This paper investigates whether increased female representation on corporate boards affects firms’ bond financing costs. Exploiting the 2017 Big Three’s campaigns as a plausibly exogenous shock, we document that firms experiencing larger increases in female board representation, induced by the campaigns, experience significant reductions in bond yield spreads and improvements in credit ratings. We identify reduced leverage and enhanced workplace environment as key mechanisms, and show that the effects are stronger among firms with greater tail risk and information asymmetry. An alternative identification strategy based on California’s SB 826 regulatory mandate yields consistent results. Our findings suggest that board gender diversity enhances governance in ways valued by credit markets.

We develop a signaling game model of investment to explore the effects of ambiguity aversion on corporate equilibrium strategies, investment dynamics, and financing decisions in incomplete markets with asymmetric information. Our analysis shows that volatility ambiguity aversion has a similar but more pronounced effect than asymmetric information, leading to higher financing costs, lower investment probabilities, and a greater likelihood of non-participation in investment. Importantly, volatility ambiguity aversion exhibits an amplifier effect, magnifying financing costs, adverse selection costs, and distortion in investment choices under asymmetric information. This increased ambiguity aversion raises the chances of inefficient separating and pooling equilibria, resulting in notable welfare losses. These findings highlight the significant impact of ambiguity aversion on strategic decision-making and equilibrium outcomes in investment, particularly in settings marked by information asymmetry and incomplete markets.

Biodiversity conservation incurs substantial economic costs. We investigate how financial markets price the risks such costs induce, exploiting the “Green Shield Action,” a major regulatory initiative launched in China in 2017 to enforce biodiversity preservation rules in national nature reserves. While improving biodiversity, the initiative led to significant increases in bond yields for municipalities with these reserves. The effects are driven by increases in local governments’ fiscal risk due to expected increases in transition costs resulting from shutting down illegal economic activities within reserves and additional public spending on biodiversity. Investors show little non-financial consideration towards endeavors counteracting biodiversity loss.

Using data from Chinese A-share listed companies for the period 2007–2022,we investigates the impact of financialization on the long-term use of short-term debt (LUSD). Our findings reveal that increased financialization leads to a stronger issue of LUSD. Financialization squeezes long-term investments and equity financing levels of firms, thereby leading to LUSD. Moreover, the rise in financing costs and the degree of financing constraints intensify the effects of financialization on LUSD. The smaller the scale of the enterprise, the shorter its operating period, the higher its operational risk, the greater the promoting effect of financialization on LUSD.

In this paper, we investigate whether those enterprises adopting digital finance exhibit higher values. On the basis of the constructed fintech-related lexicon developed by the machine learning-based Word2Vec model, we employ the frequency of fintech-related words (phrases) in the management discussion sections of annual reports as a proxy variable for the degree to which enterprises apply digital finance. We utilize panel data regression and mediation models based on data of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2016 to 2022 and explore the impact of this degree of digital finance application on enterprise value. We find that the degree to which enterprises apply digital finance elevates their values. The in-depth integration of digital technology and finance directly enhances enterprise value by reducing financing costs. Additionally, the effects are more evident among small-scale firms and enterprises located in regions with lower marketization levels. However, in the face of the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, the positive effects on enterprises are relatively low.

High-bargaining-power (low-bargaining-power) customer (supplier) firms borrow (lend) more trade credit according to the literature. We study whether this bargaining power effect strengthens or weakens when the credit supply tightens. We construct a Nash bargaining model of trade credit and show that the bargaining power effect weakens if their financing costs increase more than that of the customers. We find support for our theory using a unique database of listed firms in China that discloses firms’ transaction information with important customers and suppliers. Interest-rate sensitive suppliers, proxied by a non-state ownership, a high debt rollover risk, and a high financial constraint index, reduce trade credit to their high-bargaining-power customers during credit contractions.

We show that government deleveraging causes corporate distress in a distorted financial market. Our difference-in-differences analysis exploits China’s top-down deleveraging policy in 2017, which reduces local governments’ borrowing capacity through shadow bank financing. Private firms with government procurement contracts experience larger accounts receivable increases, larger cash holdings reductions, and higher external financing costs. These firms also experienced greater likelihoods of ownership changes and deteriorated performance. Effects are muted for state-owned enterprises, which enjoy funding privileges in China’s financial system. Our paper thus reveals a novel channel of allocation inefficiencies where government deleveraging amplifies adverse impacts of financial distortions.

We estimate real losses arising from the cross-sectional misallocation of financial liabilities. Extending a production-based framework of misallocation measurement to the liabilities side of the balance sheet and using manufacturing firm data from the United States and China, we find significant misallocation of debt and equity in China but not the United States. Reallocating liabilities of firms in China to mimic U.S. efficiency would produce gains of 51% to 69% in real value-added, with only 17% to 21% stemming from inefficient debt-equity combinations. For Chinese firms that are large or in developed cities, we estimate lower distortionary financing costs.

Using the staggered introduction of regional specialized debt recovery courts as a quasi-natural experiment, we estimate the causal effect of law enforcement on financing cost of corporate bonds in China. With primary market issuing data, we show that the introduction of specialized courts reduces issuers’bond financing cost by 15%. The analysis of secondary market trading data confirms the results that the yield spreads of existing bonds reduce significantly. Exploring regional-, firm- and bond-level heterogeneity, we find the effects to be much stronger when ex-ante default risk is high. Our case-level analyses further support that enforcement cost reduction in debt dispute resolution is a channel for the reduction of cost of bond. Our paper has important policy implications in light of the recent bond default wave in China, suggesting that creditors protection through highly efficient law enforcement is important for bond market development and will eventually benefit bond issuers as well.

We investigate the impact of the geographic proximity of underwriters on bond characteristics by using corporate and enterprise bonds issued in China from 2009 to 2019. We find bonds underwritten by underwriters in close geographic proximity are associated with lower financing costs, longer maturity in high and medium credit rating firms, shorter maturity in low credit rating firms, and lower default risk. Further, we find substitution effects between the geographic proximity of underwriter and underwriter reputation, and also between the geographic proximity of underwriter and firm transparency on reducing the costs of bond financing; i.e., a better reputation of the underwriter or higher transparency of the firm will weaken geographical proximate underwriters’ effects. Our results are robust in subsamples when firms have different degrees of local government connections.