This paper examines the use of finance leases in China’s local government debt. Using a unique dataset of government finance lease transactions, we document that local government financing vehicles (LGFVs) rapidly adopted finance leases, with the outstanding amount growing from virtually nothing in 2013 to a cumulative total of 1.02 trillion RMB by 2018. Our difference-in-differences (DID) analysis reveals that the central government’s restrictive financial policies account for a substantial portion of this surge. Because these restrictive policies confined LGFVs’access to conventional borrowing channels, finance leases emerged as a key alternative, particularly through bank-affiliated leasing firms. While LGFVs' use of finance leases offers low-cost financing for local governments, the low quality of the underlying assets poses significant risks to the leasing firms.

Understanding the impact of local government debt on economic development has emerged as a focal issue for both academic research and policymakers. This study adopts a financing structure perspective and utilizes panel data from 214 cities and 3,228 A-share listed companies in China (2017–2023) to empirically investigate the impact of local government debt on corporate “shift from virtual to real economy” and its underlying mechanisms. The expansion of local government debt significantly promotes enterprises “shift from virtual to real economy”. The positive impact of local government debt on enterprises” transition from financialization to the real economy is more pronounced among firms in first tier and new first-tier cities, non-state-owned enterprises, and labor-intensive industries. Further analysis indicates that local government debt drives capital reallocation from financial investments to real investments by alleviating corporate financing constraints. This study proposes policy recommendations including optimizing debt fund allocation, further optimizing the financing environment, implementing differentiated regulatory measures. These suggestions provide both a theoretical foundation and practical references for synergistically advancing debt governance and real economy revitalization.

We construct a new geospatial measure using high-resolution river vector data from National Geomatics Center of China (NGCC) to study how urban riparian exposure shapes local government debt financing costs. Our base-line results show that cities with higher riparian exposures have significantly lower credit spreads, with a one-standard-deviation increase in riparian exposure reducing credit spreads by approximately 12 basis points. By comparing cities crossed by natural rivers with those intersected by artificial canals, we disentangle the dual role of riparian zones as sources of natural capital benefits (e.g., enhanced transportation capacity) versus climate risks (e.g., flood vulnerability). We find that climate change has amplified the impact of natural disasters, such as floods and droughts, particularly in riparian zones, thus weakening the cost-reducing effect of riparian exposure on bond financing. In contrast, improved water infrastructure and flood-control facilities strengthen the cost-reduction effect. Our findings contribute to the literature on natural capital and government financing, offering valuable implications for public finance and risk management.

Local financial development is crucial for advancing regional financial supply side structural reform, enabling local governments to leverage financial instruments to effectively mobilize land resources and foster competitive growth. The introduction of numerous financial products linked to land-related rights and interests has resulted in a pronounced transmission and interconnection of fiscal and financial risks across regions. This study examines the impact of local financial development on land financialization in China using panel data from prefecture-level cities and detailed information on land mortgages. The findings indicate that the establishment of city commercial banks (CCBs) contributes to the progress of land financialization by incentivizing local government financing vehicles to participate in land mortgage financing, increasing the transfer of debt risks to the financial sector. Notably, the impact of CCBs on land financialization is more pronounced in regions with urban agglomeration, high GDP manipulation, inadequate local financial regulation, and robust implicit government guarantees. Further analysis reveals that CCB establishment has negative spillover effects on land financialization in neighboring areas, while expansion strategies such as establishing intercity branches, engaging in cross-regional mergers, and relaxing regulations have mitigated the rise of land financialization at the regional level. This study provides policy recommendations that focus on reducing local governments’ reliance on land financing and enhancing the prevention and management of financial risks.

This study finds that reducing political influence over local courts weakens local government debt capacity. We establish this result by exploiting the staggered roll-out of a judicial centralization reform aimed at alleviating local court capture in China and find reduced judicial favoritism towards local governments post-reform. The majority of local government lawsuits are with contractors over government payment delays. The reform not only increases government lawsuit losses but also exposes their credit risk, as payment delays without court support signal government liquidity constraint. Investors respond by tightening lending and increasing interest rates, which curbs government spending.

From the perspective of corporate labor employment, we examine whether debt pressure on local governments prompts them to shift part of their social responsibilities to local firms. We conduct an analysis on Chinese local government debt (LGD) data and find that when LGD is higher, local firms are less likely to cut labor costs when their sales decrease, indicating greater labor cost stickiness. We attribute this to the responsibility-shifting effect, i.e., with heavier debt burdens, local governments intervene more in corporate labor decisions by restricting employee layoffs. Consistent with this argument, we find that the effect of LGD on labor cost stickiness is more pronounced for state-owned and politically connected firms; in regions with lower marketization levels and government fiscal self-sufficient capacities; and when regional unemployment rates, macroeconomic uncertainty, and political risk are higher. We show that through responsibilityshiftingamid high LGD, local governments benefit from a reduction in social expenditures. However, firms with stickier current labor costs will have lower subsequent productivity and market value, despite local governments reciprocating with more subsidies. Overall, LGD not only adversely impacts firm financing through the crowding-out effect but also erodes firm value through the responsibility-shifting effect.

The macroeconomic risk associated with climate change potentially results in a risk premium on asset prices. Using a sample of 11,468 Chinese quasi-municipal bonds from 2014-2021 in 267 cities, this research investigates the impact of climate risk on the credit spreads of quasi-municipal bonds. We employ principal component analysis (PCA) to construct a climate risk index and find that climate risk significantly increases credit spreads by increasing the local government fiscal gap and debt burden. The effect of climate risk is more remarkable for bonds that have shorter maturity and lower corporate ratings, issued by smaller city investment companies and corporations located in regions with stronger environmental regulation, stronger climate risk perception, and better green financial development. A significant relationship is also observed in the eastern regions but not the western regions. This study broadens the scope of quasi-municipal bond credit spread determinants from traditional financial to climate indicators.

An optimal tax and borrowing plan determines the marginal cost of servicing government debt, p', and makes the government’s debt risk-free. An option to default restricts debt capacity. Optimal debt-GDP ratio dynamics are driven by 1) a primary deficit, 2) interest payments, 3) GDP growth, and 4) hedging costs. Hedging influences debt capacity and debt transition dynamics. For plausible parameter values, we make comparative dynamic quantitative statements about debt-GDP ratio transition dynamics, debt capacity, and how long it would take our example economy to attain that calibrated equilibrium debt capacity.

This study contributes to the understanding of the relationship between Chinese local government debt and house prices by proposing the land channel as a novel explanatory framework. We construct a three-sector equilibrium model and demonstrate that local government debt positively affects house prices through both direct and indirect effects, with the indirect effect operating through the land market. However, the land use efficiency mitigates the positive effect of government debt on land and house prices within indirect effect. These propositions are empirically confirmed using a panel dataset of 260 cities in China from 2011 to 2019.

We show that government deleveraging causes corporate distress in a distorted financial market. Our difference-in-differences analysis exploits China’s top-down deleveraging policy in 2017, which reduces local governments’ borrowing capacity through shadow bank financing. Private firms with government procurement contracts experience larger accounts receivable increases, larger cash holdings reductions, and higher external financing costs. These firms also experienced greater likelihoods of ownership changes and deteriorated performance. Effects are muted for state-owned enterprises, which enjoy funding privileges in China’s financial system. Our paper thus reveals a novel channel of allocation inefficiencies where government deleveraging amplifies adverse impacts of financial distortions.