The past three decades have witnessed the boom of patents and mounting place-based innovation policies (PIPs) in China. However, the PIP-innovation nexus, particularly the distortion effect and underlying mechanisms, remains poorly understood. Matching micro-level patent data and industrial firm data, we documented a promotion effect of PIPs on local firm innovation measured by both patent quantity and quality. Moreover, we observed a distortion effect on patent quality following the 2008 crisis, primarily originating from privately owned enterprises rather than stateowned ones. Drawing from theories of technological learning and the unique institutional characteristics of PIPs in China, we have further unpacked the underlying mechanisms driving these effects: Both industry-academia collaboration and foreign direct investment play significant roles in the PIP-innovation nexus, and the latter appears to be particularly influential in causing the distortion effect. Additionally, our analysis has revealed that preferential policies, such as patent subsidies and reductions in land prices, are instrumental in enabling PIPs to exert their impact.

We investigate whether and how political connections penetrate through headquarter-subsidiary relationships. Our results show that even though the headquarters of politically connected listed firms pay comparable land prices as other firms, their subsidiaries pay 12.1-13.2% less. The price discount, driven by corruption rather than government subsidies, is exacerbated when the land is sold through informationally opaque supply methods and when land is for commercial or residential use. The anti-corruption campaign has successfully mitigated such price distortions. Our findings also show that better legal protection and private sector development are crucial for fair markets.

Using land transaction data in China, we investigate whether and how political connections penetrate through headquarter-subsidiary relationships. The results show that even though the headquarters of politically connected listed firms pay comparable land prices as other firms, their subsidiaries pay 12.1-13.2% less. The price discount, driven by corruption, is exacerbated when the land is for commercial or residential use and is disposed of through informationally opaque supply methods. The anti-corruption campaign has successfully mitigated such price distortions. Our findings also show that better legal protection and private sector development are crucial for fair markets.