The corporate maturity mismatch is highly likely to trigger systemic financial risks, which is a realistic issue commonly faced by businesses. In the context of the intelligent era, the impact of artificial intelligence on maturity mismatch has emerged as a focal point of academic inquiry. Leveraging data from Chinese A-share companies over the 2011–2023 timeframe, this research employs a double machine learning approach to systematically examine the influence and underlying mechanisms of artificial intelligence on maturity mismatch. The findings reveal that artificial intelligence significantly exacerbates maturity mismatch. However, this effect is notably mitigated by government subsidies, media attention, and collectivist cultural. Further analysis indicates that in high-climate-risk scenarios, collectivist culture exerts a notably strong moderating influence. By contrast, government subsidies and media attention exhibit stronger moderating influences in low-climate-risk environments. This study constructs a multi-stakeholder collaborative governance framework, which helps to reveal the 'black box' between artificial intelligence and maturity mismatch, thereby offering a theoretical basis for monitoring maturity mismatch.

This paper extracts investor risk concern from the text of investormanagement communications and examines their impact on insider opportunistic sales. Utilizing data from listed companies holding online earnings communication conferences (OECCs) in China from 2007 to 2022, we find that heightened investor risk concern significantly curbs insider opportunistic sales, as manifested by reduced frequency and magnitude of such transactions. This governance effect of investor risk concern persists irrespective of motivation strength behind opportunistic sales. Further analysis reveals that the governance effect intensifies when investors exhibit superior information processing capabilities and when management’s risk statements better align with investor expectations. Notably, while mitigating opportunistic sales, elevated investor risk concern also significantly decreases the firm’s cost of equity capital. Our findings underscore the importance of fostering transparent and engaging investor-management communication in promoting effective corporate governance and mitigating insider misconduct.

China's tech companies are making waves with their recent achievements, including a "trifold" phone from Huawei and the revolutionary AI reasoning model from DeepSeek. Much discussion has centered on the founders of these companies and their ability to gain an edge on American rivals. But what is less appreciated or understood among foreign analysts of China’s tech giants is the role that innovation and transformation in corporate governance and organizational structure has played in these companies’ successes. Moreover, there are unique aspects of these companies from a corporate governance perspective that are not commonly seen in tech companies in other parts of the world or even within China itself. For instance, Huawei is 99% employee owned, while Alibaba is primarily governed by an "Alibaba Partnership." These unique corporate structures have arisen due to several factors, including the rapid changes to China’s regulatory landscape over the past three decades, distinct characteristics of Chinese business culture, geopolitical tensions and preoccupations with national security, and the “socialism with Chinese characteristics” model. In this article I overview some of the more distinctive corporate governance mechanisms of four Chinese tech companies: Huawei, Alibaba, Bytedance, and DeepSeek, and explain why these structures were adopted.

This paper examines whether employees avoid firms that commit environmental, social and governance (ESG) misconduct in China where ESG norms are weak. We find that the number of employees grows slower when firms have more ESG incidents after accounting for performance, risk, corporate governance, and time-invariant firm characteristics. The result is mostly attributable to social incidents and incidents that affect China, better educated knowledge workers, and high tech and non-labor-intensive industries, and is unlikely to be caused by layoffs. Overall, workers with better job fluidity respond to incidents that affect them personally.

Using a comprehensive dataset for Chinese listed companies from 2009 to 2021, we find that online media is negatively associated with cash dividend level, and the proportion of positive news has a negative moderating effect on this relationship. Our results support the "information intermediary" effect and exclude the "external governance" and "market pressure" effects. We further propose that online media weakens the positive relationship between cash dividends and past earnings (rather than the future), indicating that cash dividends contain signals of improvement in past earnings and are replaced by online news. We also find that only firms with more positive news pay dividends that have signaling effects, and there is a synergistic effect between positive news and dividend signal. Additional results show that the effect of online media on dividend policy is more pronounced than traditional media, which has almost no influence. Our main conclusions remain valid after addressing potential endogeneity issues and conducting various robustness tests.

