This study attempts to shed new light on how the state as a minority shareholder can affect the tax planning of non-state-owned enterprises(non-SOEs). We examine publicly traded non-SOEs in China and find that non-SOEs are more tax avoidance when the government is a minority shareholder, indicating that minority state ownership has played a "shelter effect" on tax avoidance of non-SOEs. Further analysis shows that the sheltering effect of minority state ownership is more prominent for firms located in areas with more social burden, worse tax enforcement and firms with stronger incentive to avoid taxes. Furthermore, non-SOEs with minority state ownership increase excessive capital expenditure and employ redundant employees, but still have higher firm value. Overall, our findings suggest the state as a minority shareholder shapes the tax-planning activities of non-SOEs in a “two-way favor exchange” manner and it is beneficial for non-SOEs to maintain a close relationship with the government in China where the government controls key resources.

This study investigates the impact of ultimate government ownership or control on the cost of debt of Chinese listed corporations. We first examine the relative level of cost of debt of corporations under government control compared to corporations under individual or family control. We then explore circumstances under which government control is likely to reduce a corporation’s cost of financing. Our results suggest that the benefits of government control are conditional on firm-specific financial circumstances and internal- and external-corporate governance environment. We find that, on average, government controlled corporations have lower cost of debt but the effect is not homogeneous. Government controlled corporations have lower cost of debt when they are highly financially constrained and have higher risk of being expropriated by controlling shareholders and in provinces where the local government is less effective, but not otherwise.

Different from developed markets, Chinese government imposes strict control over the IPO market. Using a sample of 156 monthly returns over the period of 1996 to 2008, we find a positive relationship between the monthly issuing size and prior market return, suggesting that government decides the timing and size of issuance based on prior market condition. Different from previous findings, we find no evidence of decline in subsequent market return after IPO. However, IPO issuance has a significantly negative impact on the return momentum effect, while the degree of impact is indifferent to issuing size. We conjecture that the overall mild impact on subsequent market results from the government control over the IPO market.