This paper illustrates how firms with publicly disclosed political connections use subsidiaries to obtain preferential treatment in land markets. While the headquarters of politically connected listed firms pay land prices comparable to those paid by other firms, their subsidiaries receive discounts of 12.1%–13.2%. These discounts are more pronounced when land is acquired through less transparent methods, in regions with weaker institutional environments, and among private firms. The anti-corruption campaign launched in 2012 effectively mitigates corruption-related discounts, with the magnitude of the discounts negatively associated with campaign intensity. Additionally, larger discounts for subsidiaries are observed following greater charitable donations, suggesting a reciprocal relationship between firms and officials. Overall, the findings contribute to a broader understanding of how firms with publicly disclosed political ties use complex corporate structures to engage in rent-seeking behavior.

The past three decades have witnessed the boom of patents and mounting place-based innovation policies (PIPs) in China. However, the PIP-innovation nexus, particularly the distortion effect and underlying mechanisms, remains poorly understood. Matching micro-level patent data and industrial firm data, we documented a promotion effect of PIPs on local firm innovation measured by both patent quantity and quality. Moreover, we observed a distortion effect on patent quality following the 2008 crisis, primarily originating from privately owned enterprises rather than stateowned ones. Drawing from theories of technological learning and the unique institutional characteristics of PIPs in China, we have further unpacked the underlying mechanisms driving these effects: Both industry-academia collaboration and foreign direct investment play significant roles in the PIP-innovation nexus, and the latter appears to be particularly influential in causing the distortion effect. Additionally, our analysis has revealed that preferential policies, such as patent subsidies and reductions in land prices, are instrumental in enabling PIPs to exert their impact.

Using land transaction data in China, we investigate whether and how political connections penetrate through headquarter-subsidiary relationships. The results show that even though the headquarters of politically connected listed firms pay comparable land prices as other firms, their subsidiaries pay 12.1-13.2% less. The price discount, driven by corruption, is exacerbated when the land is for commercial or residential use and is disposed of through informationally opaque supply methods. The anti-corruption campaign has successfully mitigated such price distortions. Our findings also show that better legal protection and private sector development are crucial for fair markets.