This paper examines how auction design can unintentionally facilitate bidder collusion in land market. Departing from the dominant view that attributes low land concession revenues to corruption, we highlight how features of auction structure enable bidder-side collusion, suppressing sale prices. Using a dataset of land auctions from 15 Chinese cities (2006–2016), we find that two-stage (listing) auctions are significantly more susceptible to collusion than one-stage formats. Empirical evidence shows that sales concluding at the (secret) reserve price occur disproportionately in two-stage auctions, even after controlling for land and market characteristics. We argue that the transparency and sequencing of two-stage auctions, while designed to enhance fairness, inadvertently reduce monitoring costs and facilitate tacit bidder coordination. Our findings underscore the need to jointly consider auction format and reserve price policy in designing land sales to enhance market efficiency and mitigate collusion risks.

China’s land market features a substantial industrial discount: industrial-zoned land is an order of magnitude cheaper than residential land. In contrast to explanations centered on subsidies to industry, we find that a primary determinant of this price gap is local public finance. Under the "land finance" system, land sales are an important source of revenues for Chinese local governments. We show that local governments, who serve as monopolistic land sellers in China, face a trade-off between supplying residential or industrial land that is determined by the different time profiles of revenues from industrial and residential land sales, local governments’ financial constraints, and the extent of local governments’ tax revenue sharing with other levels of government.