Investors and forecasters often extrapolate from past returns, but whether this reffects behavioral bias or efficient information processing remains unclear. We address this questionby inferring Chinese mutual fund managers’ market expectations from textual analysis oftheir commentaries and linking them to portfolio choices and performance. Extrapola-tion is state-dependent: it is stronger when growth is above trend and idiosyncratic riskis relatively more important. It is associated with weaker market timing and strongerstock picking, leaving overall performance unchanged. Our findings support a rational-inattention model of expectation formation, in which managers shift scarce attentionbetween aggregate and stock-speciffc information as the relative importance of differentrisks change.

We investigate the stock market reaction in China to Trump’s tariff policy announcement on April 2, 2025. We find that the tariff policy reduced stock prices of Chinese firms except those in the agricultural sector. Large-cap stocks, value stocks, stocks of high profitability firms, and stocks of state-owned enterprises experienced smaller negative impacts. Stocks with higher institutional holdings by mutual funds and Social Security Funds exhibited higher resilience, possibly due to these investors' superior capability in selecting stocks and forecasting trade war risks. In contrast, stocks held by Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (QFII) did not exhibit such resilience.

Traditional information asymmetry theories suggest that greater corporate transparency should reduce investor disagreement. Using Chinese mutual fund holdings, we document the opposite pattern: transparency amplifies disagreement among institutional investors. Mechanism tests show that transparency discourages herding while intensifying private information acquisition among fund managers. The effect is stronger for growth-oriented and high-skill funds, and during periods of elevated market sentiment, and among firms with lower credibility, excessive disclosure frequency, and greater investor attention. Further analysis indicates that this transparency-induced disagreement stems from informed trading rather than noise, thereby enhancing price informativeness and market efficiency. Overall, the evidence reveals the dual nature of transparency as both an informational input and a behavioral catalyst that increases disagreement in financial markets.

This study constructs a three-dimensional space model based on fund investment styles, using a sample of open-end equity and mixed funds from 2005 to 2021 to measure the degree of style convergence. The research explores how style convergence impacts fund managers’ window dressing behavior. The results indicate that, after accounting for the effects of fund performance, style convergence exacerbates window dressing behavior among fund managers. Specifically, this is reflected in fund managers increasing their holdings in winning stocks and selling off losing stocks, which indirectly highlights the intense competition within China’s open-end fund industry. The findings remain robust after a series of endogeneity and robustness tests. Further analysis reveals that style convergence contributes to the risk of client attrition, thereby intensifying the agency problem within the fund industry. The window dressing effect due to style convergence is particularly pronounced in funds managed by individuals with lower educational backgrounds, lower investment skills, smaller family sizes, and lower institutional investor ownership. The paper offers valuable insights into the agency problems arising from investment style convergence and provides guidance for mitigating fund managers' self-interested behavior.

This study investigates how mutual funds impact the stock market by ana-lyzing the relationship between mutual fund investment behaviours (holding and trading) and stock returns and realized volatility in the Chinese market. It is found that stocks widely held or bought by mutual funds can earn higher excess returns, and more importantly, the trading measures out-perform the holding measures, which is evident by the portfolio analysis and Fama-MacBeth regressions. Moreover, the proportional holding, pro-portional trading and shares trading measures positively and significantly predict future realized volatility. Meanwhile, a weak asymmetric effect in the share-trade measure is found.

We posit and demonstrate that, in China’s retail-dominated market, quantitative trading over-relies on non-fundamental signals, thereby crowding out fundamental information from stock prices and increasing crash risk. Using trading data from quantitative mutual funds and Chinese A-share firms during 2009-2023, we find that greater exposure to quantitative trading is associated with higher future crash risk. Mediation analysis further reveals that reduced information efficiency constitutes a key channel through which quantitative trading elevates crash risk. The effect is stronger for stocks with more retail investors, consistent with our proposed mechanism. Overall, we identify a novel potential risk of quantitative trading in underdeveloped emerging markets.

Do investors respond to what fund managers say, or how they look saying it? Using 2,000 live-streamed sessions by Chinese ETF managers and multimodal machine learning, we show that managers’ facial expressions, not their words, drive fund flows. A one-standard-deviation increase in positive facial affect raises next-day flows by 0.17pp (260% of mean). Vocal tone shows weak effects; textual sentiment shows none. Critically, facial expressions predict flows but not returns, indicating pure persuasion rather than information transmission. Effects strengthen when investors are emotionally vulnerable (down markets, retail-heavy funds) and persist 2-3 weeks before dissipating. Our findings challenge the emphasis on textual disclosure in finance and raise questions about investor protection as video communication proliferates.

This paper examines whether mandatory ownership disclosure aligns incentives or distorts in-vestor beliefs. Using a sample of 1,436 Chinese equity-oriented mutual funds from 2012 to 2023,we find that higher managerial and senior ownership are significantly associated with larger in-flows, suggesting that investors treat ownership as a quality signal. However, we find no evidencethat ownership forecasts superior future returns or risk-adjusted alphas. Mechanism tests showthat the ownership-flow effect is much stronger in low-marketing funds and that managers increaseownership after weak flows, a countercyclical pattern inconsistent with overconfidence and consis-tent with strategic remedial signaling. Overall, ownership disclosure appears to operate primarilythrough investor perception rather than information about managerial ability, weakening the linkbetween capital allocation and true skill in the mutual fund industry.

Serving on the official unsecured creditors' committee (UCC) of a bankrupt firm provides hedge funds with access to material nonpublic information (MNPI), which can facilitate their informed trading across firms and asset markets. We find that hedge funds increase equity turnover and execute more large trades in the quarters following UCC membership. In contrast, hedge funds do not exhibit such trading behavior after accessing public information about bankrupt firms or holding the bankrupt firm's debt without committee involvement. Importantly, these large trades often target firms with close economic ties to the bankrupt entity. Returns from these MNPI-driven trades are substantial.

This paper studies how mutual fund managers update their beliefs as macroeconomic conditions change. Using regulator-mandated reports from Chinese mutual funds, we measure the intensity of belief updating from year-over-year changes in stated outlooks and decompose those updates into macro and micro themes. We show that belief updating is state-contingent: funds with more intensive belief updating shift their narratives toward macro (micro) topics during recessions (expansions) and concurrently reduce (increase) procyclical stock exposures and on-site company visits. This state-contingent belief updating predicts superior performance when matched to prevailing economic conditions, with macro-oriented updates paying off mainly for high-updating funds in recessions and micro-oriented updates paying off more broadly in expansions. Investors recognize this signal of skill, allocating greater flows to these funds, especially when past returns are less informative. Finally, belief updating is stronger for younger managers and for funds from newer, smaller families, consistent with signaling under career and competitive pressures.