Firm Distress

  • 详情 Do Shadow Loans Create Firm Distress and Harm Investment? Evidence from China
    This paper uses a loan transactions dataset from China to identify whether shadow loans cost more than formal bank loans even with collateral. This motivates us to explore the reasons as to why a listed firm would opt for such loans. Using propensity-score matched data, we find that privately-owned firms with shadow loans are forced to obtain these loans since they are politically discriminated following a regulation change in 2009 that favoured state-owned firms. However, state-owned firms obtain shadow loans due to their inferior firm characteristics. Further, we employ a Difference-in-Differences methodology to uncover that privately-owned firms experience a decline in their performance, investment growth and an increase in default probability following their high dependence on shadow loans when they are excluded from the formal loan market. The above results survive various robustness checks, including doubly-robust inverse-probability weighted Difference-in-Differences regressions.
  • 详情 Appointment of Political Top Executives and Subsequent Performance and Corporate Governance: Evidence from China's Listed SOEs
    This paper investigates the replacement and appointment of top executives in a business highly involved by the government and their consequences on firm performance and corporate governance. It provides a dynamic setting to test the value of political connection as prior studies do not discern government interests and incorporate ambiguous institutions and self-selection problems by cross-section test. Using data of China’s listed state-owned enterprises (SOEs), this paper finds that the state owner is more likely to replace top executives and appoint a politically-connected executive when SOEs encounter economic distress such as poor ROA, earnings loss, high financial risk, or political distress such as SEC regulation violation. It implies that the politically-connected executive may be considered helpful by the government in response to firm distress. Further, it is found that the political top executives improve firm performance following their appointments and reduce the frequency of executives’ illegal actions, by initiating modification of internal governance structures and mitigating manager’s discretion. And those firms do not have preferential access to resources or government assistances such as fiscal subsidies, tax benefits, or the credit market. All these findings support that political executives could serve as a disciplinary or monitoring mechanism in a political economy lack of external market for corporate control and legal protection for investors, instead of being only a form of bail-out. Their efficacy is based on their administrative power, regulatory expertise and accountability to the government interests. These results provide better understanding of government interests and their impact on corporate governance.