This study investigates the impact of analysts' information source diversity on forecast bias and investment returns. We combine the GPT-4o model and text similarity, to extract the names of information sources from the text of analyst in-depth reports. Using 349,200 sources, we calculate information diversity scores based on the variety of data sources to measure analysts’ ability of selecting relevant information. The findings reveal that higher information diversity significantly reduces forecast bias and enhances portfolio returns. The effect is particularly pronounced for large companies, state-owned enterprises, those with low analyst coverage, low firm-specific experience, and reports with positive forecast revisions. Institutional investors recognize the value of this skill, while retail investors remain largely unaware, which contributes to financial inequality. This study highlights the critical role of information diversity in analyst performance.

We investigate the impact of financial geographic density on corporate financial asset holdings in emerging market. We proxy for financial geographic density by calculating the number of financial institutions around a firm within a certain radius based on the geographic distance between the firm and financial institutions. Using data on publicly listed A-share firms in China from 2011 to 2021, we find that financial geographic density has a positive impact on nonfinancial firms’ financial asset investments, especially for the firms located in regions with a larger number of banking depository financial institutions or facing greater market competition. An increase in the number of financial institutions surrounding firms increases corporate financial asset holdings by alleviating information asymmetry. Moreover, we document that Fintech has little impact on the relationship between financial geographic density and corporate financial asset holdings. As the rise of financial geographic density, firms hold more financial assets for precautionary motives, which contribute to corporate innovation.

Why is price momentum absent in China? Since momentum is commonly considered arising from investors’ under-reaction to fundamental news, we decompose monthly stock returns into news- and non-news-driven components and document a news day return continuation along with an offsetting non-news day reversal in China. The non-news day reversal is particularly strong for stocks with high retail ownership, relatively less recent positive news articles, and limits to arbitrage. Evidence on order imbalance suggests that stock returns overshoot on news days due to retail investors' excessive attention-driven buying demands, and mispricing gets corrected by institutional investors on subsequent non-news days. To avoid this tug-of-war in stock price, we use a signal that directly captures the recent news performance and re-document a momentum-like underreaction to fundamental news in China.

Reputation is widely regarded as a stabilizing factor in financial institutions, reducing capital constraints and enhancing firm resilience. However, in the insurance industry, where capital requirements are shaped by solvency regulations and policyholder behavior, the effects of reputation on capital management remain unclear. This paper examines the unintended consequences of reputation in insurance asset-liability management, focusing on its impact on capital allocation. Using a novel reputation risk measure based on large language models (LLMs) and actuarial models, we show that reputation shifts influence surrender rates, altering capital requirements. While higher reputation reduces surrender risk, it increases capital demand for investment-oriented insurance products, whereas protection products remain largely unaffected. These findings challenge the conventional wisdom that reputation always eases capital constraints, highlighting the need for insurers to integrate reputation management with capital planning to avoid unintended capital strain.

We introduce a novel perspective on private information, specifically microstructure-based private information, to unravel how institutional investors predict stock returns. Using tick-by-tick transaction data from the Chinese stock market, we find that in retail-dominated markets, institutional investors positively predict stock returns, consistent with findings from institution-dominated markets. However, in contrast to the traditional view that institutional investors primarily rely on value-based private information, our results indicate that microstructure-based private information contributes almost as much to their predictive power as value-based private information does, with both components jointly accounting for approximately two-thirds of the total predictive power of institutional order flow. This finding reveals that retail investors’ trading activities significantly impact institutional investors, naturally forcing them to balance firm value information with microstructure information, thus profoundly influencing the price discovery process in the stock market.

Recent studies highlight the resurgence of state capitalism, with the state increasingly acting as equity investors in private firms. Why do state--business equity ties, including partial and indirect state ownership in private firms, proliferate in weakly institutionalized contexts like China? While conventional wisdom emphasizes state-driven explanations based on static evidence, I argue that regulatory risk reshapes business preferences, prompting firms to seek state investors and expanding state--business equity ties. These ties facilitate information exchange and signal political endorsement under regulatory scrutiny. Focusing on China's crackdown on the Internet and IT sectors, difference-in-differences analyses of all investments from 2016 to 2022 reveal a rise in state--business equity ties post-crackdown. In-depth interviews with investors along with quantitative analysis, demonstrate that shifts in business preferences drive this change. This study shows the resurgence of state capitalism is driven not only by the state but also by businesses in response to regulatory risks.

We investigate the unintended real effects of regulator-led minority shareholder activism on corporate innovation. We use manually collected data from the China Securities Investor Services Center (CSISC), a novel regulatory investor protection institution controlled by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) that holds 100 shares of every listed firm. We find that by exercising its shareholder rights, the CSISC substantially curtails the innovation output of targeted firms. This effect is amplified in cases involving a high level of myopic pressure and few innovation incentives. We further observe variation in the real effects of different intervention methods. Textual analysis reveals that CSISC intervention with a myopic topic and negative tone contributes to a decrease in innovation. The results of a mechanism analysis support the hypothesis that regulator-led minority shareholder activism induces managerial myopia and financial constraints, impeding corporate innovation. Furthermore, CSISC intervention not only diminishes innovation output but also undermines innovation efficiency. In summary, our findings suggest that regulator-led minority shareholder activism exacerbates managerial myopia to cater to investors and financial constraints, ultimately stifling corporate innovation.

Individual institutions marginal contributions to the systemic risk contain predictive power for its potential future exposure and provide early warning signals to regulators and the public. We use higher-order co-skewness and co-kurtosis to construct systemic risk contribution measures, which allow us to identify and characterize the co-movement driving the asymmetry and tail behavior of the joint distribution of asset returns. We illustrate the usefulness of higher-order moment augmented approach by using 4868 stocks living in the Chinese market from June 2002 to March 2022. The empirical results show that these higher-order moment measures convey useful information for systemic risk contribution measurement and portfolio selection, complementary to the information extracted from a standard principal components analysis.

Site visits allow visitors to physically inspect productive resources and interact with onsite employees and executives face-to-face. We posit that, by allowing visitors to acquire investmentrelated information and monitor the management team, site visits offer disciplinary benefits for corporate investments. Using mandatory disclosures of site visits in China, we find that corporate investments become more responsive to growth opportunities as the intensity of site visits increases, consistent with the notion that site visits yield disciplinary benefits. We also find that the positive association between site visits and investment efficiency is more pronounced when visitors can glean more investment-related information and when they have stronger incentives and greater power to monitor managers. This positive association is also stronger among firms with more severe agency problems and higher asset tangibility. The overall evidence supports the notion that site visits serve as a unique venue for institutional investors and financial analysts to acquire valuable information and serve a monitoring function, which generates disciplinary benefits for corporate investments.

Based on institutions' general role and the specialty of motivated investors' relatively larger stake, we examine whether ownership by motivated investors is associated with the focal firm's ESG rating disagreement in China. Our results suggest that ownership by motivated investors can decrease the focal firm's ESG rating disagreement. That relationship is strengthened by a better internal or external information environment. What's more, ownership by motivated investors can increase the quality of ESG disclosure and the level of consensus ESG rating. ESG rating disagreement increases stock return volatility and price synchronicity, while motivated investors can mitigate those negative effects. Our results confirm that motivated investors have greater incentive and capability to discipline managers and influence corporate policies and actions even in an emerging market with weak investor protection and the popularity of exploration by ultimate controllers. That would shed valuable insights into the high-quality development of other emerging markets, especially those in south-east Asian.