详情
Hedge Fund Leverage: The Role of Moral Hazard and Liquidity Insurance
We provide a model of hedge fund securing financing from a prime broker where deterioration in collateral value exacerbates counterparty risk and liquidity risk for the prime broker due to strategic actions of hedge funds. Costs of liquidity insurance and enforcing contracts determine hedge fund leverage. The model provides several new insights. First, it uncovers a new channel for funding liquidity that can explain why illiquid funds fare worse in times of stress and why better governed funds fared better during the financial crisis. Second, the model provides a new testable hypothesis that systematic or idiosyncratic shocks to fundamentals of bank holding companies may spillover to connected hedge funds through internal capital markets. It also offers an identification strategy to distinguish between possible competing hypotheses. Third, strong governance at hedge funds may reduce incentives to invest in profitable opportunities. Fourth, banking reforms such as Supplementary Leverage Ratio, Liquidity Coverage Ratio and Standing Repo Facility intended to improve resilience of banks may also make hedge funds less vulnerable to shocks in the banking sector. Fifth, the model offers a possible reconciliation for the mixed evidence on the impact of leverage on hedge fund survival documented in the literature.