This paper illustrates how firms with publicly disclosed political connections use subsidiaries to obtain preferential treatment in land markets. While the headquarters of politically connected listed firms pay land prices comparable to those paid by other firms, their subsidiaries receive discounts of 12.1%–13.2%. These discounts are more pronounced when land is acquired through less transparent methods, in regions with weaker institutional environments, and among private firms. The anti-corruption campaign launched in 2012 effectively mitigates corruption-related discounts, with the magnitude of the discounts negatively associated with campaign intensity. Additionally, larger discounts for subsidiaries are observed following greater charitable donations, suggesting a reciprocal relationship between firms and officials. Overall, the findings contribute to a broader understanding of how firms with publicly disclosed political ties use complex corporate structures to engage in rent-seeking behavior.

Using a sample of 501 Chinese non-financial firms listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange from 2008 to 2020, we find that both foreign exchange (FX) derivatives and foreign currency (FC) debt significantly reduce firms’ probability of default. We further observe that larger, non-state-owned enterprises (SOEs), Hong Kong-headquartered firms, firms operating after China’s 2015 exchange rate reform and firms under high trade policy uncertainty (TPU) are more likely to use both FX derivatives and FC debt concurrently, thereby diversifying their strategies for managing default risk. Our analysis indicates that these tools reduce firms’ default risk primarily by improving firms’ profitability, raising their likelihood of obtaining credit ratings, and increasing their use of interest rate derivatives. Importantly, we reveal that FX derivatives and FC debt act as substitutes in mitigating firms’ default risk. Notably, this substitution effect is more pronounced for larger, non-SOEs, Hong Kong-headquartered firms, firms operating after exchange rate reform and firms facing high TPU. Finally, we find that using FX derivatives significantly dampens firms’ investment, which may explain why Chinese firms tend to prefer FC debt to manage their default risk.

This paper investigates whether regional negative public sentiment associated with extreme non-financial social shocks (e.g., violence or crime) will affect the resident firms’ M&A announcement return. Using a sample of 3,200 M&A deals in China, our empirical results consistently show that M&A announcement return is significantly lower after the firm’s headquarter city has experienced negative social shocks. We further find that better CSR performance helps to mitigate the impact of these negative shocks. Overall, we show that firm operations will be largely affected by the resident environment and location, and better CSR performance acts as an effective risk management strategy.

Based on 31 provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions in mainland China, this paper explores the temporal and spillover effects of the provincial COVID19 pandemic on stock returns. The results show that stock returns are significantly and negatively correlated both with the pandemic in the firm’s headquartered province (referred to as, local province), and the pandemics in other provinces (referred to as, non-local provinces). By multiple time dimensions analysis, we find that at the weekly (monthly) level, the impact of the pandemic in local province on stock returns is larger (weaker) than the pandemics in non-local provinces, showing the temporal (spillover) effects. Mechanism analysis shows that COVID-19 can quickly reduce investors’ attention to stock market. The heterogeneity analysis shows that firms owned by state, with bad CSR, or a higher proportion of shares held by the largest shareholder are more affected by COVID-19. After replacing samples and time intervals, the results remain robust.

Recent sociological research suggests that culturally tight environments enforce strong social penalties for mistakes. I find that such culturally tight environments incentivize managers to suppress negative information, increasing stock price crash risk. Opaque financial disclosure is a channel through which cultural tightness affects managerial bad news hoarding. Labor and capital market pressures strengthen the positive effect of cultural tightness on crash risk. The instrumental regressions using labor-intensive agriculture and ethnic homogeneity as instruments confirm a positive tightness-crash relationship. Finally, changes in environments because of headquarters relocations affect managerial tendencies to withhold bad news, resulting in changes in crash risk levels.

This study documents how the political hierarchy plays a significant role in determining corporate environmental governance. By conducting difference-in-differences analysis to investigate listed firms in China, this study demonstrates that local and central SOEs headquartered in jurisdictions far removed from central government supervision have worse environmental governance than POEs. Verticalization reforms implemented in 2016 enable provincial environmental protection bureaus to direct lower-level bureaus. Local governments cannot control environmental protection bureau leaders for economic development. This study finds that the corporate environmental governance of local SOEs has significantly improved following the reform, as local environmental protection bureaus no longer have conflicts of interest with local governments. However, the reform has not resulted in improvements to corporate environmental governance in central SOEs, whose executives occupy higher status than provincial Environmental Protection Bureau leaders, nor in POEs, which were already managed before the reform. Further evidence indicates that local SOEs experience an increase in abatement investments and relationship building expenses following the reform. Lastly, our study reveals that verticalization reform costs are negligible. Local SOEs have not experienced a decline in financial performance or corporate valuation. This study suggests that policymakers should consider the political ranking of government agencies and enterprises to improve environmental governance.

This study examines the impact of climate-transition risks on trade credits for Chinese listed companies from 2007-2017. We develop an index of county-level climate-transition risks faced by Chinese-listed companies using data on local carbon emissions and carbon sequestration when moving towards net zero carbon emissions. Our two-way fixed effects OLS regression results find that local firms facing greater climate-transition risks significantly reduce their trade credit financing. Specifically, a one standard deviation of increase in Risk leads to a 0.73% decrease in trade credit. This reduction is more pronounced for state-owned enterprises (SOEs), firms operating in less competitive industries, and those headquartered in regions without carbon trading markets. Our main finding is robust to a battery of sensitivity tests including the use of alternative measures and lagged independent variables. Results on an Instrumental Variable (IV) method and a differences-in-difference (DiD) analysis suggest a causal relationship between climate-transition risks on trade credit. Further analyses reveal two plausible channels for the effect: increased financial distress risk and enhanced access to bank credit.

Using land transaction data in China, we investigate whether and how political connections penetrate through headquarter-subsidiary relationships. The results show that even though the headquarters of politically connected listed firms pay comparable land prices as other firms, their subsidiaries pay 12.1-13.2% less. The price discount, driven by corruption, is exacerbated when the land is for commercial or residential use and is disposed of through informationally opaque supply methods. The anti-corruption campaign has successfully mitigated such price distortions. Our findings also show that better legal protection and private sector development are crucial for fair markets.

Using the staggered opening of governmental public data platforms in China, we employ the difference-in-difference approach to investigate how public data access affects stock price synchronicity. We find that stock price synchronicity significantly drops after the public data platform is established in a firm’s headquarters city. The underlying mechanism is reducing information acquisition costs rather than increasing market attention or corporate information disclosure quality. Furthermore, the informational role of public data platforms magnifies under higher informed trade risk, poorer corporate governance, or better regional economic and innovation capacity. We highlight the role of public data in facilitating financial market efficiency.

This paper investigates whether and how high-speed rail (HSR) construction affects local bank performance. Using the difference-in-difference method, we find that the city commercial banks (CCBs) significantly experience an overall decrease in ROA after HSR is introduced in the headquarters city. Mechanism analysis suggests that the HSR-driven city connectivity imposes the local CCBs on the intensified banking competition related to capital flows, and governance improvements associated with information flows. HSR exerts more pronounced impacts under higher financial liberalization. The findings are robust to the endogeneity concerns. We highlight the indispensable role of transport infrastructure in banking development.