We find evidence that firms engage in earnings management to potentially diminish environmental regulatory attention after the implementation of an automatic air pollutant monitoring system in China. Polluting firms increase their use of discretionary accruals and reduce the informativeness of earnings, compared to non-polluting firms. Polluting firms that are larger, more profitable, located near monitoring stations, and situated in less market-oriented regions exhibit heightened earnings management, consistent with the greater environmental regulatory exposure these firms face. The behavior is moderated by stronger customer-supplier relationships and lower market competition, when the cost of earnings management is higher. Our findings highlight the conflict between environmental and governance issues.

This study analyzes the network structures of institutional shareholders and examines the influence of institutional investor cliques on corporate innovation. Our empirical results reveal that institutional investor cliques significantly enhance both innovation input and output. To mitigate endogeneity concerns and establish causality, we adopt multiple empirical strategies. Further evidence suggests that the beneficial impact of institutional investor cliques on firm innovation can be attributed to increased innovation investment efficiency, enhanced employee productivity, reduced information asymmetry, and decreased managerial myopia. Additionally, we find that the positive effect of institutional investor cliques on firm innovation is more pronounced in non-state-owned enterprises and is particularly evident in firms with severe agency conflicts, CEO duality issues, highly competitive product markets, and for firms that have low stock liquidity.

In an increasingly open and transparent information environment, negative media coverage of Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) issues would detriment focal firms’ legitimacy and performance. However, we have a limited understanding of whether negative media coverage of supply chain partners would spill over to focal firms. Using a panel dataset from Chinese listed firms, we examine the research question at a dyadic (i.e., focal firm and supplier or customer) level. This study reveals that negative media coverage about supply chain partners’ ESG issues can cause a spillover effect, negatively impacting the focal firms’ financial performance. Notably, the extent of this impact is contingent on the reach of the media sources and the severity of the coverage. We also show that focal firms are more impacted by supply chain partners with stronger relationships and greater market power. Our findings underscore the importance of actively managing partners’ ESG issues to avoid potential financial losses within a multi-tier supply chain. This study has fruitful contributions to the literature on supply chain sustainability and the spillover effect in dyadic relationships.

When examining corporate governance in China, it is crucial to recognize the unique socio-economic structures and legal systems at play. The mechanisms of corporate governance theorized in the West might not necessarily have the same impact in China. In particular, given China’s distinct feature of the domestic economy and its socio-political structure, the results of introducing a hostile takeover system might not align with common anticipations that scholars and policymakers in China and elsewhere broadly share. In greater detail, this paper highlights the significant market imperfections in the Chinese economy, stemming from information asymmetry, imperfect product markets, and capital-market inefficiency. These market imperfections suggest that an active hostile takeover regime might not function effectively in China, as its disciplinary mechanism operates successfully in other advanced countries. Additionally, this paper underscores that due to China’s distinctive features—including its state-owned corporate landscape, the dominance of controlling shareholders in private corporations’ ownership structures, and its unique brand of socialism—the introduction of an active takeover regime could produce unintended consequences in the Chinese economy. Overall, challenging the prevailing perspective, I posit that within the Chinese hostile takeover framework, corporate governance is not as influential as one might assume.

We examine the impact of state-owned shareholders on fraud within private firms. Utilizing a sample of A-share private listed firms in China observed from 2008 to 2021. We discover a significant negative association between state-owned shareholders and the likelihood of fraud in private firms. State-owned shareholders primarily act as inhibitors of fraud, and their effect on the probability of fraud being detected is not statistically significant. This finding remains robust even after conducting a series of sensitivity tests to mitigate potential selectivity bias and reverse causality endogeneity issues. In the analysis of heterogeneity, we found that state-owned shareholders play a more active role under conditions of imperfect external institutional development, and they also exert a more significant inhibitory effect on enterprises with lower governance levels and higher business risks. Our mechanism test demonstrates that the inhibitory effect of state-owned shareholders on corporate fraud is achieved by improving corporate governance and alleviating financial distress. This study also examines the impact of state-owned shareholders' local characteristics, external supervision mechanisms, and internal governance mechanisms in unique Chinese enterprises on fraudulent behaviour by private enterprises. Overall, our study provides empirical evidence that state-owned shareholder ownership is associated with reducing fraudulent behaviour within private firms.