While unintentional man-made disasters constitute the majority of man-made catastrophes, empirical evidence on their economic consequences remains scarce. Utilizing a unique dataset on extremely severe accidents (ESAs) in China and a nationally representative longitudinal household survey, we find that unintentional man-made disasters reduce individuals' willingness to take risks. We further demonstrate that the severity of official penalties following ESAs is positively correlated with both fatalities and economic losses, yet these punitive measures fail to mitigate the negative impact on risk preferences. Additionally, we find that ESAs reduce demand for riskier, high-return-oriented insurance products, though they do not diminish demand for protection-oriented, non-investment productslike health insurance. Our findings address a critical gap in the literature regarding the effects of unintentional manmade disasters on risk attitudes and insurance demand.

Climate change is increasing the risks of weather-related disasters in many regions around the world. This has an adverse socio-economic impact on households, farmers and small businesses. Some strategies for effectively managing climate related disasters include index based insurance products, which are increasingly offered as alternatives to traditional insurance, particularly in low-income countries. However, the uptake of index insurance remains low, which can be partially attributed to the inherent problem of basis risk. This review assesses the problem of

Low demand for crop insurance, even when subsidized at highly favorable rates, remains a challenge for policymakers in developing countries attempting to create insurance-based farm safety nets. Evidence from a series of surveys and experiments with 477 vegetable farmers in China reveals several anomalies in farmers’ demand for crop insurance as well as deviations from predictions under both expected utility theory and cumulative prospect theory. Farmers are willing to pay higher price for neutral-frame risk protection tool than for an insurance-frame equivalent. Moreover, they tend to be more likely to purchase low-coverage than high-coverage insurance, even when high coverage provides greater subsidized value. Among risk- and loss-averse farmers, who theoretically should be more interested in adopting risk protection tools, we find less willingness to purchase high-coverage level insurance.