Do investors respond to what fund managers say, or how they look saying it? Using 2,000 live-streamed sessions by Chinese ETF managers and multimodal machine learning, we show that managers’ facial expressions, not their words, drive fund flows. A one-standard-deviation increase in positive facial affect raises next-day flows by 0.17pp (260% of mean). Vocal tone shows weak effects; textual sentiment shows none. Critically, facial expressions predict flows but not returns, indicating pure persuasion rather than information transmission. Effects strengthen when investors are emotionally vulnerable (down markets, retail-heavy funds) and persist 2-3 weeks before dissipating. Our findings challenge the emphasis on textual disclosure in finance and raise questions about investor protection as video communication proliferates.

This paper studies how mutual fund managers update their beliefs as macroeconomic conditions change. Using regulator-mandated reports from Chinese mutual funds, we measure the intensity of belief updating from year-over-year changes in stated outlooks and decompose those updates into macro and micro themes. We show that belief updating is state-contingent: funds with more intensive belief updating shift their narratives toward macro (micro) topics during recessions (expansions) and concurrently reduce (increase) procyclical stock exposures and on-site company visits. This state-contingent belief updating predicts superior performance when matched to prevailing economic conditions, with macro-oriented updates paying off mainly for high-updating funds in recessions and micro-oriented updates paying off more broadly in expansions. Investors recognize this signal of skill, allocating greater flows to these funds, especially when past returns are less informative. Finally, belief updating is stronger for younger managers and for funds from newer, smaller families, consistent with signaling under career and competitive pressures.

This paper investigates how foreign institutional investors, specifically Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (QFIIs), influence the investment strategies of Chinese mutual fund management companies (FMCs) in which they hold shares. By analysing panel data from 1,766 mutual funds managed by 44 foreign-invested FMCs in China between 2005 and 2021, we explore whether QFII-invested FMCs (Q-FMCs) learn more from their domestic counterparts (D-FMCs) than other foreign-invested FMCs (NQ-FMCs). Our findings show that Q-FMC-managed mutual funds exhibit portfolio allocations more closely aligned with local DFMCs than those managed by NQ-FMCs. This imitation is particularly pronounced when selecting new stocks, enhancing portfolio performance, but not when rebalancing existing positions. Additionally, Q-FMCs trade more actively than NQ-FMCs. Robustness checks confirm these results across various ownership structures, fund characteristics, market conditions, and regulatory changes. These findings highlight the dual role of QFIIs as both investors and learners in China’s evolving financial landscape, offering insights into how foreign capital integrates into emerging mutual fund markets, informing regulatory policy aimed at fostering cross-border financial development.

We examine how Chinese mutual funds react to superstitious beliefs about bad luck during one’s zodiac year, which occurs on a 12-year cycle around a person’s birth year. Funds decrease their holdings of zodiac stocks, non-state-owned enterprises in the zodiac years of their chairperson, and profit more from trading zodiac stocks than from trading other stocks. This pattern is more pronounced in firms with lower investor awareness and higher liquidity, and for fund managers with higher past ability, indicating that fund managers trade in anticipation of the negative market reaction towards zodiac stocks.

This paper investigates how the geographical distribution of shareholders in Chinese mutual fund management companies influences investment decisions. We show that mutual funds are more inclined to hold and overweight stocks from regions where their shareholders are located, thus capitalizing on a local information advantage. By examining changes in fund holdings in response to shifts in the shareholder base, we rule out the possibility that these effects are driven by fund managers’ local biases. Our findings reveal that stocks from the same region as the fund’s shareholders tend to outperform and significantly contribute to the fund’s overall performance.

We empirically examine how institutional investors react to adjustments in environmental policies in China. We observe a seemingly counterintuitive phenomenon: when environmental policies intensify, fund managers do not increase their holdings in high ESG-rated firms as might typically be expected; instead, they significantly divest from these firms. This behavior stems from the fact that, under stringent environmental policies, maintaining a high level of ESG investing leads to financial losses and fund outflows, especially in the short term, which impair fund managers’ compensation and raise career concerns. Further, within the context of environmental policy adjustments, our heterogeneity analysis tries to disentangle the true motivations behind institutional investors' ESG adoptions. We demonstrate that both pro-social preferences and financial incentives play pivotal roles, and that fund managers do not tolerate unlimited financial losses when ESG investing underperform. Our findings reveal the economic impact of environmental policies on institutional investors and shed light on the contentious and complex nature of the ESG concepts.

This paper investigates how the geographical distribution of shareholders in Chinese mutual fund management companies influences investment decisions. We show that mutual funds are more inclined to hold and overweight stocks from regions where their shareholders are located, thus capitalizing on a local information advantage. By examining changes in fund holdings in response to shifts in the shareholder base, we rule out the possibility that these effects are driven by fund managers’ local biases. Our findings reveal that stocks from the same region as the fund’s shareholders tend to outperform and significantly contribute to the fund’s overall performance.

The benchmark discrepancy phenomenon arises when fund managers deviate from their stated benchmarks. We investigate benchmark discrepancy in China's mutual fund market by analyzing holdings data from all actively managed funds and document its widespread prevalence. However, in China – unlike in the U.S. – benchmark discrepancy reduces relative performance and capital inflows. We also examine the characteristics of fund managers exhibiting benchmark discrepancies and find they are more likely to be male, highly educated, and professionally experienced.

We study the influence of investor attention on mutual fund investors' fund selection and fund managers' portfolio choice. Using the Google Search Volume Index to measure investor attention on individual stocks, we find fund investors tend to direct more capital to mutual funds holding more high-attention stocks; fund managers tend to perform window-dressing trading to increase the portfolio holdings of high-attention stocks displayed to investors. Our results suggest that funds, particularly those with strong incentives, strategically trade on stock attention to attract investor flows. This strategic trading behaviour is also associated with fund underperformance and leads to larger non-fundamental volatility of holding stocks.

This study explores how Chinese mutual fund managers’ degrees of disagreement (DOD) on stock market returns affect investor capital allocation decisions using a novel text-based measure of expectations in fund disclosures. In the time series, the DOD neg-atively predicts market returns. Cross-sectional results show that investors correctly perceive the DOD as an overpricing signal and discount fund performance accordingly. Flow-performance sensitivity (FPS) is diminished during high dispersion periods. The ef-fect is stronger for outperforming funds and funds with substantial investments in bubble and high-beta stocks, but weaker for skilled funds. We also discuss ffnancial sophisti-cation of investors and provide evidence that our results are not contingent upon such sophistication.