This paper investigates how government fiscal constraints transmit to the private sector through procurement. We exploit three rounds of VAT rate cuts in China (2017–2019) as exogenous shocks to local government revenues. Combining city-level fiscal pressure measures with 9,189 procurement contracts from A-share listed firms, we construct a firm-year exposure index weighted by procurement volumes across cities. We find that exposure to fiscally stressed government buyers significantly depresses firm valuation: a one-standard-deviation increase reduces Tobin's Q and price-to-sales ratios by 5.3% and 4.3%, respectively. This effect concentrates among private firms, those lacking industrial policy support, and firms with lower rent-seeking expenditures—precisely those with weaker bargaining power against government counterparties. Beyond valuation, such exposure leads to a subsequent deterioration in firm fundamentals, characterized by tightened liquidity constraints, reduced investment and financing, and worse information disclosure over a three-year horizon. Land finance partially buffers these effects. Our findings highlight an unintended micro-level consequence of macro fiscal policy: expansionary tax cuts designed to stimulate the private sector may inadvertently harm firms by weakening the government's capacity to fulfill procurement payments.

This paper examines how auction design can unintentionally facilitate bidder collusion in land market. Departing from the dominant view that attributes low land concession revenues to corruption, we highlight how features of auction structure enable bidder-side collusion, suppressing sale prices. Using a dataset of land auctions from 15 Chinese cities (2006–2016), we find that two-stage (listing) auctions are significantly more susceptible to collusion than one-stage formats. Empirical evidence shows that sales concluding at the (secret) reserve price occur disproportionately in two-stage auctions, even after controlling for land and market characteristics. We argue that the transparency and sequencing of two-stage auctions, while designed to enhance fairness, inadvertently reduce monitoring costs and facilitate tacit bidder coordination. Our findings underscore the need to jointly consider auction format and reserve price policy in designing land sales to enhance market efficiency and mitigate collusion risks.

China’s land market features a substantial industrial discount: industrial-zoned land is an order of magnitude cheaper than residential land. In contrast to explanations centered on subsidies to industry, we find that a primary determinant of this price gap is local public finance. Under the "land finance" system, land sales are an important source of revenues for Chinese local governments. We show that local governments, who serve as monopolistic land sellers in China, face a trade-off between supplying residential or industrial land that is determined by the different time profiles of revenues from industrial and residential land sales, local governments’ financial constraints, and the extent of local governments’ tax revenue sharing with other levels of government.