The role of institutional investors in the development of Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) criteria lacks consensus in the academic community. This study utilizes a quasi-natural experiment involving Chinese mutual funds that have signed the United Nations Principles for Responsible Investment (UNPRI) to investigate whether institutional Investors’ ESG investment commitments can significantly reduce ESG rating disagreement among the companies in their portfolios. We first find that companies held by ESG commitment institutional Investors exhibit less disagreement in ESG rating compared to those held by Non-ESG commitment institutional Investors. we then show that institutional Investor’ ESG investment commitment influence ESG rating disagreement by enhancing the quality of ESG disclosure and attracting external ESG attention. We further discover that institutional investors’ ESG investment commitments significantly mitigates the ESG rating disagreement among domestic ESG rating agencies and firms with a higher level of corporate governance.

Existing literature has demonstrated the aggregation and allocation effects of the corporate holding financial institutions on financial resources, but there is little literature to discuss whether it will further affect corporate employment. Therefore, this paper uses data from China's A-share listed companies from 2010 to 2021 to examine whether holding financial institutions can affect corporate employment, thus serving the real economy. Empirical results show that holding financial institutions significantly expands corporate employment, which is pronounced in periods of tight monetary policy, in financially underdeveloped areas, and for enterprises with high financing constraints, weak external supervision, and high labor intensity. The conclusion still holds after conducting a series of robustness tests. Mechanism tests show that holding financial institutions can expand corporate employment by alleviating liquidity constraints and inhibiting the dissipation of internal funds caused by agency problems. Further discussion also shows that holding financial institutions has significantly improved corporate operating performance and increased the salary levels of executives and ordinary employees, which means that there is no “executive plunder” after profit increases; Meanwhile, holding financial institutions generates spillover effects along the supply chain, expanding corporate employment among major suppliers and customers. This paper has important implications for taking measures related to “finance serves for the real economy” to achieve high-quality economic development.

This paper investigates how the geographical distribution of shareholders in Chinese mutual fund management companies influences investment decisions. We show that mutual funds are more inclined to hold and overweight stocks from regions where their shareholders are located, thus capitalizing on a local information advantage. By examining changes in fund holdings in response to shifts in the shareholder base, we rule out the possibility that these effects are driven by fund managers’ local biases. Our findings reveal that stocks from the same region as the fund’s shareholders tend to outperform and significantly contribute to the fund’s overall performance.

The benchmark discrepancy phenomenon arises when fund managers deviate from their stated benchmarks. We investigate benchmark discrepancy in China's mutual fund market by analyzing holdings data from all actively managed funds and document its widespread prevalence. However, in China – unlike in the U.S. – benchmark discrepancy reduces relative performance and capital inflows. We also examine the characteristics of fund managers exhibiting benchmark discrepancies and find they are more likely to be male, highly educated, and professionally experienced.

This paper examines how profits from mutual funds’ participation in initial public offerings (IPOs) shape fund performance, investor flows, and market stability in China. Using comprehensive fund–IPO matched data from 2016 to 2023, we decompose fund returns into an IPO-lottery component and residual performance. At the aggregate level, IPO allocations add 2.05% to annualized excess returns; net of IPOs, excess return is −0.35% per year. At the individual level, the contribution of IPO profits varies substantially across funds and is most pronounced among mid-sized funds, inflating perceived managerial skill. Funds with higher IPO-driven gains attract greater inflows despite the absence of performance persistence, leading to capital misallocation. At the market level, IPO-profit-induced trading (PIT) predicts short horizon price run-ups that dissipate and reverse over subsequent months, while raising both total and idiosyncratic volatility. Overall, IPO profits temporarily enhance reported performance but erode market stability by propagating non-fundamental shocks through secondary markets.

