Strengthening disclosure regulation and improving disclosure quality are central to China's transition to a full registration system and crucial for preventing capital market risks. Using prospectuses disclosed by IPOs on the STAR Market, ChiNext, and the Beijing Stock Exchange from 2019 to 2023, this study constructs four textual indicators from prospectuses—length, sentence complexity, technical term density, and uncertainty—and examines how they affect resource allocation efficiency under the registration system. We find that text length and sentence complexity improve resource allocation efficiency, consistent with an information effectiveness effect. In contrast, technical term density and uncertainty reduce efficiency, reflecting information redundancy. Further analysis shows that the registration system reform enhances the comprehensiveness and complexity of disclosures, but its net effect on efficiency depends on the balance between information effectiveness and redundancy. This study contributes to the international literature on “institutional environment—disclosure—resource allocation” with evidence from an emerging market, while also extending theories of information asymmetry and impression management. Our findings support Chinese regulators in optimizing prospectus standards and strengthening review oversight, and provide policy insights for other emerging markets seeking to improve capital allocation through more effective disclosure design.

This paper documents that the physical appearance of CEOs, specifically excess body weight, is priced in the capital market. In the absence of explicit health disclosures,market participants interpret obesity as a proxy for latent health risks and potential managerial disrupts, thereby demanding a compensation premium. Our analysis reveals that (1) IPOs of firms with obese CEOs have lower first-day performance, (2) these firms achieve a lower valuation, (3) the stocks of these firms have lower liquidity and (4) they provide higher stock returns thereafter. A quasi-natural experiment based on the invention of anti-obesity medications provides supporting causal evidence.

This paper examines how profits from mutual funds’ participation in initial public offerings (IPOs) shape fund performance, investor flows, and market stability in China. Using comprehensive fund–IPO matched data from 2016 to 2023, we decompose fund returns into an IPO-lottery component and residual performance. At the aggregate level, IPO allocations add 2.05% to annualized excess returns; net of IPOs, excess return is −0.35% per year. At the individual level, the contribution of IPO profits varies substantially across funds and is most pronounced among mid-sized funds, inflating perceived managerial skill. Funds with higher IPO-driven gains attract greater inflows despite the absence of performance persistence, leading to capital misallocation. At the market level, IPO-profit-induced trading (PIT) predicts short horizon price run-ups that dissipate and reverse over subsequent months, while raising both total and idiosyncratic volatility. Overall, IPO profits temporarily enhance reported performance but erode market stability by propagating non-fundamental shocks through secondary markets.

We examine a unique phenomenon among exchange traded funds (ETFs) in the Chinese stock market, finding that ETFs pervasively participate in initial public offerings (IPOs) to profit from underpricing. The ETF IPO participation passes primary market benefits to retail investors, providing benefits from hard-to-reach investment opportunities. These active moves showing ETFs are not entirely passive highlight the gains of the active management. However, we observe that this activity leads to increased non-fundamental volatility and short-term return reversals, as well as decreased investment-q sensitivity among ETF member stocks, presenting a negative externality. Using a policy shock as the quasi-natural experiment, we establish the causality of these effects, underscoring the dual nature of ETFs active management.

Culture and experience associate A with superior quality. In the marketing of dual-class IPOs, issuers are mindful of this preference. For years after IPO issuance, inferior voting rights shares labeled Class A enjoy higher market valuations and smaller voting premiums than do Class B shares.

The Chinese earnings yield differential relative to the U.S. switches from negative to positive around 2009, with the aggregate variation masking substantial cross-sector variation. Changes in sectoral composition and (changing) growth expectations are not important determinants of the variation in China-U.S. valuation differentials. Instead, changes in ownership structure, and most importantly cross-sectional and temporal variation in financial openness, are the key contributors. In addition, we show that IPOs in the banking sector and its internationalization played a critical role in the (relative) valuation change.

This article aims to provide an in-depth and comprehensive analysis of PRC Securities Law 2020 which overhauls China’s securities regulatory framework to construct more efficient and transparent capital markets with enhanced investor protection and market integrity. The law constrains regulators’ administrative powers in deciding the outcome of IPOs as well as streamline the securities offering procedure. This article pays attention to key reform initiatives proposed by PRC Securities Law 2020, such as the registration-based IPO system, the enhanced investor protection and compensation regime, the cross-border supervision, and the harsher punishments for securities frauds. It also discusses the latest enforcement cases relating to high-profile financial frauds like the Luckin Coffee scandal which resulted in Luckin Coffee being delisted from NASDAQ in 2020. The analysis in the article is accompanied by relevant US securities law in the same area to offer a comparative angle, which is of interest to practitioners, academics and policymakers in major financial centres.

The inelastic markets hypothesis states that the aggregate stock market price elasticity of demand is small, implying that flows have large impacts on prices. We exploit demand shocks created as investor funds are frozen and unfrozen during Chinese IPOs to estimate the impact of demand shocks on the Chinese stock market. Using brokerage account records, we observe the selling and buying as investors raise cash to subscribe for IPOs and then reinvest the funds that supported unsuccessful subscriptions. Using an instrumental variables estimator we find that a 10 bps demand shock increases stock prices by between 30 and 48 bps.

More than one in five listed firms in China initiate dividend payments during the year right before their initial public offerings (IPOs). This tendency, which seems to contradict the purpose of raising capital, constitutes the pre-IPO dividend puzzle. This paper examines this puzzle using manually collected Chinese data from 2006 to 2019. We find that firms initiating pre-IPO dividends tend to have lower IPO underpricing than non-initiating firms. We also find that the effect of pre-IPO dividend initiation on IPO underpricing is more pronounced for firms with stronger pre-IPO growth and profitability. Additional analyses indicate that initiating firms have better pre- and post-IPO operating performance and post-IPO stock performance. Moreover, initiating firms pay more dividends and have significantly higher investor attention after the IPOs. Collectively, the pre-IPO dividend initiation is not a short-term strategic behavior of low-quality firms but is intended to send positive signals and improve investors’ stock valuation.

We study how institutional investors utilize potentially biased information by analyzing the e ect of IPO underwriters' earnings forecasts on investors' bidding behaviors in Chinese IPO auctions. Despite the presence of upward biases in underwriters' earnings forecasts, we  nd that investors' bid prices are higher in IPOs with higher earnings forecasts. The investors' positive reaction to biased information can be explained in a rational expectation model where the underwriter has valuable information about the IPO but has a biased incentive in presenting the information to investors. Consistent with the model's predictions, we  nd that an investor's bid price is more sensitive to the underwriter's earnings forecast when the forecast bias is expected to be smaller, when the relative precision of the underwriter's information over the investor's information is higher, and when the investor has a higher valuation of the IPO.