This study examines how firm-level exposure to the COVID-19 pandemic affects the speed of leverage adjustment among 3260 US-listed firms from 2019q1 to 2022q1. Using a novel measure of COVID-19 exposure, we find that higher exposure significantly reduces the speed at which firms adjust their leverage towards target levels. This effect is more pronounced for financially constrained firms and those operating in competitive markets. We further show that COVID-19 exposure adversely impacts corporate liquidity, default risk, and financial flexibility. Our findings highlight the role of exogenous shocks in shaping corporate financing decisions.

We develop a signaling game model of investment to explore the effects of ambiguity aversion on corporate equilibrium strategies, investment dynamics, and financing decisions in incomplete markets with asymmetric information. Our analysis shows that volatility ambiguity aversion has a similar but more pronounced effect than asymmetric information, leading to higher financing costs, lower investment probabilities, and a greater likelihood of non-participation in investment. Importantly, volatility ambiguity aversion exhibits an amplifier effect, magnifying financing costs, adverse selection costs, and distortion in investment choices under asymmetric information. This increased ambiguity aversion raises the chances of inefficient separating and pooling equilibria, resulting in notable welfare losses. These findings highlight the significant impact of ambiguity aversion on strategic decision-making and equilibrium outcomes in investment, particularly in settings marked by information asymmetry and incomplete markets.

The opening of high-speed rail (HSR) has significantly boosted business development in China. This study constructs a credit rationing model based on the theory of information asymmetry, and takes the opening of HSR as a quasi-natural experiment to empirically examine its impact on the investment and financing decisions among firms with different risk profiles using data from A-share listed companies from 2005 to 2019. The findings reveal that HSR opening significantly reduces corporate short-term loans while increasing long-term loans, without affecting loan costs. Lowriskfirms, as opposed to high-risk ones, experience notable reductions in short-term loan amounts and extended loan terms post-HSR opening. This is attributed to HSR mitigating information asymmetry between banks and firms. Additionally, HSR opening suppresses "short-term debt for long-term use" behaviors, thereby enhancing investment efficiency and quality. The study empirically supports the idea of leveraging HSR's economic stimulus in terms of firm investment and financing.

This study shows that investment decisions drive tail risks (i.e., systemic risk and stand-alone tail risk) of TBTF (Too-Big-to-Fail) banks, while financing decisions determine tail risks of non-TBTF banks. After the Dodd-Frank Act, undercapitalized non-TBTF banks continue to gamble for resurrection, and their stand-alone tail risk become more sensitive to funding availability and net-stable-funding-ratio than TBTF banks. We show that implementing a slimmed-down version of TBTF regulations on non-TBTF banks cannot efficiently contain the stand-alone risk of non-TBTF banks and cannot eliminate TBTF privilege. Moreover, non-TBTF banks together generate larger pressure of contagion on the real economy, and they herd more when making financing decisions after the Act. Our findings highlight the need for enhanced regulations on the liability-side of non-TBTF banks.

This paper exploits China’s first default of state-owned enterprises to study the implicit government guarantee’s effect on SOEs’ trade credit financing. It finds that SOEs increase trade credit by 2.3% of total liabilities, on average, relative to non-SOEs after the first SOE default in China’s bond markets in 2015. The additional reliance on suppliers’ credit is more prominent among SOEs with higher information opacity. It is consistent with the literature where trade credit advantage lies in the suppliers’ superior information, as they can observe their clients through daily transactions. The current paper also finds that trade credits positively affect SOEs when IGG weakens. Overall, the results suggest that the reduction in IGG significantly affects Chinese firms’ financing decisions, highlighting the trade credit advantage against the backdrop of imperfect market institutions.

Serfling (2016) examines how the increase in firing costs impacts the capital structure decisions of firms and hypothesizes that higher firing costs of labor lead to a decline in a firm’s financial leverage use by directly increasing its distress costs and indirectly lifting its operating leverage. Stricter labor protection laws passed in China in 2007 provide an opportunity to revisit the issue within a controlled environment. Employees of SOEs already enjoy the benefits that the new labor law imparts. So, SOEs are exposed to lower firing costs than their non-SOE counterparts. Additionally, the exposure to bankruptcy is more limited for SOEs than non-SOEs. We hypothesize and show that non-SOE firms’ financial leverage decreases more than SOEs, confirming the leverage-lowering effect of labor protection laws. Further, the decline in financial leverage is more pronounced for a labor-intensive firm or one that encounters steep competition.

This paper empirically investigates the determinants of financing decisions in Chinese listed firms, using 3,196 firm-year observations from the Shanghai Stock Exchange during the period 2001–2005. Thereby, we investigate the effects of differences in institutions across Chinese provinces and municipalities, and compare the financing choices of state-owned and private-controlled enterprises. We find that a better legal environment negatively affects the debt ratio and the proportion of debt that consists of bank loans in SOEs as well as private-controlled enterprises. Conversely, regional banking development positively influences these two variables. If anything, these effects of the rule of law and regional banking development on leverage are stronger for private-controlled firms. SOEs have lower debt ratios in regions with better stock market access, while private-controlled firms rely less on bank loans in regions with more government intervention in business. Finally, we document that SOEs’ overall debt ratio and composition of debt are comparable to those of private-controlled firms.

This paper empirically investigates the determinants of financing decisions in Chinese listed firms, using 3,196 firm-year observations from the Shanghai Stock Exchange during the period 2001–2005. Thereby, we investigate the effects of differences in institutions across Chinese provinces and municipalities, and compare the financing choices of state-controlled and private-controlled enterprises. We find that a better legal environment negatively affects the debt ratio and the proportion of debt that consists of bank loans in SOEs as well as private enterprises. Conversely, regional banking development positively influences these two variables. If anything, these effects of the rule of law and regional banking development on leverage are stronger for private-controlled firms. SOEs have lower debt ratios in regions with better stock market access, while private firms rely less on bank loans in regions with more government intervention in business. Finally, we document that SOE bank loans have a longer maturity, while their overall debt ratio and debt mix are comparable to those of private firms.