The discussion on the innovative effects of intellectual property pledge financing is a mainstream trend. In this context, this study has improved the existing research from several aspects, such as broadening the dimensions of innovation, adding dynamic analysis, refining multidimensional mediation mechanisms, and employing unique samples. Ultimately, we come to the following conclusions: (1) Intellectual property pledge financing suppresses enterprise innovation, especially innovation quality, but this pattern will be broken by raising the threshold of innovation conditions. The reason is that strict innovation conditions can lead to a poor innovation foundation for enterprises, which are rarely affected by the fluctuation of funds obtained from intellectual property pledge financing. (2) Intellectual property pledge financing has a non-linear effect on firm innovation, characterized by an increase followed by a decrease, suggesting that intellectual property pledge financing in current China can only provide a temporary stimulus for firm innovation. (3) The relationship between intellectual property pledge financing and enterprise innovation is strongly moderated by the ownership, type, and size of the enterprise, with the inhibitory effect of intellectual property pledge financing on enterprise innovation occurring mainly in state-owned enterprises, high-tech enterprises, and small enterprises, while its positive effects are more pronounced in private enterprises, non-high-tech enterprises, and medium-sized enterprises. (4) Financing constraints, internal incentives, external supervision, and signaling mechanisms are indeed key pathways through which intellectual property pledge financing affects firm innovation, especially when we analyse these mechanisms using dynamic models.

Banks have a significant funding-cost advantage if their liabilities are protected by bailout guarantees. We construct a corporate finance-style model showing that banks can exploit this funding-cost advantage by just intermediating funds between investors and ultimate borrowers, thereby earning the spread between their reduced funding rate and the competitive market rate. This mechanism leads to a crowding-out of direct market finance and real effects for bank borrowers at the intensive margin: banks protected by bailout guarantees induce their borrowers to leverage excessively, to overinvest, and to conduct inferior high-risk projects. We confirm our model predictions using U.S. panel data, exploiting exogenous changes in banks' political connections, which cause variation in bailout expectations. At the bank level, we find that higher bailout probabilities are associated with more wholesale debt funding and lending. Controlling for loan demand, we confirm this effect on bank lending at the bank-firm level and find evidence on loan pricing consistent with a shift towards riskier borrower real investments. Finally, at the firm level, we find that firms linked to banks that experience an expansion in their bailout guarantees show an increase in their leverage, higher investment levels with indications of overinvestment, and lower productivity.

We examine how mutual funds form stock market expectations and the implications of these beliefs for asset returns, using a novel text-based measure extracted from Chinese fund reports. Funds extrapolate from recent stock market and fund returns when forming expectations, with more recent returns receiving greater weight. This recency tendency is weaker among more experienced managers. At the aggregate level, consensus expectations positively predict short-term future market returns, both in and out of sample. At the fund level, expectations are positively related to subsequent fund performance in the time series. In the cross-section, however, superior performance arises only when funds accurately forecast market direction and adjust their portfolios accordingly. This effect is stronger for optimistic forecasts and among funds with greater exposure to liquid stocks. Our findings highlight the conditional nature of belief-driven performance, shaped jointly by forecasting skill and the ability to implement views in the presence of execution frictions such as short-selling and liquidity constraints.

We study the influence of investor attention on mutual fund investors' fund selection and fund managers' portfolio choice. Using the Google Search Volume Index to measure investor attention on individual stocks, we find fund investors tend to direct more capital to mutual funds holding more high-attention stocks; fund managers tend to perform window-dressing trading to increase the portfolio holdings of high-attention stocks displayed to investors. Our results suggest that funds, particularly those with strong incentives, strategically trade on stock attention to attract investor flows. This strategic trading behaviour is also associated with fund underperformance and leads to larger non-fundamental volatility of holding stocks.

We investigate the economic impact of artificial intelligence (AI) adoption in the mutual fund industry by introducing a novel measure of AI adoption based on the presence of AI skilled personnel at fund management firms. We provide robust evidence that AI adoption enhances fund performance, primarily by improving risk management, increasing attentive capacity, and enabling faster information processing. Furthermore, we find that mutual funds with higher levels of AI adoption experience greater investor net flows and exhibit lower flow-performance sensitivity. While AI adoption benefits individual funds, we find no evidence of aggregate performance improvements at the industry level.