This study investigates how venture capital (VC) reputation affects initial public offering (IPO) exits in the Chinese VC market using a two-sided matching mechanism. Research that distinguishes the sorting and influence effects of VCs in the Chinese market is lacking. To address this gap, Chinese VC transaction data, comprising 3,606 VC firms and 8,173 investment transactions, was used to construct a structural econometric model. The Markov Chain Monte Carlo Bayesian estimation techniques were employed to identify the sorting and influence effects of VC reputation. We demonstrate that the likelihood of IPO exits is considerably increased by VC reputation, whereas historical investment experience has a dampening effect on exit outcomes. The IPO success rates are significantly higher for firms in the biotechnology, electronics, medical, and late-stage industries. The difficulty of IPO exits increases with investment age. Compared to influence effects, sorting effects were the dominant mechanism. VCs with a high reputation systematically selected firms with potential advantages, such as high-quality management teams, to promote IPO success. This study’s novelty lies in its application of an endogenous two-sided matching solution to the Chinese VC market. Using a structural model, we discovered the importance of the reputation sorting effect in the Chinese VC market and refined the VC’s investment preferences in high-tech industries. This study’s practical significance lies in the findings that enterprises must pay attention to the sorting capabilities of VC institutions, the government can guide capital flows to efficient exit industries, and VC institutions should optimize the resource allocation structure.

Exploring a novel dataset and a unique policy experiment, this paper examines the role of government intervention in the emergence of venture capital (VC) in China during 1999-2013. Using difference-in-difference methodology, I find that the central government program leads to an increase in local investment from both government and private VCs, which doubles the number of successful companies. The positive impact is most pronounced in relatively less developed regions and during the early development of the VC sector. I present two micro-level transmission channels of the crowding-in effects, through networks formed by previous investments and through co-ownership in VC affiliates.