The widespread replacement of gross receipt tax (GRT) with value-added tax (VAT) is an important phenomenon in the past half-century. Theory predicts that such tax reforms reduce vertical integration, increase production efficiency, and improve industrial structure. We exploit the tax reform that replaced GRT with VAT for service industries in China and find empirical evidence consistent with theoretical predictions. First, the tax reform increases the probability and intensity of outsourcing for both manufacturing and service firms. The increase is larger for industries more heavily reliant on treated intermediate industries for production and for firms with higher capital–labor intensity. Second, the reform increases total factor productivity and labor productivity. Third, the reform affects industry structure by boosting sales and promoting the employment of treated service industries.

Motivated by diverse anecdotal evidences from the Chinese markets and focusing on a technologically following firm, this paper analyzes how the managerial compensation structure affects the managerial innovative incentives, the vertical differential output competition, and the evolutions of the industry structure. To this end, multiple effects of quality improvements are identified. The managerial conservatism in taking risky product innovations, which is resulted from the obliteration of the cost-adjusting effect by trivial incentive weight, is aggravated by foregone conservatisms. This leads to the widening of the quality gaps between it and the leading firm, and the deterioration of its market performances. After fulfilling an innovation, however, the firm becomes complacent. Driven by these two tendencies, the percentage of the industries in which the following firms abandon their R&D activities forever is decreasing in their incentive weights and increasing in time. The extensions of the process innovation, the managerial innovative agressiveness, and the interactions between product innovation and process innovation are also examined, as well as the implications of the compensation structure of the leading firm and the spillovers.

During the reform era, the Chinese government has been carrying out strategic industrial policies modelled on those in post-war Japan and South Korea, in the hope of transforming its highly fragmented manufacturing sector into one that comprises a small number of internationally competitive big businesses. Using the evolution of the Chinese steel industry structure from the late 1980s to the early 2000s as a case in point, this paper finds that the Chinese government's consolidation attempts have, by and large, not been very successful. The disappointing policy outcome is interpreted by a detailed examination of the industry policy mechanism in China. It is concluded that the institutional framework of the Chinese state differs from its counterparts in Korea and Japan in some fundamental aspects. Among these, the fragmented and uncoordinated Chinese bureaucracy contributes significantly to the inefficacy of policy implementation.

摘要：新疆德隆集团是中国西部最大的民营企业集团，自从涉足资本证券市场以来，一直以其出色的经营业绩和成功的资本运营模式雄称深沪股市。通过买壳上市，德隆在资本市场上筹措巨额资金，并以资本运作为杠杆，层层并购，迅速取得产业整合的控制权和操作权，因而其资本运作模式被誉为“后巴菲特模式”。几年来，德隆成功收购了新疆屯河、合金股份、湘火炬等企业，在中国股市形成了德隆系，奠定了其产业基础。打造了中国资本王国的神话。本文采用财务分析、二级市场表现及累计超额收益率（CAR）来考察这三家上市股市的并购绩效，从而既考虑了绩效产生所需的时间因素，又兼顾了并购在证券市场中的短期效应。研究表明，这三家企业在被德隆收购后均获得骄人的业绩：财务指标逐年上升，三家2002年主营业务收入分别较并购前上升了1354%，1787%和5306%；股价神奇飙升。究其原因是德隆成功地发挥了其自身核心竞争力――“整合力”，因此德隆的产业整合经营理念，为新疆乃至中国的产业结构调整提供了新思路，标志着投资理念的一次阶段性飞跃。 Abstract: XinJiang D’Long Group, the biggest private agglomeration in western China, acquits itself well in stock market depending on the excellent operating performance and successful capital-operating mode. Through buying “shell”(listed corporate) to go public, D’Long raises money in capital market and acquisitions step by step. Soon, it gets control and operating power of industrial integration. The capital operation mode is also called “Post-Buffett Mode”. Over the years, D’Long merges XinJiang TunHe, ShenYang HeJin, Xiang HuoJu, forming the D’Long Series and creating the legend of capital kingdom. Using accounting study, stock price and Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) respectively, the paper analyzes the M&A effects of the three corporate and finds their excellent performance. And all these results can be attributed to D’Long’s great power of integration. Therefore, D’Long’s idea of industrial integration provides a new train of thought for adjusting the industry structure of XinJiang, and even the whole China.