Government Bailout

  • 详情 The Government-Led Credit Cycle in China's LGFV Bonds and the Real Effects
    Examining China's decade-long policies aimed at mitigating local government debt risk, we identify a government-led credit cycle in Local Government Financing Vehicle (LGFV) bonds, reflected in the evolving credit spread gap between high-and low-risk cities. After three waves of cross-regional divergence between 2014 and 2022, the 2023 "Debt Resolution" policy triggered a sharp convergence. We show this cycle is driven primarily by shifting market perceptions of central government bailout probability, rather than by regional economic fundamentals or bond market liquidity. Studying the real effects, we find the "Debt Resolution" policy has a dual impact on local commercial banks. It benefits those in high-risk cities by narrowing subordinated bond spreads via LGFV pricing spillovers, but also hurts them by depressing profitability, reducing market share, and increasing consolidation risk.
  • 详情 Executive Authority and Household Bailouts
    How does executive authority affect household behavior? I develop a model in which the executive branch of the government is partially constrained. These constraints credibly limit intervention under normal conditions but can be overridden when a sufficiently large fraction of the population is in distress. Households anticipate this and strategically coordinate their financial risks through public markets, creating collective distress that compels government bailouts. Weaker constraints lower the threshold for intervention, making implicit guarantees more likely. The model explains why implicit guarantees are prevalent in China and predicts that such guarantees may discontinuously emerge elsewhere as executive constraints gradually weaken.
  • 详情 The Implicit Non-guarantee in the Chinese Banking System
    Bank bailouts are systemic in China, having been extended to nearly all distressed banks, including those with no systemic importance. This paper investigates the consequences of regulators seizing control of Baoshang Bank, the country’s first bank failure in two decades. Despite the numerous liquidity and credit provision measures immediately implemented by bank regulators, we find that the collapse of this city-level commercial bank significantly exacerbated funding conditions in the market for negotiable certificates of deposit (NCD), resulting in liquidity distress for other banks. Our empirical analysis demonstrates that the spillover of Baoshang’s collapse is disproportionately concentrated in systemically unimportant (SU) banks, owing to diminished market confidence in government bailouts of SU banks, or implicit nonguarantee. We employ a difference-in-differences approach to show that the Baoshang event had a persistent and significant effect on SU banks’ NCD issuance, increasing credit spreads by 21.9 bps and the likelihood of issuance failure by 6.3%. Our empirical framework further enables us to examine the impact of China’s long-standing guarantee of SU banks, which we find impairs price efficiency, undermines market discipline, encourages excessive risk taking, and raises equity prices.
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