How does executive authority affect household behavior? I develop a model in which the executive branch of the government is partially constrained. These constraints credibly limit intervention under normal conditions but can be overridden when a sufficiently large fraction of the population is in distress. Households anticipate this and strategically coordinate their financial risks through public markets, creating collective distress that compels government bailouts. Weaker constraints lower the threshold for intervention, making implicit guarantees more likely. The model explains why implicit guarantees are prevalent in China and predicts that such guarantees may discontinuously emerge elsewhere as executive constraints gradually weaken.

This paper examines the consequences of Chinese regulators deviating from a long-standing full bailout policy in addressing the distress of a city-level commercial bank. This policy shift led to a persistent widening of credit spreads and a significant decline in funding ratios for negotiable certificates of deposit issued by small banks relative to large ones. Our empirical analysis reveals a novel contagion mechanism driven by reduced confidence in future bailouts (implicit non-guarantee), contributing to the subsequent collapse of other small banks. However, in the longer term, this policy shift improved price efficiency, credit allocation, and discouraged risk-taking among small banks.

This paper investigates the consequences of Chinese regulators deviating from a long-standing full bailout policy in addressing a city-level commercial bank’s distress. This event led to a persistent widening of credit spreads and a significant decline in funding ratios for negotiable certificates of deposit issued by small banks relative to large ones. Our empirical analysis pinpoints a novel contagion mechanism marked by diminished confidence in bank bailouts, which accounts for the subsequent collapse of several other small banks. However, the erosion of confidence in government guarantees enhances price efficiency and credit allocation while discouraging risk taking among small banks.

The foreign capital flight amid pandemic outbreaks can result in propagation effects in the equity market. With a daily shareholding dataset, this paper investigates the trading behavior of foreign mutual funds in China when it was the epicenter of COVID-19 outbreaks and the subsequent period with global spreads. Using fixed effects and panel structural VAR models, we confirm propagation effects caused by the capital flight of foreign mutual funds. Substantial heterogeneities across foreign funds affiliated and unaffiliated with commercial banks have been uncovered, though they are both found to withdraw from risky stocks as an indication of a "flight to quality." Without implicit guarantees, unaffiliated foreign mutual funds liquidated immediately and more when the pandemic hit China. The resulting price shocks led to further deleverage by bank-affiliated foreign funds on their pre-pandemic risk exposure stocks. Our results shed new light on the behavioral theory of stock market trading featuring fund and stock exposure channels.

Bank bailouts are systemic in China, having been extended to nearly all distressed banks, including those with no systemic importance. This paper investigates the consequences of regulators seizing control of Baoshang Bank, the country’s first bank failure in two decades. Despite the numerous liquidity and credit provision measures immediately implemented by bank regulators, we find that the collapse of this city-level commercial bank significantly exacerbated funding conditions in the market for negotiable certificates of deposit (NCD), resulting in liquidity distress for other banks. Our empirical analysis demonstrates that the spillover of Baoshang’s collapse is disproportionately concentrated in systemically unimportant (SU) banks, owing to diminished market confidence in government bailouts of SU banks, or implicit nonguarantee. We employ a difference-in-differences approach to show that the Baoshang event had a persistent and significant effect on SU banks’ NCD issuance, increasing credit spreads by 21.9 bps and the likelihood of issuance failure by 6.3%. Our empirical framework further enables us to examine the impact of China’s long-standing guarantee of SU banks, which we find impairs price efficiency, undermines market discipline, encourages excessive risk taking, and raises equity prices.

Although implicit guarantees are widely used in the shadow banking system, we know very little about its qualitative and quantitative properties. In this paper, we use a micro-level data set on China's shadow bank products to quantify the risk of implicit guarantees. We find a robust empirical fact that banks extend more implicit guarantees to their shadow bank debt (i.e., wealth management products) when their own default risks increase. Our result shows that this effect is particularly stronger when riskier banks plan to issue certificates of deposits in the interbank market. A simple model that is based on a signaling game is proposed to rationalize this fact. The key mechanism of the model is that as a bank's reputation becomes worse, it has stronger incentives to send positive signals to the market, i.e., to boost the realized returns of its shadow bank obligations, although it has no obligation to do so. Our findings show that implicit guarantees have nonlinear negative effects on bank fundamentals and the risk-weight of off-balance-sheet exposure should be increasing in banks' default risks.

China's local government debt financing grows rapidly featuring surging chengtou bond issuance and risk exposure since the global financial crisis in 2008. The accumulation of local government debt poses systemic risks to China's fiscal and financial systems. Using weekly data from 2009 to 2014, this paper studies the joint dynamics and risk transmission mechanism between chengtou bond spreads and treasury yields under the framework of the extended no-arbitrage Nelson-Seigel term structure model, which guarantees the no-arbitrage relationship between treasury yields of different maturities. The results show that the chengtou bonds indeed exhibit considerable local risks and can lead to systemic risk of the treasury bonds, such that the treasury yields have significant component of risk premium due to chengtou risk. On the other hand, as the safest asset in China at present, the treasury yields with short-to-medium maturities decrease as a result of the “fly-to-safety" effect when the chengtou risk increases. Meanwhile, the dynamics of chengtou bond spreads reflect the market-oriented risk pricing by investors on credit and liquidity risks under limitations of the government implicit guarantee. Under this condition, it is the right timing to reasonably standardize and institutionalize the local government bond market with transparent market mechanism.