relevant and a function of existing agency relationships and non-trivial implementation costs. Our findings are robust to the level of pyramid groups, the ownership-control wedge, and financial leverage. The research adds to the debate regarding the effect of government shareholdings on corporate culture and performance - a topic that has taken on renewed importance in recent times.