The global AI inference market—reaching approximately $90–100 billion annually and growing at 18% CAGR—operates without organized exchange infrastructure. We document three market failures: resource misallocation (80% of China’s newly built compute capacity sits idle), price opacity (100-fold price dispersion across providers of equivalent quality), and unhedged risk exposure (85% of enterprises miss AI cost forecasts by more than 10%). Following the market design tradition of Roth [2002] and Budish et al. [2015], we propose the AI Service Right (ASR) as a transferable property right on AI compute and the AI Service Unit (ASU) as a quality-adjusted, cross-platform unit of account grounded in hedonic price theory [Rosen, 1974]. The ASU is modality-neutral: billing prices across text, image, video, and speech modalities are unified via eq-token conversion factors (κimg ≈ 2,667 eq-tokens per image; κvid ≈ 2,667 per second of video; κspc ≈ 7 per second of audio), and modality-appropriate benchmark sets (MMLU/HumanEval for language; FID/CLIP Score for image; FVD/CLIPSIM for video; MMBench for multimodal) supply the quality in dex via PCA. We design a hybrid secondary market architecture synthesizing mechanisms from four orthogonal market traditions: foreign exchange markets (cross-platform exchange rates and PPP-analog arbitrage via the ASU); equity markets (Central Limit Order Book, market making, clearing); electricity markets (Compute Locational Marginal Pricing for spatial scarcity signals); and decentralized finance (Automated Market Maker for long-tail liquidity). We establish nine formal propositions: bilateral trading is generically inefficient; Compute Locational Marginal Pricing decomposes nodal prices into system marginal cost, capacity congestion, and bandwidth premia; no-arbitrage equi librium holds with capital constraints (extending Shleifer and Vishny 1997); the ASR market Pareto-improves over bilateral trading; market prices are more in formative under ASR; the hybrid CLOB-AMM architecture weakly dominates either mechanism alone; platform adoption admits multiple equilibria with a coordination trap; financialization may improve or reduce price informativeness depending on speculator-hedger composition; and a hedonic micro-foundation justifies the ASU definition. Calibrated agent-based simulation (500 steps, 30 Monte Carlo runs) provides computational validation: the hybrid architecture reduces price dispersion by 90% relative to bilateral trading, and order-of-magnitude welfare estimates suggest enterprise procurement cost savings of 0.2–20% (net of ASR transaction costs; see Table 7) and potential TFP gains from compute reallocation of up to $29.9 billion annually. We propose a phased implementation roadmap from shadow ledger to full financialization, and we engage critically with the concern that financialization may not reduce intermediation costs [Philippon, 2015].

This paper examines bond trading activity and transaction cost differences between the bilateral Over-the-Counter (OTC) and the centralized Central Limit Order Book (CLOB) venues in the China interbank government bonds market, structured as all-to-all. Using a novel trade-level dataset, we estimate that CLOB reduces transaction costs by 0.66 basis points compared to OTC, highlighting the efficiency of its centralized trading mechanism. Furthermore, our analysis of cross-venue selection patterns reveals that the CLOB venue disproportionately facilitates core traders, orders with standardized sizes and settlement speeds, and newly issued bond trades. Despite CLOB’s cost advantages, the continued use of OTC is justified by its unique benefits, including mitigating information leakage, enabling designated counterparties, and facilitating position rebalancing. These findings offer insights into how market microstructure and trading mechanism affect asset liquidity.

This paper provides new evidence on the predictive power of retail trading for future stock returns using tick data from the Chinese stock market. We explore sources of the predictive power from the novel perspective that sophisticated retail investors may exploit predictive information by observing limit order book and inferring institutional trading intentions. Employing a two-stage decomposition approach, we decompose the retail order imbalance into four components and find that the component related to retail investors’ perception of institutional trading intentions significantly contributes to the predictive power of the retail order imbalance for future returns, accounting for more than 15%.