Geographic proximity

  • 详情 Game in another town: Geography of stock watchlists and firm valuation
    Beyond a bias toward local stocks, investors prefer companies in certain cities over others. This study uses the geographic network of investor-followed stocks from stock watchlists to identify intercity investment preferences in China. We measure the city-pair connectivity by its likelihood of sharing an investor in common whose stock watchlist is highly concentrated in the firms of that city pair. We find that a higher connectivity-weighted aggregate stock demand-to-supply ratio across connected cities is associated with higher stock valuations, higher turnover, better liquidity, and lower cost of equity for firms in the focal city. The effects are robust to controls for geographic proximity and the broad investor base, are stronger among small firms, extend to stock return predictability, and imply excess intercity return comovement. Our results suggest that city connectivity revealed on the stock watchlist helps identify network factors in asset pricing.
  • 详情 Game in another town: Geography of stock watchlists and firm valuation
    Beyond a bias toward local stocks, investors prefer companies in certain cities over others. This study uses the geographic network of investor-followed stocks from stock watchlists to identify intercity investment preferences in China. We measure the city-pair connectivity by its likelihood of sharing an investor in common whose stock watchlist is highly concentrated in the firms of that city pair. We find that a higher connectivity-weighted aggregate stock demand-to-supply ratio across connected cities is associated with higher stock valuations, higher turnover, better liquidity, and lower cost of equity for firms in the focal city. The effects are robust to controls for geographic proximity and the broad investor base, are stronger among small firms, extend to stock return predictability, and imply excess intercity return comovement. Our results suggest that city connectivity revealed on the stock watchlist helps identify network factors in asset pricing.
  • 详情 Who Captures the State in China? Evidence from Irregular Awards in a Public Innovation Grant Program
    Access to state-controlled resources can be a major source of firm-level competitive advantage. However, we know little regarding which firms are most likely positioned to capture the state and access resources beyond what their rule-complying merits command. This is partially due to the challenge in identifying irregular state funding that violates official resource-allocation rules. We study a leading innovation grant program in China, and we leverage unique access to the focal grant agency’s administrative data to trace its grant allocation process. We observe occurrences of rule-violating funding and show that firms vary in capability to influence the agency’s funding decision, depending on geographic proximity, as well as other institutional variables. The observed irregular awards are most likely associated with crony capitalism rather than bureaucratic heroism.
  • 详情 Geographic Proximity of Underwriters and Information Channel Substitution Effects in Bond Markets: Evidence from China
    We investigate the impact of the geographic proximity of underwriters on bond characteristics by using corporate and enterprise bonds issued in China from 2009 to 2019. We find bonds underwritten by underwriters in close geographic proximity are associated with lower financing costs, longer maturity in high and medium credit rating firms, shorter maturity in low credit rating firms, and lower default risk. Further, we find substitution effects between the geographic proximity of underwriter and underwriter reputation, and also between the geographic proximity of underwriter and firm transparency on reducing the costs of bond financing; i.e., a better reputation of the underwriter or higher transparency of the firm will weaken geographical proximate underwriters’ effects. Our results are robust in subsamples when firms have different degrees of local government connections.