Interest rate liberalization in China intensifies the exposure of commercial banks' interest rate risks and further increases the difficulty for commercial banks to effectively control interest rate risks, thus putting forward higher requirements for the normal operation and management of commercial banks. With the development of China's financial derivatives market, banking institutions begin to use basic interest rate derivatives to hedge interest rate risks. It is very important to give full play to the maturity transformation Function of commercial banks to enhance the ability of financial services to the real economy. Based on the semi annual unbalanced panel data of 37 listed banks in A-share stock markets from 2006 to 2020, this paper empirically tests the impact of the use of off balance sheet interest rate derivatives on the Maturity Transformation Function of banks in the case of interest rate fluctuations. The empirical results show that: (1) the use of interest rate derivatives helps to weaken the negative impact of interest rate fluctuations on the Maturity Transformation Function of banks. (2) The analysis of the mechanism shows that the use of interest rate derivatives improves the stability of the bank's asset side term structure and liability side term structure, so as to support the effective play of the bank's financial intermediary role. (3) Further analysis shows that the of interest rate derivatives significantly reduces the volatility of bank earnings. This study makes it clear that the use of interest rate derivatives has a positive impact on the commercial banks, which provides evidence for the further development of interest rate derivatives market in China.

In this paper, we provide one of the first large sample comparisons of cash policies in public and private US firms. We first show that on average private firms hold less than half as much cash as public firms do. The higher cash holdings of public firms are partially caused by the fact that public firms add more to their cash reserves in a given year, even controlling for a number of spending and savings factors, than do similar private firms. At the same time, however, we find that among firms with excess cash holdings, public firms spend more of it than do private firms. Thus, public firm managers are more aggressive in both accumulating and spending cash reserves. Finally, consistent with the presence of financing frictions, we find that private firms’ cash-to-cash flow sensitivity is higher than that of public firms. Overall, our evidence supports both the agency conflicts and the financing frictions views of corporate cash policy.

Using a sample of Chinese family firms from 2000 to 2007, we investigate whether the political connection of the family firms will help them to reduce the frictions they face in external financing in a relationship-based economy. We find that political connectedness of family firms could reduce their investment-cash flow sensitivity. More interestingly, this political connectedness effect exists only in financially constrained family firms. However, from governance dimension, we cannot find any significant variation of the political connection effect on the sensitivity of investment to cash flow. We argue that these evidences are consistent with the firm’s underinvestment arising from the asymmetric information problems, and are inconsistent with the firm’s overinvestment arising from the free-cash-flow problems.

Using a sample of Chinese family firms from 2000 to 2007, we investigate whether the political connection of the family firms will help them to reduce the frictions they face in external financing in a relationship-based economy. We find that political connectedness of family firms could reduce their investment-cash flow sensitivity. More interestingly, this political connectedness effect exists only in financially constrained family firms. However, from governance dimension, we cannot find any significant variation of the political connection effect on the sensitivity of investment to cash flow. We argue that these evidences are consistent with the firm’s underinvestment arising from the asymmetric information problems, and are inconsistent with the firm’s overinvestment arising from the free-cash-flow problems.