We demonstrate that personal political preferences of corporate managers influence cor- porate policies. Specifically, Republican managers who are likely to have conservative personal ideologies adopt and maintain more conservative corporate policies. Those firms have lower levels of corporate debt, lower capital and research and development (R&D) expenditures, less risky investments, but higher profitability. Using the 9/11 terrorist attacks and Sept. 2008 Lehman Brothers bankruptcy as natural experiments, we demonstrate that investment policies of Republican managers became more conservative following these ex- ogenous uncertainty-increasing events. Furthermore, around chief executive officer (CEO) turnovers, including CEO deaths, firm leverage policy becomes more conservative when managerial conservatism increases.

This study explores how foreign competition impacts the capital structure of domestic firms. While import competition is associated with a decrease in domestic firms’ leverage, we propose a novel perspective concerning the positive effect of inward foreign direct investment (FDI) on leverage. FDI competition can boost demand for debt via productivity spillover to domestic firms, and also increase supply of debt by inducing lenders to herd toward foreign investors. Using Chinese firm-level data, we find that the positive effects of industry inward FDI on domestic firms’ leverage are more pronounced in high-tech industries and industries where foreign investors exhibit a high degree of herding behavior. Our instrument variable approach, employing industry exchange rates and import tariffs, supports these findings. Additionally, we reveal that the positive effect of FDI on local firms’ leverage is amplified when the firms have stronger absorptive capacities, receive foreign capital, and experience more human capital transfers from foreign rivals.